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ABSTRACT
Scholars have rarely examined the remedial issues that federal
courts may face when they find that an administrative agency has
acted unlawfully. This Article presents a broad survey of that topic in
the course of exploring a narrower doctrinal issue: the validity of
“remand without vacation.” That term denotes a practice whereby a
court remands an agency action for further work but allows the action
to remain in place during the remand proceedings. In recent years
many appellate panels have resorted to this practice in order to
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minimize disruption of an ongoing administrative program or to
protect private reliance interests.
Some argue that this very untraditional form of relief is prohibited
by section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides
that a reviewing court “shall . . . set aside” an agency action that
violates one of the review standards codified therein. This Article
contends, however, that section 706 should not be read literally, but
rather in light of a longstanding canon of statutory construction that
disfavors interpretations that would displace the equitable remedial
discretion of the federal courts. The Article traces the history of that
discretion in the administrative law context and examines its
numerous manifestations in modern case law.
The tradition of remedial discretion is not without limits, however.
Several recent cases, in which the Supreme Court has evinced a
preference for bright-line rules over equitable balancing, suggest that
at least some Justices would have doubts about remand without
vacation. Indeed, a peek at some of the Court’s internal working
papers confirms the existence of such doubts. Moreover, this remedial
device is subject to practical objections—most notably, that it might
unduly relax pressure on agencies to do their work carefully the first
time around, and discourage private citizens from initiating court
actions to challenge agency orders.
Nevertheless, this Article defends remand without vacation as a
legitimate exercise of discretion. The practice entails relatively simple
judgments, not drastically different from determinations that courts
have often made in the past. Moreover, the practical worries about the
device have not been borne out by experience to date. Accordingly,
the Article advocates continued but cautious use of remand without
vacation. Relying in part on guidelines endorsed by the American Bar
Association, the Article concludes by suggesting standards to guide
the courts’ exercise of discretion in this area.
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INTRODUCTION
A decade ago Professor Barry Friedman described the academic
literature on judicial remedies in constitutional litigation as
“noticeably sparse,” at least in comparison with the literature on
constitutional rights.1 In an accompanying footnote he listed thirty
articles as “[a]mong the most important” contributions to this
supposedly meager body of work.2 As a scholar who specializes in a
closely allied field of public law, I find myself wanting to reply: “You
call that sparse? In administrative law you’d have trouble finding half
a dozen.” Of course, the propensity of legal academe to focus on
constitutional issues more often than on administrative issues is not
news. But even so, this imbalance in the literature on judicial
remedies in public law seems disproportionate. The present Article
aspires to ameliorate the imbalance, at least to some extent.
To be sure, there is no dearth of relevant scholarship if one
thinks of the entire field of judicial review of administrative action as
a branch of the law of remedies. The voluminous literature on judicial
review of agencies—ranging from “access” issues such as preclusion
and standing through scope of review topics such as the hard look
doctrine and principles of deference—can be seen as spelling out the
1. Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 735, 736 (1992).
2. Id. at 736 n.4. Friedman’s compilation did not even include the vast literature on 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), the major implementing statute used as a framework for
constitutional litigation.
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“remedial” implications of such “substantive” statutes as the
securities laws, the immigration laws, and the labor laws.3 This
Article, however, picks up where most of these analyses leave off. My
focus is on remedial issues that arise within a judicial review
proceeding. Assume that a challenger has invoked judicial review and
has demonstrated to a court’s satisfaction that an agency did act
unlawfully. What remedial options does the court have at that point?
The scholarship on that question is, indeed, “noticeably sparse.”4
Now it may be supposed that the relative shortage of literature
on the remedial aspects of judicial review of administrative action is
attributable to the simplicity of the problem. For most of the
relatively brief history of administrative law, the court’s proper course
when it deems an action unlawful has been considered self-evident:
the court declares the action void and sends it back to the agency for
further consideration. That remedy is, indeed, the courts’ normal
course of action.5
Consider, however, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Idaho Farm
Bureau Federation v. Babbitt.6 In that case, the Fish and Wildlife
Service issued a regulation that listed the Bruneau Hot Springs Snail
as an endangered species. Farm groups, whose members wanted to
pump water from the stream in which the snail lived, sought judicial
3. See generally LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 152–
96 (1965) (devoting a chapter to “The System of Judicial Remedies,” meaning the system by
which litigants gain access to the courts in administrative cases).
4. Among the limited exceptions are: JAFFE, supra note 3, at 713–20 (discussing remands
in a tellingly brief section of his treatise); 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 18.4 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter PIERCE TREATISE] (describing types of injunctions
available); Toni M. Fine, Agency Requests for “Voluntary” Remand: A Proposal for the
Development of Judicial Standards, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1079 (1996); James O. Freedman, The Uses
and Limits of Remand in Administrative Law: Staleness of the Record, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 145
(1966); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 562–75
(1985) (discussed infra Part IV.B.1). In addition, a literature on remands without vacation has
emerged. See infra note 13. Empirical studies of remands include William S. Jordan, III,
Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency
Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393
(2000); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1043–54, 1059–60; Stephen F. Williams,
“Hybrid Rulemaking” Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis,
42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 331
(1976) (“If the decision of the agency ‘is not sustainable on the administrative record made, then
the . . . decision must be vacated and the matter remanded . . . for further consideration.’”
(quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973))); Garland, supra note 4, at 568.
6. 58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995).
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review. They complained, in part, that the Service had issued the rule
illegally, because it had relied heavily on a report of the United States
Geologic Service without making the report available for public
examination and comment, as required by the Endangered Species
Act. The court of appeals agreed with this contention and ordered
that the regulation be returned to the agency, so that the proper
procedures could be followed.7 The court added, however, that the
regulation could remain in place during this period of further
consideration.8
Was the court right in allowing the rule to remain in effect during
remand proceedings? The court’s explanation was that, otherwise, the
snail species might become extinct, and the sums spent on the
government studies could turn out to have been wasted.9 This makes
a certain amount of practical sense, at least from the standpoint of the
agency (and, of course, the snail). Yet, on a formal level, the remedy
seems odd. The appeal was over, the court had condemned the rule as
invalid, and the farmers had “won,” yet their tangible situation was
almost the same as if they had lost. They would in all probability reap
no benefit from their “victory.” Why should a farmer have had to face
possible sanctions for drawing water from the stream where the snail
lived if the court had unequivocally ruled that the agency’s rule on the
subject was invalid?
A court’s decision, after full consideration, to pronounce an
agency action illegal, but to allow the action to continue in effect
anyway, is sometimes known as “remand without vacation.”10 This
Article presents an extensive evaluation of the validity and uses of
this device. Over the past decade, judicial resort to the device has
become a familiar feature of administrative law practice, especially in
the District of Columbia Circuit.11 The phenomenon is also spreading
7. Id. at 1406.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1405–06.
10. Some writers prefer the term “vacatur” to “vacation.” I prefer the latter, if only
because it is conducive to a livelier title for this Article. Lexicographers accept both terms. See
BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 1331 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (7th ed.
1999).
11. Remand without vacation has been described as the D.C. Circuit’s “general practice”
when the basis for the remand is inadequate reasoning. Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk:
Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 638 n.72
(1994). Today, I believe, this assessment would be an overstatement. In recent years the court
has used the device fairly selectively, probably in part because of the questions that have been
raised about its propriety.
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to other circuits.12 Use of the device has stimulated scholarly
attention,13 debate within the practicing bar, and even drama and
poetry!14 The circumstances that have led to its rise are explored in
Part I of this Article.
Among the questions surrounding remand without vacation is
whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) permits the courts
to exercise this option. The most immediate basis for doubt on this
score is that section 706 of that Act states that a reviewing court
“shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is found to
violate any of the review standards codified therein.15 In Checkosky v.
SEC,16 the D.C. Circuit divided as to whether section 706 actually
means, as its literal language appears to suggest, that a court is
compelled to “set aside” an agency action whenever it finds that the
action transgresses one of those review standards.17 Since Checkosky,
the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly acknowledged the questions raised by
12. Idaho Farm Bureau is one example. See also, e.g., Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates,
Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (remanding veterans
benefits rule because of inconsistencies in agency’s interpretations, but leaving the rule in place
to prevent disruption); Cent. Me. Power Co. v. FERC, 252 F.3d 34, 48 (1st Cir. 2001) (declining
to vacate an inadequately reasoned FERC rate order, because “the errors at issue can probably
be mended” and “the public interest in assuring [electric] power is decisive”); Cent. & S.W.
Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 220 F.3d 683, 692 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussed infra note 30). The practice may
have originated about two decades ago in Clean Air Act cases. See David B. Chaffin, Note,
Remedies for Noncompliance with Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act: A Critical
Evaluation of United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas, 1982 DUKE L.J. 461, 466–69
(discussing early cases).
13. See 1 PIERCE TREATISE, supra note 4, § 7.13 (endorsing remand without vacation);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 75–78
(1995) [hereinafter Pierce, Seven Ways] (same); Brian S. Prestes, Remanding Without Vacating
Agency Action, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 108 (2001) (criticizing remand without vacation); Frank
H. Wu & Denisha S. Williams, Remand Without Reversal: An Unfortunate Habit, 30 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10193 (2000) (same); Chaffin, supra note 12, at 476–78 (supporting remand without
vacation).
14. A 2002 bar program in Washington, D.C., featured a skit on remands without vacation,
with a script that included such couplets as: “You defeat a rule and the rule should be gone; /
But not quite so fast, you could be wrong. / The court can remand it but let it remain / While an
agency tries to do it over again! / What kind of result is this you say, / I’ve won this long battle
but not won the day?” David F. Zoll, Introductory Comments at the Prettyman-Leventhal
American Inn of Court 1 (May 13, 2002) (script on file with the Duke Law Journal).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (emphasis added).
16. 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
17. Compare id. at 462–66 (Silberman, J., separate opinion) (supporting remand without
vacation under certain circumstances), with id. at 490–93 (Randolph, J., separate opinion)
(rejecting the legality of remand without vacation).
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that case but has avoided confronting them head-on.18 As recently as
November 2002, another panel split on the issue.19 Part II of this
Article responds to that debate by providing, on a doctrinal level, a
relatively straightforward analysis to the effect that the “plain”
language of the APA does not settle the legal issue.
That conclusion, however, leads to a more complex doctrinal and
policy inquiry in Parts III and IV. The discussion in Part III asserts
that the legality of remand without vacation must be assessed against
the background of the federal courts’ tradition of remedial
discretion—a tradition that stems from the heritage of the old equity
courts and has been reinforced by more modern developments. I
survey several doctrinal areas in which the federal courts have
adhered to pragmatism and flexibility in prescribing remedies in
administrative law and related public law cases. In this fashion, the
topic of remand without vacation, which may seem too narrow to
warrant extended scrutiny in its own right, provides an opportunity to
make a broad assessment of the status of judicial remedies in modern
administrative law.
This discretion does have its limits, however, as I discuss in Part
IV. Indeed, in a few related contexts, the Supreme Court has quite
consciously curbed the remedial discretion of courts and agencies in
favor of bright-line restrictions. I will examine some significant
evidence (including some internal Court documents) suggesting that
the Court would find the stricter of the two views from Checkosky
quite attractive. Nevertheless, I suggest in this Article that, in the
specific context of remand without vacation, a relatively permissive
reading of the tradition of remedial discretion should prevail.
Having outlined a theoretical justification for remand without
vacation, the Article concludes by addressing issues of
implementation in Part V. One focus of attention is a set of
prudential guidelines proposed by the American Bar Association to
guide the courts’ discretionary choices in using this remedy. This
discussion illuminates, I hope, some of the practical considerations
that present themselves in this area, thereby lending further support
to the pragmatic approach favored by this Article. The manner in
18. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1135 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finessing the
Checkosky issue because parties had not raised it); Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d
1266, 1273 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same).
19. See Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 755–56 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (ordering
remand without vacation); id. at 757–58 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (rejecting legality of remand
without vacation).
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which remand without vacation is implemented is sure to evolve
(assuming it is ultimately held to be lawful), but an analysis of
developments to date should be helpful in clarifying the stakes in the
debate.
I.  THE EMERGENCE OF REMANDS WITHOUT VACATION
Until recently, reviewing courts routinely vacated agency actions
that they found to have been rendered unlawfully. That practice was
generally accepted and essentially taken for granted.20 Had the courts
ever paused to analyze it, they presumably would have mentioned
several justifications for their adherence to that custom, at least as a
general norm. Common sense notions of fairness, rooted in the rule
of law, suggest that a litigant who has demonstrated that an agency
action is invalid deserves some tangible relief. Moreover, widespread
judicial refusal to disturb administrative actions that are poorly
reasoned or procedurally defective might unduly reduce the public’s
incentive to challenge official mistakes. It could also lessen agencies’
incentive to do their work carefully in the first instance.
Why has the conventional understanding broken down?
Probably several factors are at work. The first is that, under modern
conditions, inflexible adherence to the traditional practice would
sometimes result in heavy social costs. The practice of routinely
vacating actions that are being remanded took shape at a time when
most judicial review proceedings involved regulated persons seeking
relief from adjudicative orders directed specifically at them.21 Today,
in contrast, agencies make many of their most important decisions
through rules,22 and affected interests can often obtain direct review
of those rules without waiting for subsequent enforcement
proceedings.23 Increasingly, therefore, courts now find themselves
examining the validity of agency actions that directly implicate the
rights of thousands or millions of persons. Vacation of such an action
can upset a legal regime on which many citizens depend. Even a
20. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21. Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the
1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1145–47 (2001) (noting that agencies largely
neglected rulemaking until the 1960s).
22. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 375–77; Schiller, supra note 21, at 1147–51; see Alan B. Morrison, The
Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 254–56 (1986)
(exploring causes of the shift from adjudication to rulemaking).
23. Scalia, supra note 22, at 377; Schiller, supra note 21, at 1152–53.
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relatively minor error in the agency’s reasoning, or a procedural error
concerning a single issue, can lead to nullification of a rule that
underpins a major regulatory program (at least where severance is
infeasible).24 Moreover, the invalidation may occur years after the
agency has instituted the rule, at a time when regulated interests have
already made extensive commitments in reliance on it.25
Courts have understandably come to believe that they should
have at least some discretion to avoid inflicting consequences of this
sort. In a number of decisions, therefore, they have resorted to
remand without vacation in order to prevent an unduly disruptive
interruption in a regulatory regime. Idaho Farm Bureau Federation,
the “endangered snail” case mentioned earlier,26 is one example. An
even more dramatic example is Rodway v. United States Department
of Agriculture.27 In Rodway, the department issued new coupon
allocation regulations for the food stamp program, but it did not
comply with the requisite APA rulemaking procedure.28 The court
remanded for notice and comment proceedings, but declared that the
rules could continue in effect until replaced by valid regulations.29 In
doing so, the court cited “the critical importance of the allotment
regulations to the functioning of the entire food stamp system, on
which over ten million American families are now dependent to
supplement their food budgets.”30
24. See, e.g., Associated Gas Distrib., Inc. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 993, 1044 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (vacating a rule that “envisage[d] a complete restructuring of the natural gas industry”
because of “problems in a few of [its] components”).
25. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (vacating, on procedural
grounds, eleven-year-old rules that had served as a cornerstone of the EPA’s regulation of
hazardous waste facilities). The court evidently did not consider the option of remand without
vacation, and its own recommendation for avoiding disruption proved less than completely
satisfactory. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
26. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
27. 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
28. Id. at 813–17.
29. Id. at 817.
30. Id.; see also Cent. & S.W. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 220 F.3d 683, 692 (5th Cir. 2000)
(remanding a rule on disposal of PCBs because the EPA did not adequately explain its failure to
exempt electric utilities, but leaving the rule in place so that it would continue to govern entities
other than utilities); Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that,
although the EPA had provided inadequate notice of rules authorizing exemptions from
CERCLA reporting requirements, the rules would not be vacated because, inter alia, their
removal could affect the agency’s ability to respond adequately to serious safety hazards); W.
Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1980) (leaving in place an EPA list of
“nonattainment areas,” which had been issued without notice and comment, because of “a
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A second theme in the case law, which somewhat overlaps the
first, is protection of reliance interests. Frequently, when a rule is held
invalid after it has already gone into effect, private citizens will
already have arranged their expectations around it. Companies may
have entered into contracts, made capital investments, and shifted
business operations in light of the rule. In this situation, courts will
sometimes allow the invalidated rule to remain in place in order to
smooth the transition to a new regime.31
Third, as Professor Richard Pierce has contended, the growing
interest in remand without vacation is largely attributable to the
Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hospital.32 That case held that an agency cannot adopt a legislative
regulation that applies retroactively to completed transactions unless
Congress has explicitly conferred such authority.33 Before
Georgetown, an agency whose rule had been vacated could decide on
the best way to respond to the court’s concerns, promulgate a new
rule (or the old one with a new justification), and make this rule
retroactive to the date of the court’s action, thus ensuring that some
rule would provide a governing standard for transactions that
occurred during the entire affected period. Georgetown renders this
strategy unworkable, except in those rare situations in which
Congress has specified that the agency’s rules may be retroactive.
Officials therefore have stronger reasons to want to keep an old rule
in place continuously until it is superseded by a new one. The
technique of remand without vacation enables the court to
accommodate this desire. I will return later to the tensions between
this technique and the Georgetown decision,34 but on a purely
desire to avoid thwarting in an unnecessary way the operation of the Clean Air Act”
in California).
31. See, e.g., United Distrib. Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1127, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(declining to vacate, on account of a few errors, a “sweeping” rule that had been in effect for
several years directing mandatory unbundling of pipeline sales and transportation services);
A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that “vacating the rule
approving the [new animal drug application] would prove disruptive to [the drug’s
manufacturer], which has relied on it in good faith for over thirteen years”); City of Brookings
Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1171–72 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to require vacation of
rules regarding returns on long distance telephone lines, where this step would have disrupted
an ongoing settlement process and caused economic hardship to third parties).
32. 488 U.S. 204 (1988); see Pierce, Seven Ways, supra note 13, at 76–78 (contending that
growth of remand without vacation in the D.C. Circuit in 1990s “was motivated largely by a
desire to avoid the potential disruptive effects” of Georgetown).
33. Georgetown, 488 U.S. at 208.
34. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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descriptive level Pierce is probably correct in his hypothesis that the
Supreme Court’s decision has contributed to the burgeoning use of
remand without vacation.
Fourth, Pierce also suggests that the growing use of remand
without vacation, at least in the D.C. Circuit, may reflect that court’s
effort to minimize the extent to which judicial review contributes to
the “ossification” of rulemaking.35 The ossification theory holds
generally that the threat of court review causes agencies to spend
inordinate amounts of time on their rulemaking proceedings, and also
to avoid rulemaking entirely in favor of less intensely reviewed
adjudicative actions. Thus, according to Pierce, courts have acted on
the view that a remand will create less of a disincentive to rulemaking
if it is not accompanied by vacation.
Although the ossification analysis has a substantial following
among academics,36 it is not clear that judges on the D.C. Circuit or
elsewhere have been persuaded by it.37 However, I would propose a
slight variation on Pierce’s argument that may come closer to
explaining the growth of the remand without vacation device.
Whatever judges may think on a general level about the incentives
impinging on agencies, I suspect that they often feel in particular
cases that a strong remedy like vacation of a rule or order under
review is disproportionate to the magnitude of the violation they have
found. Although judicial reversal under the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review was once considered a disposition
35. See 1 PIERCE TREATISE, supra note 4, § 7.13, at 521 (calling the device a “significant
step toward reducing policy paralysis”); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum,
41 DUKE L.J. 1462, 1471 n.30 (1992) (praising the D.C. Circuit’s consideration of alternatives to
suspending a rule upon remand).
36. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY 224–31 (1990) (warning about a trend toward ossification); Thomas O. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387–96 (1992) (same);
Pierce, Seven Ways, supra note 13, at 60–62 (same). But see Jordan, supra note 4, at 440–41
(noting that, in one sample of cases, “[a]gencies generally achieved what they sought . . . with no
significant interference from judicial review under the hard look doctrine”); Mark Seidenfeld,
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice
and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 489 (1997) (acknowledging the trend but
warning that “many of the proposed solutions will do more harm than good”). For many more
citations to the literature, see Jordan, supra note 4, at 393–95.
37. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REV.
659, 662–63 (1997) (arguing that courts should adhere to prevailing review standards, despite
possible effects on agency rulemaking, and that Congress expects them to do so).
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reserved for truly outrageous administrative conduct,38 that is no
longer so. Today courts feel free to remand a rule because of
weaknesses in an agency’s explanatory statement that might be best
described as unanswered questions.39 They might not think of their
own analyses as nitpicking, but they may nevertheless feel that their
objections to the agency’s position may turn out not to add up to very
much, once the agency has had a renewed opportunity to justify its
position. It is easy to imagine that, in this circumstance, a judge may
well be reluctant to hold that the agency’s program should cease
during the remand proceedings. Judges probably like the option of
being able to have it both ways: remanding without vacation enables
them to enforce high standards of rigorous analysis without causing
serious disruption to an agency’s program.
To be sure, courts have other means at their disposal to deal with
potential disruptions resulting from invalidation of an agency rule.
The need for remand without vacation should be weighed in light of
these alternatives. One such alternative is simply to vacate the rule
but delay issuance of the court’s mandate, so that the agency will have
time to make adjustments before the court’s order goes into effect.40
This solution is probably adequate in a simple case in which the
agency could be expected to repair its error immediately.
Postponement of the court’s mandate will not always be a satisfactory
solution, however. In a relatively complex case, the court may not feel
able to estimate how much time the agency would need, and it may
well want to avoid the burden of having to entertain a series of
requests for extension of such a stay. Thus, it will often prefer to get
the review proceeding off its docket by entering a simple remand
order, perhaps accompanied by an exhortation to the agency to
38. See, e.g., Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185–86 (1935) (equating
arbitrariness review of rules with due process review of legislation for rationality, under which
the law survives “if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it”
(quoting Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934))).
39. See Wald, supra note 37, at 665–66 (noting that “the agency’s failure to give an
‘adequate’ explanation for its rule or decision is the most common reason for a judicial
remand,” and that these reversals “are most often caused by the agency’s failure to
communicate or explain to generalist judges what they are doing, not by the agency’s failure to
do enough research or garner sufficient expert opinions for the record”).
40. This is a frequently used technique. See infra note 168 and accompanying text; Jordan,
supra note 4, at 416–17 (citing examples).
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proceed with dispatch (and a warning that if it does not, the
challenger can return to court for additional relief).41
An agency can also take steps on its own to minimize
discontinuity in its program after the court has vacated a rule. It can
issue an “interim” rule to maintain (or improve on) the status quo
until it has developed a new rule to meet the court’s objections.42 The
agency can claim that it has “good cause” to issue the rule without
notice and comment.43 However, this too is not always an entirely
satisfactory alternative to remand without vacation. Several months
may elapse before the agency decides whether and how to issue an
interim rule,44 and even then the rule may not stand up in court.45
Moreover, under Georgetown, the interim rule will probably have to
be prospective only; as such, it will not save enforcement actions
41. See infra notes 421–22 and accompanying text. Postponement of the court’s mandate
may be particularly ineffective in connection with rules that create cumulative liability over
time, such as rules that impose user fees or regulate ongoing conduct. A regulated party who
knows that the rule will become void in the near future has little incentive to come into
compliance with it. For example, a person who is behind on fee payments can simply choose to
remain in arrears, knowing that the debt will ultimately be canceled.
42. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (recommending this
alternative to the EPA).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2000) (exempting rules from notice and comment obligations if
the agency finds for good cause that such procedure would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest”); Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 822 F.2d 1123, 1131–34 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (upholding a post-remand interim rule).
44. Such delay can occur for many reasons. For example, the original rulemaking team may
have moved on to other responsibilities, and new personnel may need to familiarize themselves
with the issues. The agency may want to evaluate events that have occurred since the rule was
promulgated. Regulated interests may prevail on the agency to adopt some fresh alternative.
Consensus within the agency itself as to the proper response may be difficult to achieve. These
complicating factors are all normal elements of the rulemaking process, and their influence on
the agency’s development of a long-term response to the judicial remand would not be
troubling. They do, however, illustrate the potential for disruption in the immediate aftermath
of a court’s decision to remand and vacate, while the agency is deciding what interim rule, if any,
to issue.
45. Although the agency’s claim of “good cause” in Mid-Tex survived judicial review, the
court remarked that the petition for review raised a “substantial and troubling question,” in
light of the customary judicial view that the good cause exception should be “‘narrowly
construed and reluctantly countenanced.’” Mid-Tex, 822 F.2d at 1132 (quoting Am. Fed’n of
Gov’t Employees v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). If the interim rule is similar to
the original rule, the agency may also face accusations that it has not complied with the court’s
mandate. This was another unsuccessful basis for challenge to the interim rule in Mid-Tex. Id. at
1129–31. The court wrote narrowly, however, leaving room for uncertainty as to whether it
would take an equally permissive view in other fact situations.
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stemming from the period during which the now-vacated rule was
supposedly in force.46
To round out this survey of the rise of remand without vacation,
I should note that, although the device has most often been used to
protect private interests from the untoward effects of temporary
invalidation of a regulation, a few decisions have explored variations
on this theme. In the first place, this remedy has at times been
invoked in order to prevent harm to the government’s interests. In the
context of licensing programs that are financed through user fees,
some courts have identified deficiencies in a fee schedule that require
a remand, but have allowed the schedules to remain in effect.47 Where
the agency would otherwise be unable to recoup lost fees later, this
disposition serves to preserve the financial stability of the program.
Second, although the logic of the above case law applies most
clearly to controversies involving agency rules, courts have sometimes
left adjudicative decisions standing during remand proceedings for
analogous reasons. One such case is Massachusetts v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.48 There, environmentalists
challenged an appeal board’s order that granted an operating license
to a nuclear power plant. The First Circuit remanded the case because
of the board’s unsatisfactory analysis of the results of a safety exercise
at the plant. However, the court allowed the license to remain in
effect. The court explained that a judicial decree voiding the license
would be “immensely disruptive.”49 Moreover, the questions about
the plant’s safety might soon be put to rest by further explanations on
46. For example, the interim rule that the EPA issued after Shell Oil reinstated for the
future the regulations that the D.C. Circuit had vacated in 1991, but that response did not save
enforcement actions based on pre-1991 violations of the regulations. United States v. Goodner
Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380, 384–85 (8th Cir. 1992) (reversing a criminal conviction for
dumping hazardous wastes in 1988); William Funk, The Other Chevron Doctrine: When Court
Decisions Only Have Future Effect, ADMIN. L. NEWS, Fall 1993, at 6, 15–16 (summarizing the
unfortunate aftermath of Shell Oil). The D.C. Circuit could have avoided the Goodner result by
not vacating the regulations in the first place.
47. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the
agency violated the APA by failing to allow notice and comment in promulgating a fee schedule
for a program that Congress intended to be self-financing, but declining to vacate because of
“obvious hardship” to agency); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that a fee schedule devised pursuant to
congressional mandate was inadequately explained, but declining to vacate it because the
commission would then have had to refund fees and would probably not have been able to
recoup them later).
48. 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 336.
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the board’s part, or by other tests that were scheduled to be
performed shortly thereafter.50
II.  REMAND WITHOUT VACATION AND THE APA
A. Checkosky v. SEC
A major objection to remand without vacation, at least
potentially, is that it may not be permissible at all under the APA.
This possibility first came into focus in Checkosky v. SEC.51 Although
the fact situation in Checkosky is strongly reminiscent of the
accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002, it actually arose a decade
earlier. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) found that
two accountants, Checkosky and Aldrich, had violated generally
accepted accounting standards during an audit of a photocopier
manufacturer. Specifically, they had condoned the manufacturer’s
decision to omit millions of dollars in research and development
expenses from its financial statement, making the company look more
successful than it was. The SEC suspended the accountants from
practice before the agency, concluding that their behavior had
constituted “improper professional conduct.”52
A fractured panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed. In the lead
opinion, Judge Silberman expressed strong dissatisfaction with the
Commission’s analysis. He found the SEC’s opinion ambiguous as to
whether the agency thought that the accountants had acted with any
mental state more culpable than mere negligence.53 If the agency had
concluded that the respondents could be suspended merely because
they had been negligent, it would have been obliged to “consider not
only the administrative burden such a position would entail but also
whether it would [illegitimately] constitute a de facto substantive
50. Id.; see also United Mine Workers, Int’l Union v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 928
F.2d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In the latter case, the agency had exempted a mining company from
a worker safety rule on the condition that it follow an alternative safety procedure. The court
found that the exemption had been inadequately explained, but did not vacate it, because the
company had already reasonably relied on the exemption by implementing the alternative
procedure, and the agency might be able to furnish a more adequate explanation on remand. Id.
at 1203. See also Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 924
F.2d 340, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (similar case); Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety
& Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (similar case).
51. 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
52. Id. at 454.
53. Id. at 458–60 (Silberman, J., separate opinion).
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regulation of the [accounting] profession.”54 It had neither clearly
committed itself to the negligence theory nor produced the requisite
justification for one. Nor had the Commission made a plausible case
for imposing the sanctions on a recklessness theory.55 Judge Silberman
concluded that the case should be remanded to the Commission for
further analysis—but that, during the administrative proceedings that
were to come, the suspensions could remain in effect.56
Another member of the panel, Judge Randolph, agreed that the
case should go back to the SEC for further explanation. However, he
dissented from the court’s decision to allow the suspensions to stand
during the remand proceedings.57 He argued that such a disposition
was incompatible with section 706 of the APA, which states that a
reviewing court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action”
that violates the review standards codified in that section (e.g., by
being “arbitrary and capricious,” procedurally defective, or in excess
of statutory authority).58 Judge Silberman responded that he did not
need to reach the “shall . . . set aside” language of section 706 in that
case, because he had only found that the agency action might be
arbitrary. Until the agency had explained the suspension orders more
explicitly, he could not decide whether it was arbitrary.59 He cited
dozens of cases in which his court had similarly remanded agency
decisions for a better explanation, without vacating those decisions
immediately.60
Although my overall position in this Article is to commend Judge
Silberman’s support for remand without vacation, his theory for
sidestepping the literal wording of section 706 was far from
satisfactory. It is true, as he noted, that judges often say, in the course
of remanding an action, that the court must obtain more clarification
before finally deciding the arbitrariness question.61 But, as Judge
54. Id. at 459.
55. Id. at 460.
56. Id. at 462.
57. Id. at 490–93 (Randolph, J., separate opinion). The third member of the panel, District
Judge Reynolds, would have upheld the SEC’s decision outright. Id. at 493–96 (Reynolds, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In effect, therefore, Judge Silberman’s opinion
controlled the outcome of the appeal, because Judge Randolph gave him a majority on the
decision to remand, while Judge Reynolds gave him a majority on the decision not to vacate.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (emphasis added).
59. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 462–65 (Silberman, J., separate opinion).
60. Id. at 466.
61. See id. at 463–64. For a more recent example, see County of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192
F.3d 1005, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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Randolph pointed out, it is also extremely common for courts to say
that an action is arbitrary because the agency has not supported it
with a rational explanation.62 Judges use these verbal formulas more
or less interchangeably, because in either situation the normal
consequence is the same: a remand for reopened proceedings
conforming to the court’s conclusions. The question of whether the
court must also vacate the action should not depend on which
terminology a particular judge prefers.
Indeed, if one had to choose between these two ways of
describing what happens when a court remands an administrative
decision due to inadequate explanation, Judge Randolph’s
formulation is probably preferable. Carried to its logical conclusion,
Judge Silberman’s approach seems to mean that he would not
characterize an action as “arbitrary and capricious” unless it were so
irredeemably flawed that the agency had no reasonable prospect of
saving it. In this situation, the court presumably would not remand at
all. Yet, although courts occasionally do reach a conclusion to that
effect, it is not a common occurrence.63 Usually a court does not
know, or professes not to know, whether the agency could salvage a
poorly explained opinion. Thus a court will normally remand such a
decision to the agency.64 If that sequence of events cannot be
62. See Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 491 n.33 (Randolph, J., separate opinion) (citing
numerous examples).
63. For discussion of the relevant case law, see infra notes 348–55 and accompanying text.
Ironically, one of the few cases in which a court has definitively ruled an agency’s efforts to
explain itself incurable and terminated the proceeding, instead of remanding, was a subsequent
decision by the D.C. Circuit in the Checkosky litigation itself. After an unsatisfactory response
from the SEC on remand, the court decided that it had had enough. Checkosky v. SEC, 139 F.3d
221, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But the court added that this remedy should be “‘reserved for truly
extraordinary situations,’” and that it had not found any other example in its case law from the
past seven years. Id. at 226 (quoting Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 926 F.2d 1206, 1214 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J., concurring)). For a more recent example, see Radio-Television News
Directors Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (issuing a mandamus to force the
FCC to rescind rules that it had failed for twenty years to justify).
64. See Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law
Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 262 (1986):
[C]ourts will nearly always defend their “abuse of discretion” reversals by asserting
that the agency has not “explained its decision” sufficiently. Part of the explanation
for the popularity of this rationale is judicial politeness. When a court feels that an
agency’s action is illogical or inconsistent with prior practices or simply ill-advised, it
is far easier to ask the agency to “explain” the alleged flaw than to hold flatly that the
flaw is fatal. Indeed, such a judicial argument is not necessarily disingenuous. The
judge may really believe that the agency might be able to justify the apparent
weakness in its opinion; at least there is no need for the court to reach that question
immediately.
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described as a holding that the agency action is arbitrary and
capricious (or, to use a synonymous phrase, an “abuse of discretion”),
the term is far narrower than most administrative lawyers understand
it to be.
At best, Judge Silberman’s reasoning provides an escape route
from the literal construction of section 706 in an ill-defined subset of
the total universe of situations in which a court might decide that an
agency’s action is too poorly explained to be upheld. Indeed, since
Checkosky, the D.C. Circuit has continued to invoke the technique of
remand without vacation in those circumstances.65 But his argument
does not provide a rationale for the remedy of remand without
vacation in all of the situations in which the equities favoring that
remedy may be present. It does not, for example, apply to situations
in which a court does pronounce an agency’s rationale to be arbitrary
and capricious, yet wishes to minimize disruption by leaving the
action in place while the agency tries to frame an acceptable rationale
for it, or tries to find a different solution to the same regulatory
problem.66 Nor does his reasoning provide a satisfactory rationale for
decisions that have remanded but not vacated actions because of a
procedural violation, such as rules that have been issued without
proper notice and comment.67
Still, Judge Silberman’s instincts were in the right place. He
apparently realized that as a matter of circuit precedent, not to
mention practicality, the remedy of remand without vacation needed
defending. He had to resort to a questionable defense because of his
willingness to accept Judge Randolph’s literal approach to statutory
construction at face value. As we are about to see, a better response
would have been to challenge that interpretive method head-on.
65. See, e.g., Norinsberg v. USDA, 162 F.3d 1194, 1199–1200 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing and
following Checkosky); A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same).
66. See, e.g., La. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 1085 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (rules governing farm loans); Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1040–49
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (rule on television station ownership); City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC,
822 F.2d 1153, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rule setting reimbursement rates for long-distance
telephone calls).
67. Judge Silberman tacitly recognized this difficulty in a later case in which, in an opinion
for the panel, he remanded a rule because of noncompliance with section 553 but did not vacate
it. Instead of explaining why this relief was consistent with the APA, he merely relied on circuit
precedent. Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., Inc. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 98 (D.C. Cir.
2002); see also Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405–06 (9th Cir. 1995)
(agency failure to disclose relevant information); Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1133–
35 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (agency failure to provide notice and comment opportunity); Fertilizer Inst.
v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1310–12 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (insufficiently informative rulemaking notice).
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In any event, in cases subsequent to Checkosky, the D.C. Circuit
has acknowledged the question raised by that case, but has declined
to resolve it.68 Remand without vacation continues to exist,69 but its
availability may depend on the composition of a particular panel.70
Meanwhile, other circuits have yet to address the issue of whether the
device is consistent with section 706.
B. Section 706 Reexamined
If Judge Randolph’s literal reading of section 706 were tested in
the Supreme Court, what would be the result? The attraction of that
reading is its simplicity. The statute says that a court “shall” set aside
an agency action found to be unlawful, and arguably it should be
interpreted to mean exactly what it says. This straightforward
argument would surely hold some appeal for the current Supreme
Court, which, in a number of recent decisions, has adopted literal or
otherwise inflexible readings of other sections of the APA, even in
the face of longstanding lower court interpretations pointing in a
contrary direction.71
68. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69. Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 755–56 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Sierra Club v.
EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1999); cf. Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 184
F.3d 872, 888–89 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (remanding unsatisfactorily explained failure to rescind a rule,
but granting no further relief).
70. Consider, for example, Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855 (D.C.
Cir. 2001), in which the successful petitioner, the Sierra Club, requested remand without
vacation, but the court vacated the rule anyway, explaining that the industry petitioners’ claims,
which the court had not reached, were “potentially meritorious.” Id. at 872. It seems unlikely
that the court would have resorted to this curious reasoning if Judge Randolph had not been a
member of the panel. See also, e.g., Util. Solid Waste Activities Group v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 755
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (Randolph, J.) (vacating an amended rule because the agency had failed to
allow notice and comment before repairing an inadvertent word-processing error in a prior rule;
no discussion of whether to vacate); Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 923–
24 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Randolph, J.) (vacating an EPA rule on the treatment of aluminum by-
products as hazardous wastes, but not addressing the possibility of remand without vacation).
71. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999) (holding that the APA displaced prior
case law on standard of review in patent cases); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t
of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 270 (1994) (reading section 556 as codifying the
burden of persuasion in formal adjudication); Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146–47 (1993)
(reading the last sentence of section 704 as limiting the case law doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, despite decades of contrary lower court case law); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in
the Regulatory State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 755–56, 755 n.30 (1995) (criticizing Greenwich
Collieries as an unduly rigid interpretation of APA); Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the
Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 486–93 (same).
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The Court’s readiness to accept a literal reading of the “shall . . .
set aside” language of section 706 would probably depend in large
part on jurisprudential judgments. The Justices would have to make a
number of tradeoffs—between bright-line rules and open-ended
standards, between judicial creativity and judicial restraint, and
between strong regulation and safeguards against administrative
overreaching. These underlying issues in the debate over remand
without vacation are the subject of the next two Parts of this Article.
For the present, however, it is worth noting that, from a purely
doctrinal perspective, the Randolph theory is not as strong as it seems
to be at first blush. Conventional statutory construction analysis alone
would be sufficient to cast significant doubt on the literal
interpretation. I will first examine arguments on that level, and then
turn to more theoretically ambitious matters.
The literal interpretation of the “shall . . . set aside” language of
section 706 is by no means inescapable. In all probability, a well
briefed court would not construe the statute in isolation, but rather in
light of a longstanding judicial presumption that militates against a
finding that Congress has placed curbs on the courts’ remedial
discretion. The leading case is Hecht Co. v. Bowles,72 which rejected
an interpretation of price control legislation that would have
compelled district courts to issue an injunction whenever they found a
violation of that law. Although the language of the challenged statute
seemed to make such injunctions mandatory,73 the Court asserted that
“equity practice with a background of several hundred years of
history” militated in favor of a more flexible judicial role; only an
“unequivocal statement of [legislative] purpose” would suffice to
establish that Congress had meant to override that tradition.74 Hecht
has spawned a series of decisions treating this presumption as a kind
of judicially enforced “clear statement rule.”75 This is not to say that
72. 321 U.S. 321 (1943).
73. See Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33 (1942) (“[U]pon a
showing by the Administrator that [any] person . . . is about to engage in any [violation of the
Act,] a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted
without bond.”). The Court did suggest that “other order” could include an order that merely
retained the case on the district court’s docket. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 328. The Court did not rest
heavily on that line of argument, however, perhaps because such an order is not the kind of
judicial action that one would think should have to be predicated on a showing of violation.
74. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329–30.
75. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (“The grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with
a statute hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances . . . .”);
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the Court never finds that the presumption has been overcome. As
with other canons, the holdings go both ways.76 But the Hecht
presumption is at least a well-established factor in the equation.
One of the latest in this series of cases is Miller v. French,77 in
which the Supreme Court gave a literal construction to a clause in the
Prison Reform Litigation Act of 1995. Under that Act, a state’s
motion to terminate an existing injunction regulating prison
conditions would operate automatically as a stay, beginning not later
than ninety days after the motion was filed.78 The stay would continue
in effect until such time as the issuing court determined that the
injunction remained necessary to correct a federal right and was
narrowly tailored under criteria specified in the Act.79 Two dissenters
argued that the language should be read to preserve the court’s ability
to suspend the stay.80 The Court refused, finding that the Act was
unambiguous.81 Nonetheless, the Court conceded that “we should not
construe a statute to displace courts’ traditional equitable authority
absent the ‘clearest command’ or an ‘inescapable inference’ to the
contrary.”82 In short, although the presumption articulated in the line
of cases extending from Hecht to French does not displace attention
to the particular context of a given statute, these cases do indicate the
strong tradition of caution that courts have endorsed when
confronting statutes that seemingly replace equitable discretion with
mandatory commands.83
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 694 n.9 (1979) (“[T]he [statutory] word ‘shall,’ particularly
with reference to an equitable decision, does not eliminate all discretion . . . .”). For further
discussion of this line of authority and the academic literature that has grown up around it, see
infra Part III.C.
76. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 496 (2001)
(acknowledging Hecht but deferring to clearly expressed congressional priorities); TVA v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 193–94 (1978) (same); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 503–04 (1st Cir. 1989)
(Breyer, J.) (acknowledging the equitable balancing test but still granting an injunction). For
further discussion, see infra Part III.C.
77. 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (2000).
79. Id. §§ 3626(b)(2), 3626(e)(2)(B).
80. French, 530 U.S. at 353–62 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 336–41 (opinion of the Court).
82. Id. at 340 (citations omitted).
83. Brian Prestes has recently argued at length for the literal reading of “shall . . . set aside”
in section 706. Prestes, supra note 13. His article is well crafted, but my disagreement with it
centers on his failure to give any significant weight to the canon against repeals of equity
powers. See id. at 141–46 (minimizing the significance of Hecht). That canon rests on a
substantial body of precedent—not, as his argument suggests, the Hecht case alone.
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The evidence of congressional intent to curb the courts’ remedial
discretion in section 706 is by no means “inescapable.” The word
“shall” does point in that direction, but its context—consisting of the
provision as a whole, related provisions, and its enactment history—
points the other way. In the first place, the last clause of section 706
states that “due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial
error.”84 This clause, a harmless error principle, necessarily implies
that the “shall . . . set aside” language found earlier in the provision
must mean “shall generally,” not “shall always.”85 Furthermore, the
draftsmanship of section 706 as a whole suggests that Congress
expected courts to flesh out its meaning over time. The provision
contains open-ended phrases such as “arbitrary and capricious,”
“substantial evidence,” and “unreasonably delayed,” which plainly
invite judicial creativity. One would not expect so broadly worded an
enabling statute to impose severe constraints on the courts’ remedial
discretion.
Another conventionally accepted source of guidance in statutory
construction is the language of closely related statutory provisions.86
Here, related statutes cast further doubt on the literal reading of
section 706. Congress has given appellate courts essentially open-
ended discretion to fashion appropriate remedies when they review
the decisions of lower courts.87 And in the APA itself, Congress has
84. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). An early student Note on remand without vacation argued that
the “rule of prejudicial error” clause itself permits a court to leave in place a rule that was issued
without APA procedures, because the challenger can simply be afforded proper procedures on
remand. Chaffin, supra note 12, at 477. That argument seems to go too far toward weakening
the APA, because it could be used in every case that involves procedural error.
85. Moreover, a strictly literal reading of section 706 would mean that the court must “set
aside” “findings and conclusions” that violate any of the criteria in the six numbered categories
listed in that provision. By ordinary understanding, however, a court sets aside actions, not
findings and conclusions. That implication in the text of section 706 furnishes another reminder
that literalism, as a method of statutory construction, has its limits.
86. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“[T]he
meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken
subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.”).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2000) (“[Any] court of appellate jurisdiction may . . . vacate . . . any
judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the
cause and . . . require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the
circumstances.”); Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 166–73 (1996) (asserting broad discretion
under § 2106 to grant certiorari, vacate, and remand cases to courts of appeals). Prestes takes
issue with this inference drawn from § 2106. He writes:
[I]t stands to reason that Congress might provide courts with broad discretion to
fashion remedies when reviewing the highly variable category of lower court
judgments and that Congress might also provide courts with little discretion when
faced with insufficiently reasoned agency action, a confined and clearly identified
LEVIN.DOC 06/21/04 4:01 PM
2003] JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 313
authorized courts to wield similarly broad discretion in staying agency
action pending adjudication.88 In light of these provisions, one can
certainly question the notion that Congress meant to confine the
courts’ remedial discretion in section 706 as severely as the words of
that provision could be read to require. Also instructive is the
language of a number of statutes in which Congress has provided for
judicial review of agency actions in specific regulatory contexts. These
laws authorize a reviewing court not only to “set aside” agency
actions, but also to “modify” or “suspend” them.89 If the APA is read
to mean that every action that fails the review standards of section
706 must be “set aside,” these provisions become difficult to explain.
Finally, the enactment background of the APA contains little if
any indication that Congress paid attention to the precise implications
of the “shall . . . set aside” language of the Act. In the published
legislative history of section 706, members of Congress focused on the
standards of review listed there, paying no particular attention to the
subset of cases. In addition, given agencies’ anomalous role in the separation of
powers, judicial review might be more strict or disciplined when courts are reviewing
agency action than when they are reviewing the judgments of other, constitutionally
equal courts.
Prestes, supra note 13, at 141 (footnote omitted). I disagree with the factual premise of Prestes’s
first argument. Administrative decisions can be remarkably varied, ranging from complex
rulemaking proceedings and formal adjudications to decidedly informal agency
pronouncements such as letters and press releases. District court decisions look relatively
uniform by comparison. Prestes’s second argument appears to be a non sequitur, because if
section 706 imposes “discipline” on anyone, it must be the Article III courts, whose
constitutional position is not “anomalous.” Moreover, it is unclear why Congress would express
an across-the-board preference for “strictness” in judicial review of agency actions that may be
either regulatory or deregulatory, and that may either coerce citizens’ conduct or bestow
benefits on them.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2000) (“On such conditions as may be required and to the extent
necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court . . . may issue all necessary and
appropriate process . . . to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review
proceedings.”); see also FED. R. APP. P. 18 (authorizing stays pending appeal of agency actions,
without specifying permissible grounds).
89. E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2000) (“[The courts of
appeals] shall have power to make and enter a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside the
order of the Commission . . . .”); Administrative Review Orders Act (Hobbs Act) § 2342, 28
U.S.C. § 2342 (2000) (“The court of appeals . . . has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside,
suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of [various agency orders].”);
Occupational Safety and Health Act § 11(a), 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (2000) (“[The courts of appeals]
shall have power to . . . make . . . a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in
part, the order of the Commission . . . .”). Similar provisions in the labor, natural gas, and
disability benefits areas are discussed infra notes 119–20, 129–30. In turn, these provisions,
which simply confer “power” or “jurisdiction” to take the listed actions, do not purport to
foreclose other options such as remand without vacation.
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remedial issue. The committee reports, in paraphrasing the provision,
ignored the “set aside” language entirely, remarking that a court
should “hold unlawful any action, findings, or conclusions found to be
[within the six categories listed in the provision].”90 One
representative, for example, said that an agency decision “can be set
aside” if any of the six categories applies;91 evidently he did not
believe that a court must do so. On the whole, section 706 does not
seem to have been intended to accomplish anything daring or new.
One respected source, the Attorney General’s Manual on the APA,
maintains, in fact, that section 706 was viewed as “restat[ing] the
present law as to the scope of judicial review.”92 This comment is
quite suggestive, because part of the “present law” at that time was
the Hecht case itself, which was handed down while the APA was
being drafted. Some of the authors of the Act must have been aware
of it and presumably would have commented on the discrepancy if
they had intended to create one.
In the context of the overall legislative record, courts could easily
hold that the evidence of Congress’ desire to displace the courts’
traditional remedial discretion is insufficient to meet the standard set
forth in the Hecht line of cases. Indeed, at least one modern Supreme
Court case appears to assume that the equity tradition described in
Hecht does remain viable in APA cases. In Webster v. Doe,93 the
Court held that a former Central Intelligence Agency employee’s
claim of wrongful termination was reviewable under the APA insofar
as he pleaded a constitutional violation. The Court then returned the
90. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at
213 (1946) [hereinafter APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (Senate Judiciary Committee report); id.
at 278 (House Judiciary Committee report); id. at 370 (floor summary by Rep. Walter, chair of
the relevant subcommittee).
91. Id. at 377–78 (remarks of Rep. Springer) (emphasis added).
92. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 108
(1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL], reprinted in ABA SECT. OF ADMIN. L.
& REG. PRAC., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 33, 140 (William F.
Funk et al. eds., 3d ed. 2000); accord APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 90, at 39 (Senate
Judiciary Committee print). The Court has often given weight to interpretations in the Attorney
General’s Manual (and continues to do so despite the questions raised in recent years about
reliance on legislative committee reports). See, e.g., Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 148 n.10
(1993) (unanimous opinion); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981). Professor Duffy has disputed
the Attorney General’s characterization insofar as it may imply that the judicial review
provisions of the APA merely recognize court-created principles and have no legal force in their
own right. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113,
119, 132 (1998). I respond to his analysis infra at note 133.
93. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
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case to the district court for further proceedings, pointedly reminding
that court that, under Hecht, “traditional equitable principles
requiring the balancing of public and private interests control the
grant of declaratory or injunctive relief in the federal courts.”94 The
Court certainly did not seem to believe—as Judge Randolph’s
reading of section 706 would apparently require—that the lower court
would automatically be obliged to “set aside” the CIA’s termination
order if it were to find that the agency had acted unconstitutionally.
All of this adds up to a fairly convincing case against the thesis
that the “shall . . . set aside” language of section 706 has such a “plain
meaning” as to make any further consideration of the validity of
remand without vacation nugatory. At the same time, however,
section 706 surely contains no affirmative endorsement of remand
without vacation. The courts’ ultimate decision about whether and
how far to utilize that device may well depend in large measure on
how expansively they interpret the tradition of equity that underlies
the Hecht line of cases. I turn next to that issue.
III.  REMANDS AND THE REMEDIAL DISCRETION
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
How broad is federal equity power, anyway? An ample judicial
and scholarly literature speaks to that question, at least on a general
level.95 The Supreme Court has most often addressed the issue in the
context of constitutional litigation—especially “structural injunction”
cases brought against state and local governments as remedies for
school desegregation, housing discrimination, or other infringements
of civil rights. When the Court upholds strong relief of this kind, it
tends to recite expansive formulas, such as the frequently quoted
language of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education:96
“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district
court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth
and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”97 As one might
94. Id. at 604–05.
95. For an extensive compilation of references to the law review literature on remedial
issues in federal courts, see Thomas E. Baker, Federal Court Practice and Procedure: A Third
Branch Bibliography, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 909, 1081–90 (1999).
96. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
97. Id. at 15; see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183–84 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting the same language from Swann); id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(same); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 297 (1976) (same); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081,
1108 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same).
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expect, however, this assertiveness has its limits. The Court showed a
different attitude, for example, in Missouri v. Jenkins.98 In that 1995
case, the Court overturned a district court decree that had required
Missouri to make massive expenditures to upgrade the Kansas City
school district, as a remedy for past discrimination in the schools.99
Particularly noteworthy in Jenkins was Justice Thomas’s concurring
opinion. He argued at length that Swann had vastly overstated the
legitimate scope of federal equity power, at least if the expectations of
the framers of the Constitution were to be honored.100 “[W]e ought to
be reluctant to approve its aggressive or extravagant use,” he argued,
“and instead we should exercise it in a manner consistent with our
history and traditions,”101 as well as with fundamental principles of
federalism and separation of powers.102
As I observed at the outset of this Article, the remedial issues
posed by constitutional cases of this sort have stimulated a large
amount of academic commentary.103 I will occasionally draw on that
literature in the following pages, but it will not play a central role in
my analysis. Sweeping rhetorical pronouncements of the sort just
quoted should be seen as products of their context—namely, high-
profile litigation that involves fundamental constitutional rights as
well as the complications of federalism. The tradeoffs that judges
make among competing values in situations like that are probably not
reliable guides to the manner in which they will, or should, dispose of
equitable relief issues presented in the workaday world of regulatory
appeals. In contrast with civil rights cases, proceedings for judicial
review of federal administrative action tend to be less ideologically
charged,104 to involve much less sweeping assertions of judicial power,
98. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
99. Id. at 75–80, 100.
100. Id. at 123–37 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 124.
102. Id. at 131–33.
103. In addition to the thirty sources compiled in Friedman, supra note 1, at 736 n.4, see, for
example, Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857 (1999); Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two
Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475 (1999); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s
Foot?: The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123
(1996).
104. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits on Judicial Power in Ordering Remedies: Civil
Rights and Remedies, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 103 (1991) (“When we hear an
objection to the remedy, it is almost always a disguised objection to the definition of what is
due, and not to the methods used to apply the balm.”).
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and to present no such collisions between federal courts and state or
local governments.105 On the assumption that context matters,106
therefore, the following discussion will focus rather tightly on the role
of equity in administrative law and closely related public law cases.
A. The Equitable Remedial Tradition in Administrative Law
As an initial matter, one may ask: why are equity principles
relevant at all in administrative law cases? A short historical exegesis
will be helpful in answering that question. It can begin with the
uncontroversial premise that the federal judiciary has possessed
broad equity powers since the earliest days of the republic. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the national courts jurisdiction over “all
suits . . . in equity.”107 The Supreme Court has recently noted that this
legislation conferred “’an authority to administer in equity suits the
principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised
and was being administered’” by the English Chancery Court at
that time.108
105. See Duffy, supra note 92, at 128 n.72 (declaring that academic criticisms of structural
injunctions “do not undermine my conclusion here that the judge-made law of equity applied
against federal administrative agencies was (and is) fundamentally legitimate, because the
equitable remedies imposed in this field were (and are) almost always garden-variety
injunctions with little or no judicial innovation”).
106. For another expression of judicial doubt about the wisdom of expanding the scope of
equitable discretion, see Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527
U.S. 308, 333 (1999). The Court held that a federal district court may not issue a preliminary
injunction to prevent a debtor from disposing of unsecured assets if the creditor seeking the
injunction has not already obtained a judgment on the debt. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
pointed out the novelty of this sort of relief, adding:
We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in the federal system,
at least, that flexibility is confined within the broad boundaries of traditional
equitable relief. To accord a type of relief that has never been available before . . . is
to invoke a “default rule” not of flexibility but of omnipotence. When there are
indeed new conditions that might call for a wrenching departure from past practice,
Congress is in a much better position than we both to perceive them and to design the
appropriate remedy.
Id. at 322 (citations omitted). The Court made these comments, however, in the context of
creditors’ rights—a private-law field that is heavily laden with several centuries’ worth of
tradition. I would anticipate that the claims of tradition will usually be considered less weighty
in the context of federal administrative law, the major contours of which have been shaped
primarily during the modern era.
107. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).
108. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 527 U.S. at 318 (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.
Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939)); accord id. at 335 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See
generally Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1245–70
(2001) (reviewing in detail how early federal courts wielded equity powers and thereby
determined the scope of their own subject-matter jurisdiction).
LEVIN.DOC 06/21/04 4:01 PM
318 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:291
As administrative agencies began to emerge, equity actions
became one route by which citizens could obtain access to court to
challenge wrongful executive action. The suit for injunction served as
a “catchall” to which one might resort if writs such as mandamus or
certiorari proved unavailing.109 For example, the classic 1902 case of
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty110 held that the
plaintiff could use an injunction suit to obtain judicial review of the
Post Office’s order suspending its mail delivery, although no statute
specifically provided for such review.111 By early in the twentieth
century, according to Professor Davis, the injunction had become
“the main weapon in the arsenal for attacking federal administrative
action.”112
This heritage survives today in what are commonly known as
“nonstatutory” review proceedings. Standard administrative law
usage differentiates between so-called “statutory” and “nonstatutory”
judicial review. The distinction is embedded in section 703 of the
APA.113 According to that provision, if Congress has created a
“special statutory review proceeding” in the legislation under which
the agency acted, a person who wants to challenge the agency’s action
in court must normally resort to that proceeding. This is known as
“statutory” review.114 Section 703 goes on to say, however, that “in the
absence or inadequacy” of such a proceeding, the challenger may
resort to “any applicable form of legal action,” including an action for
declaratory judgment or injunction. Such proceedings are usually
called “nonstatutory” (although this is a misnomer, inasmuch as the
APA does authorize them).115 The term “nonstatutory” is also used to
refer to situations in which a litigant challenges executive authority
entirely outside the framework of the APA.116 In either of the latter
109. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 193.
110. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
111. Id. at 110–11.
112. 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 23.04, at 308 (1958); see
Duffy, supra note 92, at 121–26 (reviewing the early history of equity in administrative law).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2000).
114. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL 343 (4th ed. 1997).
115. Id. at 343, 345; ABA Sect. of Admin. L. & Reg. Prac., A Blackletter Statement of
Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 46 (2002) [hereinafter Blackletter Statement].
116. Blackletter Statement, supra note 115, at 46. An example is an action brought against
the President, who is not subject to the APA. See, e.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474
(1994) (finding the APA to be inapplicable to a suit challenging President’s decision to close
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two situations, the “nonstatutory” review plaintiff will normally
commence a civil action for injunctive or declaratory relief, or both,
in a federal district court. Such a suit is self-evidently equitable in
nature. Indeed, Davis observes, the injunction “has become a general
utility remedy for use whenever no other form of review proceeding
is clearly indicated.”117
Today, however, most judicial review of agency action is
“statutory” in the sense just explained. That is, the challenger obtains
access to court—usually a court of appeals—pursuant to a statute that
specifically provides for review of a particular administrative power
or program. One might reasonably have supposed that Congress, in
adopting these statutory review provisions, intended to make a clean
break from the past, leaving behind the equitable heritage of ordinary
civil litigation. But the courts have reached a different conclusion. For
many years, even in statutory review cases, they have referred to
themselves as courts of equity and have claimed the powers that
accompany that status. The premise of these claims seems to be that
statutory review proceedings, although “appellate” in many respects,
can also be seen as exercises of original jurisdiction. In this
understanding, the reviewing court possesses equitable authority like
that of a federal district court in a civil case.118
Representative of this line of authority is Ford Motor Co. v.
NLRB,119 which was decided in 1939 but is still a leading case. The
military base, but assuming arguendo that some presidential violations could be reviewed
outside the APA framework).
117. 3 DAVIS, supra note 112, § 23.20, at 386. According to Professor Duffy, the federal-
question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), provides the current statutory authority
for this exercise of equity powers. See Duffy, supra note 92, at 126–29, 146–48.
118. See Mobil Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 417 U.S. 283, 311–12, 312 n.45 (1974) (citing
with approval Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 128 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1942)). In
Natural Gas Pipeline, the Commission ordered a reduction in a pipeline company’s rates. The
court stayed this order but required the pipeline to post a bond for the protection of consumers.
Later the Commission’s rate reduction order survived judicial review, so that the pipeline
became liable for refunds. Asserting that the bond created an equitable “fund” for the benefit of
consumers, the court held that it had exclusive jurisdiction to oversee distribution of this fund,
and that it could enjoin consumers from seeking refunds through litigation in any other forum.
128 F.2d at 483–84. The court explained:
We think it well settled that in respect to review of orders of Federal Boards and
Commissions, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals, when granted by
Congress [in typical statutory review provisions], is original rather than appellate in
character and that, being endowed with original jurisdiction, the court may by its own
orders protect the rights of the parties in any manner in which any trial court of
equity of general jurisdiction might do so in an injunction suit.
Id. at 484.
119. 305 U.S. 364 (1939).
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Board ordered Ford to reinstate certain employees and then
petitioned a court of appeals for enforcement. While the enforcement
action was pending, the Board became aware that its reinstatement
order was vulnerable to a procedural challenge. The Board
accordingly asked the court of appeals to remand the case, so that it
could repair the error. The court complied with this request. In the
Supreme Court, Ford protested that the court of appeals had
possessed no authority to grant the Board’s request, because the
judicial review provision of the labor laws provided that the court
could either enforce, modify, or set aside the Board’s action. In Ford’s
view, the statute left no room for the court to remand the matter so
that the agency could do the modifying.120 A unanimous Supreme
Court brushed this contention aside and affirmed the lower court,
declaring: “The jurisdiction to review the orders of the [NLRB] is
vested in a court with equity powers, and while the court must act
within the bounds of the statute and without intruding upon the
administrative province, it may adjust its relief to the exigencies of the
case in accordance with the equitable principles governing judicial
action.”121
Later the same year, the Court decided United States v.
Morgan,122 a case known in the literature as Morgan III.123 The
Secretary of Agriculture entered an order requiring stockyard
companies in Kansas City to reduce their rates. The district court
temporarily enjoined the Secretary’s order but required the
companies to pay into court the sums that the department claimed
were excessive. Later, the Secretary’s order was set aside on
procedural grounds, and the companies sought immediate repayment
of the withheld money. The Supreme Court held, however, that the
district court should retain the money for the present. “[T]he district
court sits as a court of equity,” the Court said, “and . . . assumes the
duty of making disposition of the fund in conformity to equitable
120. Brief for Petitioner at 22.
121. 305 U.S. at 373. For a thorough discussion of choices that a court may face while
exercising its discretion in the specific context of an agency’s request for a voluntary remand,
see Fine, supra note 4.
122. 307 U.S. 183 (1939).
123. At least, it would be so known if commentators chose to write about it. Morgan III is
somewhat like Zeppo Marx—an often forgotten member of a famous quartet. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Gifford, The Morgan Cases: A Retrospective View, 30 ADMIN. L. REV. 237 (1978) (discussing
the first, second, and fourth Morgan cases and ignoring the third).
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principles.”124 Thus, if the Secretary were to establish in subsequent
administrative proceedings that the (now expired) rates had been
excessive, the court should use the money to make the companies’
customers whole125—even though the Secretary could not lawfully
have ordered such a retroactive adjustment himself.126 Professor Davis
has summarized Ford and Morgan III as follows: “The Supreme
Court has declared that a proceeding in the court of appeals on a
petition for review is controlled by equitable principles and the court
has equity powers, even though the statute does not explicitly so
provide.”127 The lower courts have frequently proceeded on the same
assumption.128
Note that, in Ford, the Court was disinclined to construe the
relevant statutory review provision as limiting the courts’ equitable
authority. In this respect, too, Ford has set a pattern for later
decisions. The Court has continued to adopt flexible interpretations
of the standard legislative formula that empower a reviewing court to
“affirm, modify, or set aside” a challenged order. For example, does
this standard formula permit a reviewing court to uphold an order on
a provisional basis, with the explicit understanding that the agency
may revise its decision if it believes that subsequent events justify
such action? A literalist might have answered no, but the Court’s
answer was yes.129 Does a reviewing court operating under such a
124. 307 U.S. at 191 (citations omitted).
125. See id. at 193–95.
126. See id. at 192.
127. 3 DAVIS, supra note 112, § 23.03, at 304.
128. See, e.g., Zambrana v. Califano, 651 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding a judicially
imposed time limit on an agency’s disposition of applications for disability benefits); Indiana &
Michigan Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 502 F.2d 336, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that
although the Commission’s suspension of a utility’s rate increases had been untimely, equity
required the utility to forego collecting retroactive rate increases and to refund any charges that
the Commission might later find to have been excessive); Sindicato Puertorriqueno de
Trabajadores v. Hodgson, 448 F.2d 1161, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that agricultural
workers in Puerto Rico were entitled to initiate further administrative consideration of their
request for an upward adjustment in minimum wage rates set by the Department of Labor). See
generally Samuel Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contributions of Judge Harold Leventhal to
Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894, 926–29 (1980) (tracing “the importance of
equitable principles in judicial review of administrative decisionmaking” in numerous opinions
by the late Judge Leventhal). Judge Leventhal discerned an additional statutory foundation for
the courts’ authority: “While [28 U.S.C.] § 2106 applies in terms only to review of a court order,
its basic principle is not inapposite to appellate review of agency orders.” Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
129. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 417 U.S. 283, 310–12 (1974) (holding that,
under a statute empowering a court of appeals to “affirm, modify, or set aside [a Commission]
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legislative provision have the authority to certify a nationwide class
action and enter an injunction that requires the agency to improve its
hearing procedures? One might have thought that the standard
formula would rule out such creative judicial measures. However, at
least in the Social Security disability benefits context (in which initial
review powers are lodged in the district courts), the Court has held
that this legislative language is no obstacle to the reviewing court’s
exercise of its normal authority under the class action and injunction
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.130 These holdings
that a statutory review provision should not be read too literally,
where such a reading would confine the court’s equitable remedial
authority, have obvious implications for this Article’s overall thesis.
Indeed, this approach to construction has migrated into judicial
interpretation of section 706 of the APA—the same provision that
was at issue in Checkosky. In NAACP v. Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development,131 the plaintiffs brought a class action alleging
that the department was breaching its statutory duty to take
affirmative steps to implement the policy of the Fair Housing Act.
The First Circuit held that the district court could find that a pattern
of governmental neglect was an abuse of discretion and could be “set
aside” pursuant to section 706. Then-Judge Breyer acknowledged
that this reading of the APA might seem forced. Nevertheless, citing
the language from Ford about the court’s equity powers, he wrote
that “the words ‘set aside’ need not be interpreted narrowly. A court,
where it finds unlawful agency behavior, may tailor its remedy to the
occasion.”132 This language does not quite go so far as to endorse the
converse proposition—i.e., that a court may also “tailor its remedy”
on certain occasions by deciding that the words “set aside” should be
read narrowly. It does, however, clearly foreshadow such a possibility.
I do not want to claim too much for the cases that I have
summarized in this Section. Some of them predated the APA, and
none involved the same degree of tension between statutory text and
order in whole or in part,” the court could simultaneously uphold a Commission rate order and
authorize the Commission to modify the order later if necessary).
130. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699–700, 704–06 (1979); see also Avery v. Sec’y
of HHS, 762 F.2d 158, 163 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.) (holding that, in remanding certain
disability claims to the agency as required by a recent statute, the district court could
nevertheless retain jurisdiction over a class action in which the agency’s management of those
claims was at issue).
131. 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987).
132. Id. at 160–61.
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equitable powers as does the problem of the Checkosky case. To
sustain the validity of remand without vacation, the canon disfavoring
restriction of equity powers will have to do more work than it did in
these decisions. Nevertheless, this line of cases teaches a lesson that is
decidedly helpful to my theme: For more than sixty years, courts have
drawn upon the traditions of equity to support a broad understanding
of the remedial powers of federal courts in administrative law cases—
even in the face of arguably contrary statutory directives.133
B. The Modern Prevalence of Remedial Discretion
This Section continues the survey of remedial discretion in
administrative law that I commenced in Part III.A, but the emphasis
shifts from historical antecedents to current practice. I will
summarize, in a basically descriptive fashion, a variety of situations in
which courts have continued to adhere to the kind of flexibility that is
characteristic of traditional equitable discretion, although they do not
always describe it in those terms.134 These situations reflect a pattern
into which remand without vacation can fit comfortably.
133. Although Professor Duffy acknowledges that courts may properly rely on judge-made
principles, stemming from the legacy of equitable jurisdiction, when they hear challenges to
executive authority outside the APA framework, see supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text,
he reaches a different conclusion with respect to cases to which the APA does apply. In the
latter situation, he argues, courts must comply with the APA’s mandatory directives—including
the “set aside” language of section 706. See Duffy, supra note 92, at 130–31, 165, 175–76. To this
extent, his position seems at odds with mine. The disagreement may, however, be more
apparent than real. The main thrust of Duffy’s article is a challenge to the tendency of many
courts and commentators to enunciate case law doctrines, such as exhaustion and ripeness, as
exercises of pure judicial law-making authority. In particular, he argues that these authorities
wrongly regard the APA as merely declaratory and, therefore, as less binding than other
legislation. Id. at 119, 131–32. In this Article, I accept the authority of the APA as law, but I also
invite reviewing courts to adopt a limiting construction of one clause of that Act, utilizing a
canon of statutory construction that predates and exists apart from the APA itself. This
construction would leave the courts free to exercise the considerable equitable discretion that
other statutes confer upon them.
134. The present discussion deals only with the courts’ equitable remedial discretion, not
with equitable discretion that may lead a court to decline to adjudicate the legality of an agency
action in the first place, such as equitable estoppel or laches. See Wilkinson v. Legal Servs.
Corp., 80 F.3d 535, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a discharged employee was equitably
estopped from challenging the legality of LSC’s composition because plaintiff had been a paid
LSC employee for years); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 905–14 (9th
Cir. 1994) (dismissing on laches grounds an action by a tribe that waited too long to sue the
Forest Service to halt construction of a telescope); Indep. Bankers Ass’n v. Heimann, 627 F.2d
486, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dismissing on laches grounds an action challenging a twelve-year-old
interpretive ruling by the Comptroller of Currency). For similar reasons I will not discuss the
D.C. Circuit’s longstanding practice of invoking “equitable discretion” to support dismissals of
suits brought by members of Congress to challenge governmental policies. See, e.g., Riegle v.
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A familiar example is the judicial power to grant or deny a stay
of an administrative action while an appeal is pending.135 In Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,136 the FCC granted a radio station’s
application for permission to increase the power of its broadcasting
signal. A competing broadcaster sought judicial review of the
Commission’s decision, as well as a stay of that decision pending the
disposition of the appeal. The question before the Court was whether
the court of appeals had authority to grant the stay. The relevant
provisions of the Communications Act could have been read as
withholding that authority.137 The Court said, however, that the power
to grant stays in order to prevent irreparable injury had always been
part of the judiciary’s traditional equipment for the administration of
justice,138 and it had to be assumed that Congress would not deprive
the court of appeals of this power without clearly expressing its
intention to do so.139 That presumption, of course, is quite similar to
the Hecht canon discussed earlier in this Article.140 The drafters of the
APA were well aware of Scripps-Howard. In what is now section 705
of the Act, Congress codified the authority of reviewing courts to
grant a stay “[o]n such conditions as may be required and to the
extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury.”141 In subsequent
years, the criteria that judges use to determine whether to order a
stay have evolved,142 and variations on those criteria have emerged in
Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 879–82 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But see Chenoweth v. Clinton,
181 F.3d 112, 114–16 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (suggesting that such discretion will henceforth be
subsumed into the doctrine of legislator standing). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme Than Court?: The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 333 n.576 (2002) (collecting examples of overlaps between
equitable discretion and the political question doctrine); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (surveying equitable doctrines that serve as
jurisdictional barriers).
135. See generally JAFFE, supra note 3, at 689–700 (presenting a wide-ranging analysis of the
courts’ stay authority in administrative cases); L. Harold Levinson, Interim Relief in
Administrative Procedure: Judicial Stay, Administrative Stay, and Other Interim Administrative
Measures, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 639, 640–48 (1994) (same).
136. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
137. See id. at 18–19 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 9–11 (opinion of the Court).
139. Id. at 11, 15.
140. See supra Part II.B. For more on the Hecht line of cases, see infra Part III.C.
141. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2000); see Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 68 n.15 (1974) (citing Senate
committee report on APA for the proposition that section 705 codifies principles of Scripps-
Howard).
142. The leading case of Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Federal Power Commission,
259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958), set forth four factors that a court should consider in deciding
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specific contexts,143 but the APA drafters’ core premise that they were
conferring an equitable power144 has not been controversial.
A commitment to flexibility in judicial remedies is also visible in
a number of more specific administrative law contexts. For example,
most courts have maintained that they have discretion to decide on an
appropriate sanction for a violation of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act. Invalidation of the agency action that resulted from
the proceeding in which the violation occurred is an option, but is not
mandatory in every case.145 Similarly, when an agency commits a
violation of the ex parte contacts requirements of the APA, the court
must weigh various policies in order to decide whether to invalidate
the agency’s action due to the violation.146 In the recently enacted
judicial review provision of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Congress
whether or not to stay an administrative action pending appeal: (1) whether the petitioner is
likely to prevail on the merits, (2) whether the petitioner will be irreparably injured without a
stay, (3) whether issuance of the stay would substantially harm other interested persons, and (4)
the public interest. Id. at 925. With minor variations, this test remains authoritative. See, e.g.,
Michael v. INS, 48 F.3d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1995); Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. NRC, 812 F.2d 288,
290 (6th Cir. 1987); Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 673–74 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Indeed,
the Virginia Petroleum factors have become the standard touchstone for preliminary injunctions
in civil litigation generally. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); 11 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2948 at 131 (1995). For
voluminous citations, see id. §§ 2948–2948.4; see also Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions
and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 111 n.4 (2001) (asserting that, although case
law variations in the precise formulations of the standard have elicited scholarly complaints, the
criticism is “overstated”).
143. See Murray, 415 U.S. at 83–84 (holding that when a probationary government worker
seeks a judicial stay of her employer’s decision to terminate her, the court, in exercising its
equitable powers, must require her to make an especially strong showing of irreparable injury,
instead of applying “the traditional standards governing more orthodox ‘stays.’ See Virginia
Petroleum . . . .”).
144. See APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 90, at 213 (Senate committee report)
(“The authority granted is equitable and should be used by both agencies and courts to prevent
irreparable injury or afford parties an adequate judicial remedy.”); id. at 277 (House committee
report) (same); ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 92, at 106 (“This power to stay
agency action is an equitable power, [and] reviewing courts may ‘balance the equities’ in
determining whether to postpone the effective date of agency action.”).
145. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 341–42 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
district court had discretion to fashion a remedy that would serve purposes of Act); Natural Res.
Def. Council v. Peña, 147 F.3d 1012, 1025–27 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); Nat’l Nutritional Foods
Ass’n v. Califano, 603 F.2d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 1979) (declining to invalidate regulations as a
remedy for violation of Act). But see Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Dep’t of Interior,
26 F.3d 1103, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that injunctive relief is the only adequate
remedy).
146. See Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 563
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (inferring this approach from 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(D), although that provision
seemingly speaks only to agencies).
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has adopted its own version of remand without vacation.147 Also worth
mentioning in this connection is the highly discretionary manner in
which courts determine whether to require an agency to complete a
long-pending rulemaking proceeding.148 In one sense, these judgments
are about liability, not remedy; the issue is whether, in the language
of section 706 of the APA, the court should “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”149 However, even
when the agency has missed a statutory deadline, so that its
susceptibility to some judicial order is apparent, the courts will not
automatically direct immediate compliance.150 Liability and remedy
seem to merge in this area.
In addition, remedial discretion is a prominent feature of cases in
which the constitutionality of regulatory legislation is at issue. In
these cases, which might be said to dwell on the boundary line
between constitutional law and administrative law, courts have
frequently invoked doctrines that bear a more than passing
resemblance to remand without vacation. The focus of this discussion
will be on situations in which the court reaches the merits and finds a
violation of law, but might deny relief anyway, at least in significant
part.151
Consider, for example, the de facto officer doctrine. This
doctrine, which dates back to feudal times, “confers validity upon acts
performed by a person acting under the color of official title even
though it is later discovered that the legality of that person’s
147. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110
Stat. 857 (1996) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 611(a)(4) (2000)) (providing that relief from a Regulatory
Flexibility Act violation shall include, in addition to remand, an order directing the agency to
defer enforcement of the improperly issued regulation against small entities unless the court
finds that continued enforcement is in the public interest).
148. See In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1149–50 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (listing
multiple considerations that courts should consider in deciding whether delay in completing
rulemaking proceeding is unreasonable); Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d
70, 79–80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same). See generally 2 PIERCE TREATISE, supra note 4, § 12.3 at 839–
46; Neil R. Eisner, Agency Delay in Informal Rulemaking, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 7, 18–23 (1989).
149. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000).
150. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 475–78 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (permitting a continued breach of a statutory deadline in light of the agency’s good faith
efforts and the court’s limited capacity to supervise those efforts); In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930
F.2d 72, 74–76 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same); 2 PIERCE TREATISE, supra note 4, § 12.3 at 846–53.
151. This discussion excludes a host of other remedial issues that may arise in such
constitutional litigation, such as the court’s familiar responsibility to tailor the terms of an
injunction to the nature and magnitude of a violation. On that topic, see 2 PIERCE TREATISE,
supra note 4, § 18.4, at 1345–55.
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appointment or election to office is deficient.”152 The traditional
rationale for the doctrine is that it “protect[s] the public from the
chaos and uncertainty that would ensue if actions taken by individuals
apparently occupying government offices could later be invalidated
by exposing defects in the officials’ titles.”153 The Supreme Court
apparently relied on this theory when it declined to invalidate statutes
enacted by state legislators who were later found to have been elected
from unconstitutionally apportioned districts.154 Similarly, when the
Court held in Buckley v. Valeo155 that the procedure that had been
used to appoint some of the members of the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) had violated the Appointments Clause of the
Constitution, it added that it would accord de facto validity to past
actions of the Commission.156
The current status of the de facto officer doctrine is not very
clear. In Ryder v. United States,157 a member of the Coast Guard
alleged that two judges on the military tribunal that had reviewed and
upheld his court-martial conviction had been appointed in violation
of the Appointments Clause.158 The Supreme Court, permitting his
challenge to proceed, stated that it was disinclined to extend Buckley
and the reapportionment cases beyond their facts.159 The Court
indicated, however, that its restrictive attitude toward the de facto
officer doctrine was heavily influenced by the importance of the
constitutional values at stake.160 The Court seemed to accept older
152. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995). See generally Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 581,
595–96 (2001) (surveying the history of and early literature on the de facto officer doctrine).
153. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 650 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
154. Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 550–51 (1972).
155. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
156. Id. at 142.
157. 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
158. Id. at 179.
159. Id. at 183–84. The Court passingly recognized, but did not attempt to resolve, a tension
between the de facto officer doctrine and its recent decisions holding that newly adopted
constitutional principles must be given broad retroactive effect. Id. at 184–85. These decisions
are discussed infra in Part IV.A.2.
160. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180–83. Other recent cases involving Appointments Clause
challenges have also rejected the de facto officer defense. See United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d
987, 998 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding, however, that the relevant officer’s appointment had not
actually been unconstitutional); Silver v. USPS, 951 F.2d 1033, 1036 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (same);
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S.
88, 89 (1994) (deeming the doctrine inapplicable where the constitutional issue is raised by the
defendant in an enforcement action).
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precedents that had applied the doctrine to validate actions in which
the defect in an official’s appointment was at most statutory and was
more fairly viewed as merely technical.161 The doctrine probably
retains some vitality in the latter sort of case,162 at least where the
defect in an officer’s title is not raised until well after the government
has taken the action being challenged.163
The Supreme Court also used a second remedial device in
Buckley v. Valeo to soften the impact of its decision to declare the
FEC unlawfully constituted: The Court stayed the issuance of its own
mandate for thirty days, to give Congress time to reorganize the
Commission on a lawful basis.164 The same technique surfaced again in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,165
where the Court found a constitutional defect in the structure of the
bankruptcy court system. The Court delayed issuing its mandate for a
period of three months166 (later extended for an additional three
months),167 so that Congress could restructure the system.168 The
161. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 181–83; see also Nguyen v. United States, 123 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (2003)
(indicating that the de facto officer doctrine should apply to defects that are “merely technical,”
but not to defects that offend a “strong policy”) (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
535–36 (1962)); Roell v. Withrow, 123 S. Ct. 1696, 1707–08 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(same).
162. See, e.g., Levine v. United States, 221 F.3d 941, 944 n.7 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a
collateral attack on a criminal conviction, even though the Assistant U.S. Attorney did not meet
a local residency requirement, which was a mere “matter of government administration”);
Horwitz v. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 822 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that
members of a licensing board who had failed to take an oath of office were de facto officers).
163. Compare Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1496–1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
the de facto officer doctrine does not bar a judicial challenge if the plaintiff sues at or around
the time when the challenged action is taken and the agency had reasonable actual notice of the
objection to the claimed defect), with Office of Thrift Supervision v. Paul, 985 F. Supp. 1465,
1475 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (applying the de facto officer doctrine because the plaintiff’s challenge was
belated). Timely notice to the government about a claimed defect in an officer’s title is
important, because a properly appointed officer’s subsequent ratification of the challenged
action can often cure the defect. See Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139
F.3d 203, 212–14 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that a possibly invalid notice from an Acting Director
of OTS was immune from challenge because a properly appointed Director had effectively
ratified the notice in his final decision in the petitioner’s case); FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d
704, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that ratification by a properly constituted FEC cured the
Appointments Clause problem that had been found in NRA Political Victory Fund).
164. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142–43 (1976).
165. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
166. Id. at 88.
167. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
168. Lower courts often use this same technique. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d
525, 536–37 (7th Cir. 1989) (remanding an order registering a company as a clearing agency, but
deferring the court’s judgment for 120 days in order to avoid harming investors); Nat’l Coalition
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results of such an exercise of remedial discretion, especially when it is
employed in tandem with the de facto officer doctrine, are somewhat
similar to the results of remand without vacation. In either instance,
the judiciary heads off the potentially disruptive interruption of a
government program, by allowing the status quo to remain in effect
for a limited time while the government is fixing the problem the
courts have identified. Indeed, one practical question that a court
should address in deciding whether to resort to remand without
vacation in a given case is whether it could reach an equally
satisfactory outcome by simply postponing the issuance of its own
mandate.169
The doctrine of severability, an issue that can arise in both
constitutional law and administrative law, illustrates remedial
flexibility in a different way. In the constitutional context, the usual
severability question is whether, when a court holds a statutory
provision unconstitutional, it should strike down the entire statute, or,
instead, should “sever” the offending provision and leave the
remaining provisions in place. According to the traditional doctrine,
“the unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the statute
created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have
enacted.”170 In other words, the theoretical touchstone is legislative
intent.171 The problem is that the legislature’s intentions regarding
severability are typically highly speculative—especially inasmuch as
the issue relates, by its nature, to a state of affairs that the lawmakers
assumed (or at the very least hoped) would not exist.172 Even if the
challenged act contains a severability clause, the judicial response is
not foreordained, because courts tend to treat such clauses as raising
Against Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875, 884–85 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (remanding a
pesticide regulation with directions to the agency to address the issue within thirty days, but
deferring the effective date of the mandate during that period); Simmons v. ICC, 757 F.2d 296,
300 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (holding that a rule that relaxed carriers’ reporting obligations
had been adopted without requisite procedures, but could remain in effect for ninety days);
EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969, 975–76 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that certain powers had
been invalidly transferred to the EEOC subject to an unconstitutional “legislative veto,” but
staying issuance of mandate for four months to allow Congress to enact the transfer properly, as
it did).
169. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (comparing the two approaches).
170. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987).
171. See John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 210, 213 (1993)
(documenting the longstanding predominance of legislative intent criterion).
172. Id. at 230–31.
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only a weak presumption about legislative intent.173 As a practical
matter, therefore, the court has wide leeway in making
determinations about severability,174 but the discretionary element of
the court’s decision remains somewhat masked, due to the formal
terms in which the doctrine is couched.
The corresponding issue in administrative law is whether a court
should sever part of a regulation that it has found to be invalid for
one reason or another. In theory, the decision supposedly again turns
on the intentions of the promulgating authority (here, the agency).175
And, once again, that test can lead to disparate results, depending on
the court’s fictionalized reconstruction of the agency’s intent.176 In this
context, however, courts seem more willing to acknowledge openly
that discretionary considerations, including equitable factors, play a
role in their decisions about whether to sever.177 A particularly
relevant illustration is the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Davis County
Solid Waste District v. EPA.178 There, the court held that EPA
emission standards for municipal waste “combustor units” violated
the Clean Air Act. However, the court vacated the standards only
insofar as they regulated small combustor units; it left in place
portions of the rules pertaining to larger units.179 What is of special
relevance here is that the court, in reaching this conclusion, relied
173. Id. at 222–25. The presumption is weak in that courts typically apply roughly the same
test in determining whether to sever, regardless of whether the legislation contains a severability
clause. Id. at 235–36.
174. Professor Nagle argues that courts should give severability clauses their plain meaning,
and, when no such clause is available, should determine whether to sever on the basis of
traditional statutory construction and, if necessary, a general presumption in favor of severance.
Id. at 232–57. What is noteworthy for present purposes is that the courts, despite their growing
attraction to formalism in other statutory interpretation areas, see supra note 71 and
accompanying text, have shown no movement toward adopting such an approach.
175. See North Carolina v. FERC, 730 F.2d 790, 795–96 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
176. Compare Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1447 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (denying
severance because of “substantial doubt” that the agency would have preferred it), and North
Carolina v. FERC, 730 F.2d at 795–96 (denying severance because the Commission’s order was
“unitary”), with K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 294 (1988) (allowing severance
where there was “no indication that the regulation would not have been passed but for [the]
inclusion” of the invalid provisions); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366
(1999) (invalidating one section of an FCC rule and upholding others, without discussing
severability).
177. See MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass’n v. FCC, 253 F.3d 732, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(refusing to accede to the FCC’s explicit preference for severance, because “to do so would [not]
leave a sensible regulation in place”).
178. 108 F.3d 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
179. Id. at 1460.
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squarely on its precedents concerning remand without vacation.
Under that body of case law, as I will discuss later, the seriousness of
the rule’s deficiencies and the disruptive effect of short-run
invalidation are factors that the circuit routinely considers in deciding
whether to vacate.180 Applying those principles, the court in Davis
County explained that its interpretation of the Act was unlikely to
affect the provisions regulating the large units; moreover, vacation of
the entire rule would result in a significant increase in pollution
emissions from those units while the rule was being revised.181 In a
strikingly direct fashion, therefore, Davis County demonstrates the
compatibility between remand without vacation and the existing
remedial landscape, of which the severability doctrine is one
element.182
Closely related to severability is the narrow but interesting
problem of selecting a remedy for a statute that violates the
Constitution because it is underinclusive. In Justice Harlan’s famous
formulation, a court facing such a situation has “two remedial
alternatives: [it] may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order
that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to
benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those
who are aggrieved by exclusion.”183 In one representative case,
Califano v. Westcott,184 a section of the Social Security Act provided
certain welfare benefits to families of unemployed fathers, but not to
families of unemployed mothers. The Court ruled unanimously that
180. See infra notes 389–90 and accompanying text.
181. Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1454, 1458–59 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
182. Indeed, one member of the panel that decided Davis County was Judge Randolph, the
dissenter in Checkosky. Presumably he assumed that this problem, unlike the Checkosky issue,
lent itself to equitable balancing because the text of the APA did not settle the matter. A textual
analysis was, however, potentially available, as demonstrated in Catholic Social Service v.
Shalala, 12 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1994). One reason the court gave in that case for finding a
regulation severable was that only a “part” of the rule was invalid, not the “whole” of it. This
distinction was said to follow from 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000), which defines “agency action” to
include “the whole or a part of an agency rule.” Id. at 1127–28. The Catholic Social Service
analysis has not been followed subsequently, perhaps because it leaves little room for equitable
balancing.
183. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
Congress had exempted conscientious objectors from military service, but only if their
opposition to war was “by virtue of religious training and belief.” Justice Harlan concluded that
this limitation violated the Establishment Clause and that the only acceptable remedy was to
extend the exemption to nonreligious conscientious objectors, rather than to eliminate the
exemption entirely. Id. at 361–67.
184. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
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this arrangement violated equal protection principles, but it divided
on the question of remedy. The majority, in an opinion by Justice
Blackmun, decided to extend the benefit to unemployed mothers’
families.185 Justice Blackmun defended this expansion of the statute
on the ground that the alternative—a suspension of the program—
would impose hardship on needy children whom Congress had plainly
intended to assist.186 In addition, he said, the Act contained a strong
severability clause, which he thought was evidence of the legislature’s
desire to protect these beneficiaries in the event of a constitutional
challenge.187 Four dissenters would have eliminated the benefit
entirely, leaving any reconfiguration of the program to Congress.188
The case law on this issue is noteworthy for its candid
recognition that the problem calls for judicial creativity. Even the
Westcott dissenters agreed with that premise.189 Some opinions do
reach for a legislative baseline, by suggesting that a court should
strive to act as Congress would have wanted,190 or at least should not
“’circumvent the intent of the legislature.’”191 Yet even those formulas
leave a good deal of responsibility in the courts’ hands.192 Thus the
task quickly comes down to judicial weighing of competing policies:
the court should “’measure the intensity of commitment to the
residual [legislative] policy and consider the degree of potential
disruption of the statutory scheme that would occur by extension as
185. Id. at 90–93.
186. Id. at 90.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 96 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. The dissenters did not suggest that an extension would be categorically beyond the
province of the judiciary. On the contrary, their major premise was that, “[i]n choosing between
these alternatives [extension or nullification], a court should attempt to accommodate as fully as
possible the policies and judgments expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. at 94.
Their dissent was based on the relatively narrow ground that Congress would not have favored
this particular extension. See id. at 94–96 (noting, inter alia, that Congress had adopted the
classification at issue in Westcott precisely in order to avoid the broad coverage that the majority
was now prescribing).
190. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 489 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e can
excise the two provisions only if Congress likely would prefer their excision . . . .”).
191. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 n.5 (1984) (quoting Westcott, 443 U.S. at 94
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
192. In Westcott, Justice Blackmun did not claim that the severability clause was dispositive
of his case. Nor could he easily have done so, for the Court’s decision did not actually “sever”
any provision of the Social Security Act. In any event, the courts’ wariness about severability
clauses is longstanding. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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opposed to abrogation.’”193 It is a situation-specific determination,194
and the cases have by no means always favored extension over
nullification, as Westcott did.195 Overall, the courts seem to share the
view expressed in this context by Professor (now Justice) Ruth Bader
Ginsburg: “The courts act legitimately, I am convinced, when they
employ common sense and sound judgment to preserve a law by
moderate extension where tearing it down would be far more
destructive of the legislature’s will.”196 This consensus further attests
to the recognized capacity of the judiciary to use discretion to resolve
remedial questions that the legislature is unlikely to have considered.
In short, as the examples summarized in this Section show,
remedial discretion is a recurring theme in administrative law and
closely related public law cases—as the equity heritage recounted in
the preceding Section might lead one to expect. This is not to say that
judges consistently mention equitable antecedents to justify their
preference for keeping their options open. Frequently they do not. At
times they seem to take remedial discretion for granted, or to use a
passing reference to “equitable discretion” as little more than a
makeweight slogan.197 This casualness about tradition should not be
surprising, now that the era predating the merger of law and equity
courts has become a distant memory in the federal judicial system.198
193. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 739 n.5 (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 365 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring in the result)).
194. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair
Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 301, 318–24 (1979) (exploring the merits of
this choice in various fact situations).
195. See, e.g., Mathews, 465 U.S. at 739 n.5 (deferring to an express congressional preference
for nullification over extension); Quiban v. Veterans Admin., 928 F.2d 1154, 1163 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (R. Ginsburg, J.) (opining that, even assuming a constitutional problem with Congress’s
decision to provide veterans’ benefits to 12,000 Filipinos who had served in the U.S. army
during World War II, but not to over 200,000 Filipinos who had served the Allied cause in the
Philippine army, Congress might well prefer to withdraw the benefit from the former group
rather than to extend it to the latter); Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (R.
Ginsburg, J.) (noting that, even assuming that Congress could not permit one religious sect to
use marijuana for sacramental purposes without permitting other sects to do likewise, the court
would not lightly predict that the legislature would prefer extension over abandonment of this
exemption from drug laws).
196. Ginsburg, supra note 194, at 324. She added that, although extension of a statute can be
seen as judicial legislation, “[t]he function the courts perform in [this regard] seems to me
entirely harmonious with a view that sees our institutions of government not as rigidly
compartmentalized but as interdependent.” Id.
197. See, e.g., Zambrana v. Califano, 651 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1981); Sindicato
Puertorriqueno De Trabajadores v. Hodgson, 448 F.2d 1161, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
198. Carrying this point to its logical conclusion, Professor Laycock argues that “we should
consider it wholly irrelevant whether a remedy, procedure, or doctrine originated at law or in
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The courts’ continued attraction to open-ended approaches probably
derives in large measure from more practical considerations, such as
their desire to do justice in particular cases, and their prudential
intuition that the factors that should influence remedial decisions are
too complex to be reduced to simple rules or one-size-fits-all
solutions. Another part of the explanation may be that judges simply
have a good deal of confidence in their own ability to work out fair
solutions on an ad hoc basis. Part IV of this Article examines some of
the grounds on which that self-confidence may be called into
question. For the present, however, it can at least be said that the
prevalence of remedial discretion strongly suggests that, over time,
the continued integration of remand without vacation into public law
adjudication would not prove to be too difficult.
C. Equitable Discretion to Withhold Injunctive Relief
I now address in greater detail what is probably the closest
analog to remand without vacation in the remedies case law. In Part
II.B above, I discussed a canon of statutory construction stemming
from Hecht Co. v. Bowles199 and its progeny. The Hecht canon
disfavors statutory interpretations that tend to foreclose the courts
from exercising equitable remedial discretion. This Section discusses
a related topic—the substance of the equitable authority that the
canon seeks to leave undisturbed.200 I examine cases that have arisen
in the context of civil litigation, in which the plaintiff (either a private
party or an agency acting in an enforcement capacity) has sought an
injunction that would prohibit the defendant from violating a
regulatory statute. The teaching of the cases, broadly speaking, is that
equity does not always require the court to issue such an injunction,
even if the court has found the defendant to be in breach of the
equity,” because “the discretion once associated with equity now pervades the legal system.”
Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 54 (Summer 1993).
He continues: “We can argue about the right balance between discretion and formalism, but it
makes no sense to argue about the right balance between law and equity.” Id. at 75. (He
acknowledges, of course, an exception for doctrines such as the constitutional right to jury trial,
where a distinction between law and equity is textually compelled. Id. at 53–54.) Although
Laycock’s view has considerable appeal, courts considering the validity of remand without
vacation, or similar devices, do not need to go so far, because, as the preceding Section showed,
the equity tradition in administrative law has a substantial pedigree in any event.
199. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
200. Only for expository convenience does this Article discuss these two aspects of the cases
separately. The Justices surely would not take such pains to preserve the Hecht canon if they did
not value the uses to which it is commonly put.
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statute. In this respect, the cases contain parallels to the kind of
discretion that courts exercise in administrative cases when they
consider remand without vacation. At the same time, the cases
contain refinements and qualifications that also deserve attention.
The courts’ application of this discretion-favoring doctrine has
been the target of academic criticism, especially in the environmental
context. Commentators have questioned whether judges have any
business using equitable balancing tests to weaken the
implementation of public-regarding remedial legislation.201 The Hecht
decision itself causes relatively little concern in this regard. It is
commonly explained away as a situation in which the defendant (a
department store accused of price control violations) had decisively
abandoned its unlawful conduct, making an injunction against future
misconduct simply unnecessary.202 The focus of controversy has been
the case law of the past two decades, in which courts have drawn
upon equity traditions to justify their refusal to enjoin continuing
violations.
Particularly troubling to commentators is Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo.203 There, Puerto Rico residents sought an injunction to
prevent the Navy from conducting weapons training exercises off the
coast of the island without having obtained a permit from the EPA, as
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) required. The
district court directed the Navy to apply for a permit, but refused to
instruct it to cease further training exercises while the permit
application was pending. The court noted that the Navy’s violations
were not causing “’appreciable harm’ to the environment,” and that
the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs would harm the public
interest “’because of the importance of the island as a training
center.’”204 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice White,
upheld the district court’s disposition, relying on the “traditional
function of equity,” pursuant to which a court “’balances the
201. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 220–21 (1990); Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public
Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 398–400 (1983); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations
and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 524 (1982). Professor Plater maintains that “a court
has no discretion or authority to exercise equitable powers so as to allow violations of statutes to
continue.” Id. at 525–26. For a critique of Plater’s reading of the precedents, see David S.
Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and
Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 638–47 (1988).
202. See, e.g., Plater, supra note 201, at 549–52.
203. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
204. Id. at 310 (quoting Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 706 (D.P.R. 1979)).
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conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as
they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the
injunction.’”205 Romero-Barcelo can be read to indicate that a court
may allow a statutory violation to continue, perhaps indefinitely, by
evaluating the “equities” of a case on the basis of the court’s own
sense of fairness. This open-ended notion strikes some scholars as
unacceptably rootless and incompatible with the primacy of Congress
in determining how the FWPCA should be enforced.206
The commentators’ premise that a court may not use equitable
balancing to override what a statute requires is surely sound.207
However, their critique of Romero-Barcelo tends to exaggerate the
extent of the Court’s departure from that premise.208 Particularly
instructive is the manner in which Romero-Barcelo took account of
the Court’s famous earlier decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill.209 In Hill, the Court upheld an injunction that prohibited the
Tennessee Valley Authority from completing construction of a dam
that endangered the habitat of the snail darter (a species of perch).
The Court held that the relevant provisions of the Endangered
Species Act made an injunction mandatory, leaving no room for any
argument that the economic benefits of the dam outweighed the
possible danger to an obscure species of fish.210 Congress itself had
struck the balance between these two policies in the Endangered
Species Act. The Court said that it could not supersede that policy
judgment under the guise of exercising equity jurisdiction.211
In Romero-Barcelo, the Court distinguished Hill instead of
repudiating it.212 The Court explained that issuance of an injunction
205. Id. at 312 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)).
206. See, e.g., Shreve, supra note 201, at 397 n.96 (lamenting Romero-Barcelo’s “refus[al] to
issue an injunction through a kind of vague balancing of the equities”).
207. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (“When Congress
invokes the Chancellor’s conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is
required is the principled application of standards consistent with those purposes.”); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings Empanelled May 1988, 894 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[I]n cases
where the plaintiff has an established entitlement to an equitable remedy the judge cannot
refuse the remedy because it offends his personal sense of justice.”).
208. The following account draws heavily on a persuasive analysis in Daniel A. Farber,
Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513,
522–27 (1984).
209. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
210. Id. at 187–88.
211. Id. at 193–95.
212. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314 (1982).
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was the only means available in Hill to vindicate Congress’s choice.
The Puerto Rico situation was different, because an injunction “is not
the only means of ensuring compliance” with the FWPCA.213 The
district court had discretion to allow the Navy to come into
compliance by applying for a permit. Even though this approach
would allow the Navy’s statutory violation to continue in the short
run, it would fulfill the purpose of the Act. In a sense, it would
circumvent the permit process, but “[t]he integrity of the Nation’s
waters, . . . not the permit process, is the purpose of the FWPCA.”214
Indeed, other provisions of the Act authorized the EPA to adopt
measures that allowed polluters to come into compliance in an
orderly and measured way, rather than immediately, and the district
court’s approach to the Navy was similar.215 Thus, “[t]he exercise of
equitable discretion, which must include the ability to deny as well as
grant injunctive relief, can fully protect the range of public interests at
issue at this stage in the proceedings.”216 In short, Romero-Barcelo
construed the FWPCA as preserving the courts’ discretion to
determine the manner in which a polluter should come into
compliance, not as giving them discretion to negate the statutory
policy itself.217
Justice Stevens dissented in Romero-Barcelo, challenging the
majority’s reasoning as too facile. Congress had itself made a
judgment that the permit process was necessary, he argued, and the
federal courts had no business second-guessing that decision.218 Thus,
while the judiciary did retain some discretion in enforcing the
FWPCA, “a general rule of immediate cessation must be applied in
all but a narrow category of cases.”219 The Court’s failure to adhere to
the “strong presumption in favor of enforcing the law as Congress has
written it” was, he asserted, particularly regrettable in an
environmental case.220
Despite that protest, the Court adhered closely to its Romero-
Barcelo reasoning in another case five years later. Amoco Production
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 316–18.
216. Id. at 320.
217. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 247–48 (2d ed. 1993) (interpreting Hill and
Romero-Barcelo as giving courts “[d]iscretion to deny remedies, not discretion to deny rights”).
218. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 322.
220. Id. at 326.
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Co. v. Village of Gambell221 involved a challenge to a sale by the
Secretary of the Interior of oil and gas leases off the coast of Alaska.
Residents of two Alaskan native villages sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent oil companies from conducting exploratory
activities in the leased areas. One of the plaintiffs’ claims was that the
Secretary had not complied with the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act (ANILCA), which required him to hold a hearing
and make certain findings before taking action that would impair
natural resources used for subsistence purposes in Alaska. The
district court agreed that the Secretary had not complied with
ANILCA, but refused to enter the injunction. The Ninth Circuit
reversed and directed the entry of a preliminary injunction,
contending that “injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy for a
violation of an environmental statute absent rare or unusual
circumstances.”222
Again speaking through Justice White, the Supreme Court
disagreed with the court of appeals, finding in ANILCA no “clear
indication” that Congress meant to “deny federal district courts their
traditional equitable discretion.”223 The Court explained that “the
Ninth Circuit erroneously focused on the statutory procedure rather
than on the underlying substantive policy the process was designed to
effect—preservation of subsistence resources.”224 Justice White
acknowledged that if environmental injury is sufficiently likely,
equitable balancing will usually favor the issuance of an injunction,
because such an injury is often irreparable and can seldom be
adequately remedied by money damages.225 In this instance, however,
the district court had expressly found that the oil companies’
exploration activities were unlikely to impair subsistence resources.226
Moreover, the companies would need to obtain additional permission
from the Secretary before taking further steps, such as development
and production.227 On the other hand, the Court said, issuance of the
injunction would cost the oil companies $70 million in nonrecoverable
221. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
222. People of the Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985).
223. Gambell, 480 U.S. at 544.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 545.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 538 n.6, 544.
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expenses and would hinder the public interest in development of
energy resources.228
If the holdings of Romero-Barcelo and Gambell created an
impression that the Supreme Court, despite its protestations to the
contrary, was prepared to give lower courts unlimited freedom to
modify regulatory legislation through equitable balancing, that
impression presumably has now been dispelled by the Court’s recent
decision in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative.229
The United States sought an injunction under the federal Controlled
Substances Act to prevent the Cooperative from distributing and
manufacturing marijuana for medical purposes. The district court
granted the injunction. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit directed the
district court to modify its injunction, in the exercise of equitable
authority, to permit patients to use the drug if they could show a
“medical necessity.” The Supreme Court was not prepared to tolerate
this. It held that the Act contained no exemption for “medical
necessity,” and that courts could not rely on the traditions of equity as
a backdoor means of creating one.230 Writing for the Court, Justice
Thomas returned to the rationale of TVA v. Hill:
Courts of equity cannot, in their discretion, reject the balance that
Congress has struck in a statute. Their choice (unless there is
statutory language to the contrary) is simply whether a particular
means of enforcing the statute should be chosen over another
permissible means; their choice is not whether enforcement is
preferable to no enforcement at all.231
It is tempting to look to ideology to explain the Court’s renewed
emphasis on congressional policies as a trump to equitable discretion.
Was the Court simply inclined to be more zealous about the war on
drugs than about environmental protection? Perhaps. Yet the Court
also went out of its way to declare that it was not abandoning the
teachings of Romero-Barcelo. Justice Thomas devoted an entire
subsection of his opinion to emphasizing that the issuance of an
228. Id. at 545–46. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Scalia, declined to join this section of
the Court’s opinion. He noted that the Court’s disposition of other issues made it unnecessary to
reach the question of the proper standard for granting an injunction. Id. at 555–56 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see infra note 235 (explaining the Court’s
additional holding).
229. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
230. Id. at 494, 497.
231. Id. at 497–98 (citation omitted).
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injunction is discretionary unless a statute clearly provides
otherwise.232 The Controlled Substances Act, he continued, contained
no such clear statement.233 The Court noted that, in contexts like that
of this Act, “criminal enforcement is an alternative, and indeed the
customary, means of ensuring compliance with the statute. Congress’
resolution of the policy issues can be (and usually is) upheld without
an injunction.”234
In summary, despite some superficially contrasting results, the
cases reviewed in this Section appear to fall into a reasonably
consistent pattern. Their collective message is that a court may not
rely on equity to repudiate a statutory objective outright, but it has
some leeway to decide whether or not to grant an injunction as a
means of achieving compliance with the statutory scheme. Romero-
Barcelo and Gambell suggest, more specifically, that a court may
decline to order immediate cessation of a continuing violation if the
breach in question is expected to be temporary,235 the requirement
being violated is merely a means to an ultimate statutory purpose, the
defendant’s impairment of that underlying purpose is minimal or
nonexistent, and the costs to the defendant of complying with the
injunction would be high. To be sure, in a given context there can be
room for debate as to whether the requirement that the defendant is
violating is merely a “means” or implicates a more fundamental
statutory purpose. Such a disagreement provided the impetus for
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Romero-Barcelo. Thus, the task of applying
the principles requires a court to make delicate judgments about
232. Id. at 496–97.
233. Id. at 496.
234. Id. at 497. A separate opinion in Oakland Cannabis suggested that cultivation and
possession—as distinguished from distribution and manufacturing—of marijuana should be
tolerated under the Controlled Substances Act for seriously ill patients. Id. at 501–02 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment). By expressing a preference for criminal enforcement, the Court
may have intended to leave room for executive officials to achieve such a possibility, at least as a
practical matter, through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
235. In Gambell, the Court did not refer to the defendants’ breach as temporary. This
omission, however, is readily explained by an unusual feature of the case. In a separate section
of its opinion, the Court upheld the district court’s ruling that ANILCA did not apply to the
contested leases at all. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546–55 (1987).
Thus, in these two courts’ view, the Secretary had not committed a statutory violation in the first
place. As Justice White pointed out, had the district court not reached this conclusion, it could
easily have ordered the Secretary to hold the hearing and make the findings prescribed in
ANILCA. Id. at 543 n.8. Such a mandate would have supplied the alternative remedy
envisioned by Romero-Barcelo.
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legislative objectives.236 The overall framework for analysis, however,
is fairly well defined.
Hecht, Romero-Barcelo, and Oakland Cannabis grew out of civil
litigation, in which the courts had original jurisdiction. With minor
adaptations, however, one can easily extrapolate the teachings of
those cases to fit the context of judicial review of agency action,
where the court acts in a basically appellate capacity. (Indeed, it
would seem that in Gambell the Court has already made that
extrapolation, although it did so sub silentio and perhaps with no
attention to its possible significance.) The “set aside” remedy of
section 706 of the APA is functionally similar to an injunction and, as
I have shown above, is rooted in the traditions of equity.
236. See, e.g., United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d 36, 58 (1st Cir. 2001)
(refusing to require the defendant to install a filtration system, as prescribed in an EPA rule,
because the court regarded that step as unnecessary to secure the Safe Drinking Water Act’s
goal of water purity). Cases involving a defendant agency’s failure to prepare an impact
statement, such as the one prescribed by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2000), exemplify the difficulty of applying the Court’s teachings. The
holdings vary widely. See Sarah W. Rubenstein, Injunctions Under NEPA After Weinberger v.
Romero–Barcelo and Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 5 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 13–17
(1998) (compiling cases). One prominent analysis is that of then-Judge Breyer in Sierra Club v.
Marsh, 872 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989). He argued that the case for enjoining a federal project if the
initiating agency has not prepared a required environmental impact statement is somewhat
stronger than in Gambell, because NEPA contains no judicially enforceable substantive
provisions that could support an ultimate judicial reversal “on the merits,” as ANILCA did.
Thus, he said, an injunction is the court’s only available tool with which to cure a NEPA
violation. Id. at 502–04. See Rubenstein, supra, at 21 (endorsing this analysis); Leslye A.
Herrmann, Comment, Injunctions for NEPA Violations: Balancing the Equities, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1263, 1290 (1992) (same). But see, e.g., Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d
190, 201–02, 206–07 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.) (remanding to allow the FAA to supplement
an environmental impact statement with a required conflict-of-interest form, but declining
under Romero-Barcelo to treat this breach as a reason to invalidate the FAA’s approval of
airport expansion plan).
The Sierra Club reasoning seems at best incomplete, because the substantive purposes
embedded in other congressional legislation, including the agency’s enabling statute, can also
deserve consideration on the equity balance scale. See Gambell, 480 U.S. at 546 (mentioning, as
one factor militating against injunctive relief in that case, the public’s interest in oil production,
as recognized in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act). However, even if one accepts the
argument of Sierra Club, there is a sense in which the “irreparable harm” element in most
NEPA cases will tend to be more severe (and thus more deserving of an injunction) than in the
fact situations that potentially lend themselves to remand without vacation. In the latter
situations, the adverse effects of an agency’s APA violation will generally be felt only during an
interim period, while the agency is considering how to cure that violation. In contrast, a court’s
willingness to allow a federal agency to proceed with a project without analyzing its possible
environmental consequences would create a risk of a permanent negation of NEPA’s purposes
in relation to that project.
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Consequently, the Hecht doctrine carries strong implications
concerning the proper dimensions of remand without vacation.
Specifically, the logic of Hill and Oakland Cannabis suggests that
where an administrative agency has injured a citizen by acting in a
manner that the substantive statute flatly forbids, or by withholding a
benefit to which the citizen is flatly entitled, a court has no room to
use “equitable balancing” to override the statute. Indeed, as we shall
see, courts have not resorted to remand without vacation in these
situations.237 Many administrative law cases, however, involve no such
categorical statutory breach, but instead an exercise of discretion.238 It
may appear to the court that the agency might be able to justify its
action, or something very similar to it, by following better procedure
or giving better reasons for its decision. Here, Romero-Barcelo and
Gambell imply that the judiciary should retain a residuum of
flexibility. In some circumstances, they suggest, a reviewing court
might allow temporary continuation of an agency action that does not
comply with the APA, especially where the balance of practical
hardships favors such a disposition.
There remains, however, the commentators’ fundamental
normative question about the Hecht doctrine: Should not a court
hesitate to use equitable doctrines to supplement, and in a sense to
supersede, the remedial framework that Congress has created? The
most carefully developed argument for judicial self-restraint is that of
Professor Daniel Farber. In essence, his analysis is an elaboration of
the Stevens position in Romero-Barcelo. He starts from the premise
237. See infra notes 394–95 and accompanying text.
238. The importance of agency discretion in administrative law reveals the limited utility, in
this context, of a proposal offered by Professor David Schoenbrod. He would replace the
equitable balancing of Romero-Barcelo with a guideline that he views as less incoherent. He
proposes that, in bestowing or withholding injunctive relief, a court should never aim to give the
plaintiff more than his or her rightful position; however, it may grant less than the rightful
position if the alternative relief is consistent with the goals of the statute and is warranted by
circumstances that were not reflected in the formulation of the underlying rule. Schoenbrod,
supra note 201, at 647. “[R]ightful position” means “the position that the plaintiff would have
had but for the wrong.” Id. at 628. Schoenbrod’s rule of thumb may be workable where the
plaintiff has been deprived of a categorical statutory right. In a typical administrative law case,
however, in which the violation involves incorrect procedure or inadequate reasoning, a court
would have considerable difficulty using the plaintiff’s “rightful position” as a reference point.
This would be true not simply because of possible vagueness in the underlying law, but also, and
more fundamentally, because only the agency would have authority to decide what “position”
the plaintiff should occupy. See infra Part IV.B. It would hardly be appropriate for the court to
define the plaintiff’s “rightful position” as reinstatement of the state of affairs that existed prior
to the agency’s action. Such a restoration of the status quo ante might well retard, rather than
promote, the objectives of the underlying regulatory scheme.
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that the scope of equitable discretion depends on congressional
intent, but he also recognizes that legislative intent on this point is
often unclear.239 He then sets forth three reasons why, in the particular
context of modern environmental legislation, courts should resolve
these close cases by applying a presumption against the exercise of
equitable discretion. First, according to Farber, equitable discretion is
“superfluous” in most such contexts, because “modern environmental
statutes . . . contain elaborate mechanisms for taking cost and
hardship into account while providing considerable discretion to
administrative agencies.”240 Second, “many environmental cases . . .
involve value judgments that are inherently political in nature and
that should be made by a politically accountable entity.”241 Third,
Congress has often proved willing to provide its own remedies for
overly stringent statutory requirements in environmental regulation.
Thus, “[t]he availability of legislative relief reduces the need for
judicial assistance.”242
None of Farber’s three policy arguments supports a similar
presumption against equitable discretion when the statutory scheme
that the courts are implementing is the APA. First, the judicial review
provisions of the APA243 are written in broad terms, not detailed ones.
They provide a framework for consideration of matters such as
reviewability, standing, finality, and the scope of judicial review, but
most of the conceptual foundations of each of these topics have been
defined through judicial case law. Second, remand without vacation
actually enhances the leeway available to political actors. It leaves the
defendant agency—a politically accountable entity—free to
determine for itself how to react in the short run to the court’s refusal
to uphold the original administrative action on the merits. Third, and
derivatively from the second point, remand without vacation may
actually augment congressional influence. In a typical APA case, the
likelihood that the legislature will reinstate a given rule or
adjudicative order that a court has vacated is usually remote.244 To
239. Farber, supra note 208, at 542; see also Schoenbrod, supra note 201, at 632–33 (arguing
that courts need “trans-substantive” principles in this area, because legislative intent is usually
inconclusive).
240. Farber, supra note 208, at 542.
241. Id. at 542–43.
242. Id. at 543.
243. 5 U.S.C §§ 701–706 (2000).
244. This argument may seem directly contrary to Farber’s analysis. Recall, however, that he
offered his observation in the specific context of environmental programs, in which
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override a court order, Congress needs to pass a statute, a task that
for familiar Madisonian reasons is not easy to accomplish. If,
however, a court has utilized remand without vacation and thereby
given the agency the freedom to decide on its next move, interested
members of Congress can readily resort to their usual methods of
informal persuasion (and pressure) to influence the agency’s choice.
An additional, and compelling, justification for circumspection in
the APA context is that a court’s use of the section 706 “set aside”
remedy—in effect, if not in form, an “injunction” rectifying the APA
violation—will often work against the thrust of the substantive
statute. A judicial decree that vacates an inadequately reasoned
antipollution regulation, for example, vindicates the APA policy
against arbitrary decisionmaking, but may also weaken the
government’s environmental program. In these circumstances, then,
congressionally endorsed values typically press in more than one
direction.245 A system that retains some play in the joints has the
virtue of allowing the reviewing court to take account of the
objectives of each statute involved. To that extent, at least, a principle
of flexibility looks more attractive than a bright-line principle that
requires all violations to be “set aside” forthwith.
Ultimately, I have no quarrel with the admonition by Farber and
others that courts should remain cognizant of whatever limitations
the underlying legislation, fairly interpreted, may place on their
exercise of equitable discretion. The discussion in this Section
highlights the prominent role that equitable discretion has played
over the years in the case law on remedies for violations of regulatory
statutes. I also have explained why certain objections to that
discretion, as voiced in other contexts, have limited force in the
context of the APA. Nevertheless, commentators who fear that this
doctrine opens the door to excessive judicial discretion raise a
legitimate issue. I will discuss those concerns more fully in the
next Part.
congressional oversight tends to be exceptionally intense. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected
Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch
the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 206 (Autumn 1991). One should
hesitate to extrapolate from experience in that subject area to other contexts.
245. The Court took account of a similar tension in Gambell. See supra note 236.
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IV.  POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO REMAND WITHOUT VACATION
My argument to this point has been that remand without
vacation, though arguably foreclosed by the language of section 706
of the APA, can be validated if that section is interpreted in light of
the Hecht v. Bowles canon of statutory construction. As Part III
showed, a prominent tradition of equitable remedial discretion
supports the application of the canon in this situation.
However, the strength of the canon argument may also be its
weakness. Just as I have relied heavily on background principles of
our legal system to support my preferred reading of the APA, other
analysts can readily appeal to other background principles as a reason
not to apply the canon. Thus, I must come to grips with a variety of
doctrinal and policy factors that may make some judges reluctant to
adhere to the canon under these circumstances. Specifically, their
reluctance might stem from (a) general reservations about equitable
balancing; (b) a desire to prevent the courts from intruding upon the
legitimate prerogatives of the executive branch; or (c) concern for
maintaining the rule of law and providing sufficient redress to
litigants, namely citizens who have won their appeal on the merits but
might be denied effective relief. This Part addresses these potential
reservations about remand without vacation. In doing so, I will again
need to take a wide-ranging look at the courts’ remedial discretion,
this time with greater attention to its limits.
A. The Formalist Challenge
Part III showed that pragmatism and flexibility have been
recurrent and durable themes in the jurisprudence of administrative
law remedies. Viewed in isolation, the doctrines surveyed in that Part
would lead one to assume that remand without vacation, with all its
practical advantages, would elicit significant support from the
Supreme Court. The overall jurisprudential picture is, however, more
mixed. For it is also true that the Court has recently adopted
distinctly inflexible doctrinal stances in a few other contexts that
seem, on their facts, closely related to remand without vacation. I will
highlight two such lines of decisions in this Section. Both, as it
happens, have emerged in the context of retroactivity.246 At first
246. For broader treatments of retroactivity, see DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE
LEGISLATION (1998); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1997); Nelson Lund, Retroactivity, Institutional Incentives, and the
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glance, to be sure, neither seems to be rooted primarily in the law of
remedies. As the Justices have been well aware, however, the
principles stemming from both lines of cases operate, in effect, as
limitations on the exercise of remedial discretion.
Particularly evident in these cases has been a movement away
from the kind of case-by-case balancing that has historically been
associated with equitable relief. These developments suggest that the
Court, or at least some Justices, might have similar doubts about the
highly discretionary device of remand without vacation. In fact, a
peek at the Court’s private papers reveals the actual existence of
such doubts.247
Seen in this light, the question of the lawfulness of remand
without vacation exemplifies what academics have often described as
the tension between “rules” and “standards”248—or, to use the
terminology I prefer, between formalism and pragmatism.249 The
contrast between these two styles of decisionmaking provides a
helpful way of thinking about much of the Supreme Court’s recent
jurisprudence, as even commentators writing in the mainstream press
have remarked.250 Justice Scalia is often identified as a leading
exponent of the “formalist” side of the debate,251 and Justices
Politics of Civil Rights, 1995 PUB. INT. L. REV. 87; Russell L. Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory
Interpretations: An Analysis of Judicial Responses, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (1986).
247. See infra notes 271–76 and accompanying text.
248. A leading article by Dean Sullivan has popularized this terminology. See Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
249. I do not favor the “rules”-”standards” terminology in the present context, because it
tends to beg the question of whether courts should at the very least be expected to apply a well-
defined analytical framework—a “standard”—as they make decisions about remand without
vacation. Indeed, Dean Sullivan and others recognize that the terms “rules” and “standards”
actually represent only two points on a continuum of possible approaches that embody varying
degrees of open-endedness. See Sullivan, supra note 248, at 58 n.231; Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 959–68 (1995). In fact, however, the D.C. Circuit
seems to be well on the way to developing a coherent standard that it can successfully apply to
most of these situations. See infra Part V.
250. See Walter Dellinger, The Breakfast Table, SLATE, June 24, 2002, at http://slate.msn.
com/id/2067003/entry/2067324/ (describing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), as
reflecting a split between the Court’s “Legalists” of the left and right, on the one hand, and its
“Pragmatists,” on the other) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Linda Greenhouse, The
Competing Visions of the Role of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, § 4, at 3 (explaining the
Court’s internal “debate over text versus context,” and comparing it with Sullivan’s typology).
251. Sullivan, supra note 248, at 65; see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989) (urging that appellate judges apply “the law of rules”
whenever possible); Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 999–1020 (1994) (reviewing Justice Scalia’s formalist writings and
opinions in detail).
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Stevens252 and Breyer253 as defenders of pragmatism and flexibility. All
of these theoretical constructs could undoubtedly be framed with a
great deal more precision than I have displayed here.254 For some
purposes, for example, a rule-based approach could and should be
distinguished from a “formalist” approach. The relatively simple
categories of analysis that I have just set forth should, however, prove
sufficient for the limited purposes to which I will put them in the
following discussion.
At a high level of generality, much can be said on both sides of
the rules-standards debate. One camp can argue, for example, that
rules tend to offer consistency and predictability of application, ease
of administration, and protection against arbitrary or subjective
decisionmaking by unelected judges.255 The opposing camp can
respond by saying, among other things, that flexible standards allow
decisionmakers to avoid the over- or underinclusiveness of rigid
rules,256 as well as to adapt to changing circumstances over time.257 Of
course, one can favor rules to govern some legal problems and
standards to govern others.258 I do not prefer the latter over the
former in all situations.259 I will maintain, however, that in the
particular case of remand without vacation, the courts should opt for
252. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 248, at 88–90.
253. See Greenhouse, supra note 250 (reporting Dean Sullivan’s view that Justice Breyer is
now the “quintessential justice of standards”); see also Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic
Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 249, 269–71 (2002) (asserting that his own approach to
constitutional decisionmaking, which emphasizes “the real-world consequences of a particular
interpretive decision,” is no more subjective than the “more literal approach” favored by other
judges).
254. See generally Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1999).
255. See Sullivan, supra note 248, at 62–66; Sunstein, supra note 249, at 969–77.
256. Sunstein, supra note 249, at 992–93.
257. See Sullivan, supra note 248, at 66; Sunstein, supra note 249, at 993–94.
258. Laycock, supra note 198, at 73–74; Sunstein, supra note 249, at 1012–16.
259. For example, I agree with Professor Merrill’s contention that predictable, easy-to-apply
principles should govern the courts’ decision, in a given case, as to the proper scope of review of
a statutory interpretation rendered by an administrative agency. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead
Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 819–26
(2002). Indeed, I would simplify the choice even further than Merrill would, because I believe
(as does Justice Scalia) that the distinctions the Court has recently set forth in this area, with
Merrill’s support, should in most circumstances not be drawn at all. See Ronald M. Levin, Mead
and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771 (2002). See also Devlin v.
Scardelleti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002). In Devlin, the Court abandoned the bright-line rule that a class
member may not appeal from a settlement without first intervening in the class action. Id. at 14.
To me, Justice Scalia’s protest against the majority’s vague alternative approach is quite
persuasive. See id. at 18–23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (denouncing the Court’s “exponential
increase in indeterminacy”).
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flexibility. Accordingly, this Part concludes with a discussion of why,
in this context, the allure of recent thrusts toward formalism—like the
allure of a literal reading of section 706—should be resisted.
1. The Decline of Retroactive Rulemaking. When a court uses
remand without vacation to permit an invalid agency rule to affect
legal rights before its errors have been cured, its choice is comparable
in some respects to permitting a rule to affect legal rights
retroactively. The Supreme Court strongly discouraged the latter
practice in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital.260 In
Georgetown, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
adopted a rule in 1981 that revised the formula for calculating its
reimbursements to hospitals for the services they rendered to
Medicare beneficiaries. A group of District of Columbia hospitals,
including Georgetown, challenged the rule in a district court, which
invalidated the rule in 1983 because it had been adopted without
notice and comment procedure. HHS then readopted the rule in 1984,
using proper procedures. The 1984 rule was retroactive, in that it
purported to allow HHS to recoup from the hospitals the amounts
that the agency would have saved in 1981 and 1982 if the initial rule
had been validly in force during that period. As Justice Kennedy later
noted in his opinion for the Court, “the net result was as if the
original rule had never been set aside.”261
Under the 1984 rule, the Washington hospitals stood to lose
more than $2 million in reimbursements for services they had
rendered in 1981 and 1982. They again brought suit. The Supreme
Court held that the retroactive aspect of the 1984 rule was invalid.
Justice Kennedy wrote: “Retroactivity is not favored in the law.
Thus, . . . a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not,
as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power to
promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by
Congress in express terms.”262 The Medicare Act, however, did not
authorize retroactive rulemaking.
Why did the Court adopt this canon disfavoring retroactivity? Its
opinion provided no enlightenment. One could assume that one of its
260. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
261. Id. at 207.
262. Id. at 208. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia read the APA to require a similar
result, i.e., that a rule could not be retroactive unless Congress had specifically authorized such
an effect. Id. at 216–25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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reasons was the basic unfairness of imposing a detriment on a
regulated person for conduct that has already been completed. These
concerns about inadequate notice and unfair surprise, which have
strong due process overtones, presumably also contributed to Justice
Kennedy’s further declaration that “congressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this result.”263 The Court reaffirmed
this latter canon in a detailed opinion six years later in Landgraf v.
USI Film Products.264 However, the due process theme does not seem
to have been the only factor at work in Georgetown. The Court also
appears to have been motivated by a more abstract concern about
orderly process and the rule of law.
This component of the Court’s thinking is discernible in its
reaction to the Secretary’s argument that the Court should tolerate
the regulation in the case at bar because it was a “curative” rule,
designed to repair the defects in an earlier rule that had been
invalidated. Such a rule, the government argued, would often
promote “congressional intent and important substantive goals,” and
in any event would not defeat substantial reliance interests, because
the original, invalidated rule would have provided at least some
notice to regulated persons.265 But the Court rejected this plea,
declaring that the Medicare statute denied the Secretary the authority
he sought.266 Justice Scalia, in concurrence, was even more caustic on
this point:
[E]ven if I felt free to construct my own model of desirable
administrative procedure, I would assuredly not sanction “curative”
retroactivity. I fully agree with the District of Columbia Circuit [in
the decision below] that acceptance of the Secretary’s position
would “make a mockery . . . of the APA,” since “agencies would be
free to violate the rulemaking requirements of the APA with
impunity if, upon invalidation of a rule, they were free to ‘re-issue’
that rule on a retroactive basis.”267
As one measure of how far the Court in Georgetown seems to
have drifted away, at least temporarily, from the flexible doctrines of
263. Id. at 208 (opinion of the Court).
264. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
265. Georgetown, 488 U.S. at 215.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 225 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. Bowen, 821 F.2d
750, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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remedial discretion that it has embraced in many other corners of the
law, consider the contrast between the Court’s decision in
Georgetown and the district court’s decision in the same case. The
district court had invalidated the retroactive Medicare reimbursement
regulation using an equitable balancing test—the same test that the
D.C. Circuit uses to evaluate the retroactivity of administrative
agencies’ adjudicative precedents.268 The Court obviously was aware
of that potential basis for resolving the case, but its rationale was
conspicuously different.269
Now suppose the district court had held in the 1983 appeal that
the original rule had to be sent back to HHS for notice and comment
proceedings, but that the 1981 rule could remain in effect during
those proceedings. The pointed language in the Court’s statement of
facts would again be true: “the net result [would be] as if the original
rule had never been set aside.” Indeed, that would be precisely the
effect, with no “as if” about it. Applying the logic of Justice Scalia’s
concurrence, one might argue that if “curative” rulemaking makes a
“mockery” of the APA, remand without vacation does the same—for
an agency should not be able to do directly what Georgetown says it
may not do indirectly. An agency would surely not need to make a
subsequent (curative) rule retroactive if it could simply continue to
regulate under the old one during the remand proceedings. In other
words, if “retroactivity is not favored in the law,” one can argue with
at least some force that an agency should not normally be able to
268. See id. at 207–08 (opinion of the Court) (noting the district court’s reliance on Retail,
Wholesale & Department Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). Justice Scalia
indicated that courts should employ a similar test to determine whether a rule that has
“secondary retroactivity” (i.e., that applies only to future transactions but does so in a way that
alters the practical consequences of past private choices) is arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 219–
20 (Scalia, J., concurring). For post-Retail Union developments concerning the balancing test
applied to retroactive agency adjudication, see, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. FERC, 315 F.3d
316, 323–24 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074,
1081–86 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
269. See also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994). Rivers, a companion
case to Landgraf, rejected the idea that the presumption against retroactivity lawmaking is
suspended if the enactment “restores” what was generally believed to be the law when the
parties acted. Id. at 310–11. (The statute in Rivers was “restorative” in the sense that it
reinstated a rule of law that the Court had recently and unexpectedly abandoned. Id.) Like the
Court’s resistance to “curative” rulemaking in Georgetown, Rivers seems to confirm that the
Court’s reservations about retroactivity do not revolve entirely around the objective of avoiding
unfair surprise to individuals.
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impose monetary or other liability with respect to a time period
during which it had no valid rule on the books.270
As a matter of fact, there is direct evidence that at least some of
the Justices were well aware that their ruling could affect the use of
remand without vacation, and they wanted to avoid encouraging it.
That evidence comes from the Supreme Court’s internal working
papers on Georgetown, some of which are now in the public
domain.271 In a first draft of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
proposed dicta that would have endorsed, in principle, the
government’s argument in support of curative rulemaking—although
the draft went on to conclude that such a remedy was unwarranted in
the particular circumstances of that case.272 His draft said that
“[w]here the exigencies of the case or the importance of the policies
served by a judicially invalidated regulation create a compelling need
for retroactive correction, courts may exercise their equitable
discretion to remand to the agency or to stay invalidation of the
challenged regulation pending curative rulemaking.”273 Justice Scalia
responded with a memo asking him to omit that language. He wrote:
270. Whether Georgetown leads directly to a conclusion against remand without vacation
was an incidental issue in ICORE, Inc. v. FCC, 985 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The FCC
approved a schedule of rates in 1986 that reduced the amounts that local telephone companies
could charge their customers for routing their calls to long-distance carriers. On review, the
court of appeals remanded the rate decision, deeming it poorly reasoned, but did not vacate it.
City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1171–72 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The rates thus
remained in effect during the next several years, while the Commission revised its reasoning to
meet the court’s criticisms. Eventually, in 1991, the Commission readopted the same rates for
long-term use. In a second appeal, the telephone companies argued that the implementation of
the original rates during the 1986–91 period constituted retroactive rulemaking within the
meaning of Georgetown. The court disagreed. It maintained that, although Georgetown would
have prevented the agency from filling a regulatory “gap” retroactively, if the court had vacated
the initial rates, the Supreme Court’s opinion did not mean that the court had been obligated to
create such a gap in the first place. ICORE, 985 F.2d at 1082.
On its own terms, the decision in ICORE seems clearly correct, because the court in the
later case was simply following out the implications of the relief ordered in the earlier case. The
petitioners were in effect asking the court to act as though the rate schedule had been vacated.
At best, therefore, their challenge came too late. The larger issue, however, is whether the relief
granted in the earlier appeal had been appropriate in the first place. The court did not really
come to grips with the tensions between the remand without vacation case law and the potential
underlying implications of the Supreme Court’s decision.
271. These internal working papers on the Georgetown decision are available in the Justice
Thurgood Marshall documents collection at the Library of Congress.
272. Justice Anthony Kennedy, Draft Op., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital 11–12
(Nov. 22, 1988) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
273. Id. at 11.
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The judicial review provision of the APA provides that “the
reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency
action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C.
§706(2)(A). I think we would be buying grief to suggest that a court
may exercise its equitable discretion to disregard this provision by
leaving a regulation “not in accordance with law” in effect, or by
allowing a revised rule to be formulated and then applied as though
it had been issued earlier. . . . [I]t is not wise for us to invite agencies
to seek exercise of “equitable discretion” to let invalid rules stand.
. . . .
I am confident that the dicta in [the draft majority opinion] will be
seized upon by the government to urge “a compelling need for
retroactive correction” in many cases where a regulation is
invalidated. Perhaps some courts of appeals have in effect exercised
such a power in the past, but we should not approve it—at least not
without argument and careful consideration.274
Justices Stevens and Blackmun then also wrote brief memos to
Kennedy, stating that they shared Scalia’s concerns.275 At that point,
Kennedy deleted the disputed language, replacing it with a simple
statement that the government’s arguments need not be addressed
because “[t]he case before us is resolved by the particular statutory
scheme in question.”276
Obviously, no one should equate the views that jurists express in
private correspondence with the views that they express in published
opinions. The former may be tentative and incompletely thought out;
the latter are positions that they have formally agreed to live with. In
this particular instance, Justice Scalia himself suggested in his memo
that “argument and careful consideration” might change his mind. I
am prepared to take his disclaimer at face value. Nevertheless, this
correspondence provides extraordinarily clear confirmation of the
intuition that members of the Court would be likely to entertain some
274. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Anthony Kennedy 1–2 (Nov. 28, 1988)
(second emphasis added) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
275. Letter from Justice Harry Blackmun to Justice Anthony Kennedy 1 (Nov. 30, 1988) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal); letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Anthony
Kennedy 1 (Nov. 29, 1988) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
276. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 215 (1988).
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doubts about remand without vacation. Proponents of the device
would have to overcome those doubts.
2. The Rise of Retroactivity in Judicial Decisions. Another arena
in which we can see a clash between formalist and pragmatic
approaches in public law, with the former winning out over the latter,
is a series of cases from the early 1990s in which the Supreme Court
considered the circumstances in which it would give retroactive effect
to a newly announced principle of constitutional law. In a way, these
cases are even more revealing than Georgetown, even though they do
not deal specifically with administrative law. In Georgetown, although
the Court announced an important constraint on courts’ and agencies’
remedial flexibility, its terse opinion did not really spell out reasons
for it. In contrast, the cases on retroactivity of judicial decisions
contain extensive—indeed verbose—discussion of the comparative
merits of formalist and pragmatic approaches to the problem at hand.
Thus, the cases deserve close attention here. The cases are complex,
however, so a somewhat extended explanation will be necessary.
At common law, courts normally gave full retroactive effect to
new case law principles. That is, a court would apply a newly declared
rule of law in all subsequent cases in which the rule was relevant, even
if the events underlying those cases had predated the announcement
of the new rule.277 During a period of about two decades, however,
roughly the 1970s and 1980s, the Court favored a different
approach.278 The leading case of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson279
prescribed a multifactor balancing test by which a court was to
determine whether to apply a new precedent retroactively. That
determination was to be made on the basis of whether the court had
established a new principle of law, whether retrospective operation
would further or retard the purposes of the rule, and whether
retroactive application would produce substantial injustice.280
The circumstances of Chevron Oil itself illustrate the operation
of the test. The substantive holding of the case was that personal
277. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993) (noting the traditional
rule); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965) (“At common law there was no authority
for the proposition that judicial decisions made law only for the future.”).
278. The preeminent contemporaneous article supporting this development was Roger J.
Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977).
279. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
280. Id. at 106–07.
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injury suits filed by injured workers under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act were governed by state statutes of limitations—not
by a federal doctrine of laches, as had previously been thought. The
Court decided, however, that this holding should apply only
prospectively. Thus, although an application of Louisiana’s one-year
statute of limitations would have rendered Mr. Huson’s suit untimely,
the Court allowed him to proceed, because the new rule had been
unforeseeable, would defeat the remedial purpose of the Act (i.e., to
aid injured workers by allowing them to use familiar state-law
remedies), and would be inequitable by depriving him of a day in
court to redress a serious injury.281 In short, the Chevron Oil test
roughly resembled a traditional balancing-of-equities approach.
Chevron Oil fell into disfavor in the 1990s in a series of cases
involving state taxes that were held to violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. The first modification of the balancing test occurred in James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.282 That case involved a challenge to
Georgia’s practice of taxing liquor imported from out of state at a
higher rate than liquor produced in Georgia. For many years,
disparities of this kind were considered permissible because of the
states’ reserved powers under the Twenty-First Amendment.283 In
1984, however, the Court held in a case from Hawaii, Bacchus
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,284 that a tax like Georgia’s discriminated against
interstate commerce and was invalid. In Beam, the question was
whether this new constitutional ruling should apply to taxes Georgia
had collected prior to Bacchus. Writing for three Justices, Justice
O’Connor argued that it should not. She relied squarely on Chevron
Oil reasoning: Georgia authorities had relied in good faith on pre-
Bacchus case law, and the state would suffer hardship if it were forced
281. Id. at 107–08.
282. 501 U.S. 529 (1991). In the interest of simplifying this account, I will forego discussion
of American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990), a slightly earlier case in which
the Justices engaged in lengthy debate over the same issues as in Beam, but reached no
definitive result. See Charles Rothfeld, The Cost of Turning Back the Clock, THE RECORDER,
Oct. 2, 1992, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library, Recrdr File (offering an incisive and
pungent discussion of American Trucking and Beam). Also in the interest of simplification, I
will omit discussion of a series of criminal cases in which the Court followed a path similar to its
treatment of civil cases. Compare Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 629 (applying a test
resembling that of Chevron Oil), with Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987)
(rejecting the Linkletter approach).
283. See Beam, 501 U.S. at 554–56 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (summarizing the case law).
284. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
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to refund all of the incorrectly collected money.285 A decision
requiring states to comply with Bacchus in the future would suffice.286
But that was a dissenting opinion, and a majority of Justices in
Beam saw the matter differently. For Justice Souter, joined by Justice
Stevens, the dispositive consideration was that the state was
advocating “selective prospectivity.”287 The Court had already applied
the new Commerce Clause rule to one litigant, namely the taxpayer in
Bacchus. Thus, failure to apply the same rule to Beam would breach
“the principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the
same, a fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule of law
generally.”288 In short, Souter’s position was that “it is error to refuse
to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing
the rule has already done so.”289 He went on to emphasize the
difference between his approach and a balancing-of-equities
approach. His position was based on “the nature of precedent, as a
necessary component of any system that aspires to fairness and
equality,” regardless of whether the parties had “actually relied on
the old rule and how they would suffer from retroactive application of
the new.”290
The Souter position was technically reconcilable with Chevron
Oil, because, in Justice Souter’s jargon, the earlier case had involved
“pure” rather than “selective” prospectivity.291 That is, the Court
adopted a prospective-only holding without having yet applied the
new rule to anyone, including Mr. Huson. However, three concurring
Justices in Beam—Blackmun, Marshall, and Scalia—declared that
they would have preferred to abandon Chevron Oil entirely.292
Regardless of whether the Court in an earlier case had given the
successful challenger the benefit of the new rule, they argued, “the
integrity of judicial review . . . does not justify applying principles
determined to be wrong to litigants who are in or may still come
to court.”293
285. Beam, 501 U.S. at 557–59 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 550–51.
287. See id. at 537–41 (plurality opinion) (Souter, J.).
288. See id. at 537.
289. Id. at 540.
290. Id. at 543.
291. See id. at 536–37 (explaining this terminology).
292. See id. at 547–48 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
293. Id.
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The next step in the story came two years later in Harper v.
Virginia Department of Taxation,294 in which a majority of the Court,
speaking through Justice Thomas, adopted the prohibition on
selective prospectivity that Justice Souter had espoused.295 At the
same time, the Court’s opinion avoided disavowing the broader
position advocated by the Beam concurrences. If anything, the
opinion suggested that the Court might well endorse that position in a
case that squarely presented that issue.296
So far, these cases had not dealt directly with remedial discretion.
Indeed, Beam and Harper had specifically reserved the possibility
that states might be able to use remedial principles to ameliorate the
strict teachings of those cases.297 Soon afterwards, however, in
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde,298 the Court threw cold water on
this possibility. As in Chevron Oil, the question in Hyde was whether
a personal injury action was time-barred. The Supreme Court had
recently held that the tolling provision in Ohio’s limitations statute
was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, and relief had
been granted on that basis. Nevertheless, the state supreme court
decided to give the plaintiff the benefit of the tolling provision. In the
Supreme Court, the plaintiff defended this ruling as a valid exercise of
the state court’s discretion to take her reliance interests into account
in fashioning an equitable remedy for the state’s constitutional
violation. Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer responded
that “this type of justification—often present when prior law is
overruled—is the very sort that this Court, in Harper, found
insufficient to deny retroactive application of a new legal rule.”299
Thus, “[i]f Harper has anything more than symbolic significance,”
294. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
295. See id. at 97.
296. See id. at 115 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discerning this implication in the majority
opinion). A minority of Justices in Harper continued to support Chevron Oil, although they
divided as to how to apply it to the facts of the case at bar. Compare id. at 113–31 (O’Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Chevron Oil required nonretroactivity), with
id. at 110–12 (Kennedy, J., joined by White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that Chevron Oil permitted retroactive imposition of Virginia’s tax, because
the unconstitutionality of the tax had been predictable).
297. See Beam, 501 U.S. at 544 (Souter, J.) (plurality opinion) and Harper, 509 U.S. at 100–
02. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1764–66 (1991) (arguing that problems
resulting from changes in legal doctrine are best addressed through the law of remedies).
298. 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
299. Id. at 753.
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plaintiff could not avoid retroactive application of the Commerce
Clause holding merely by characterizing the case as being about
“remedy” rather than “nonretroactivity.”300 As Justice Breyer went on
to explain, a court must apply constitutional holdings retroactively,
pursuant to Harper, except in a few limited circumstances, such as
where a court finds an “alternative way of curing the constitutional
violation,” or where further litigation is foreclosed by a final court
judgment.301
Now, what does the Court’s new jurisprudence on retroactivity of
judicial holdings have to say about the permissibility of remand
without vacation? At first glance, not much. Indeed, on a mundane
level, the two doctrines can coexist readily enough. Even assuming
that Beam, Harper, and Hyde apply to judicial review of agency
action,302 they have nothing to say, at least directly, about whether a
court must, in the first instance, vacate an administrative decision that
it finds to be inadequately supported. They merely prescribe equal
treatment among litigants. For example, if a court remands an
administrative decision at the behest of one litigant, it must do the
same for any other similarly situated litigant; and if the court vacates
the action as to one petitioner, it must be prepared to do the same
when another petitioner brings an indistinguishable case to the court.
These principles of equal treatment are already being honored in
300. Id. at 754.
301. Id. at 754–59.
302. The D.C. Circuit has held that the retroactivity principles of Beam and its progeny will
generally control the scope of judicial decisions invalidating agency action. Nat’l Fuel Gas
Supply Corp. v. FERC, 59 F.3d 1281, 1288–89 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The court noted that insofar as
the Supreme Court cases articulate the necessary consequences of an Article III court’s
judgment, both agencies and courts must accept those consequences. Id.
In dictum, however, the court pointed out a potentially important loophole in this rule. In
Hyde, the Supreme Court had mentioned that a constitutional decision need not be applied
retroactively if the state can find “an alternative way of curing” the problem with the law being
challenged. 514 U.S. at 759. For example, if a state tax discriminates against out-of-state
residents, the state can avoid having to make retroactive refunds to out-of-staters if it levies a
commensurately higher tax on local residents. Id. at 755–56. By extension, the D.C. Circuit said,
“an administrative agency may be able to cure the problem that a court has found in its order—
such as inadequate support in the record—and repromulgate the order with retroactive effect.”
Nat’l Fuel, 59 F.3d at 1290; cf. FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704, 707–09 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(allowing the FEC to proceed with a case that it had brought while unconstitutionally
composed, because the Commission had since been reorganized in a constitutional manner and
had ratified its earlier complaint). The National Fuel reasoning suggests that Beam should prove
no threat to the common situation in which a reviewing court remands an order to an agency,
and the agency then adheres to its previous action, using improved reasoning that responds to
the court’s concerns.
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regulatory contexts303 (although their applicability to the retroactivity
of agency decisions is less clear).304
Even if the Supreme Court were to extend its “retroactivity of
judicial holdings” case law to its logical terminus by overruling
Chevron Oil completely, appellate practice in regulatory contexts
might not be affected very profoundly, because prospective-only
303. See Jones Stevedoring Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs, 133 F.3d 683,
688–90 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that Supreme Court’s interpretation of notice requirement
applied retroactively to worker compensation claim, although in this instance the lack of notice
was excused as nonprejudicial); Nat’l Fuel, 59 F.3d at 1289–90 (stating that court’s invalidation
of “contract demand reduction” program in one case had the effect of retroactively preventing
Commission from granting reduction requests in parallel case); Raines v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 1355,
1363–64 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Supreme Court precedent retroactively so as to disallow
award of attorney fees to disability benefits claimant).
304. The D.C. Circuit has several times declined to decide whether the Beam doctrine
circumscribes an agency’s freedom to make one of its own adjudicative decisions prospective
only. See, e.g., Power Co. of Am. v. FERC, 245 F.3d 839, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2001); District Lodge 64,
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 949 F.2d 441, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1991). It has noted in dicta that
Justice Souter’s contention that like-situated litigants should be treated equally has force in both
judicial and administrative contexts. See id.; Nat’l Fuel, 59 F.3d at 1289.
On the other hand, some of the theoretical arguments invoked by judicial opponents of
Chevron Oil seem inapplicable to agency adjudications. In Beam, Justice Scalia contended that
prospective overruling is incompatible with the Marbury principle that federal judicial power is
“the power ‘to say what the law is.’” James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
Although he conceded that in a real sense judges do “make” law, he noted that “they make it as
judges make it, which is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is,
rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.” Id. This sort of
analysis has been searchingly criticized in its own context. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 297,
at 1758–63 (“[I]n the vast run of cases the Court . . . recognizes no sharp line between
lawmaking and law-applying.”); Fisch, supra note 246, at 1078–82 (calling Scalia’s analysis
circular and out of step with modern legal developments). That debate aside, however, Justice
Scalia’s position seems a misfit in the context of agency adjudication. Unlike an Article III
court, a typical administrative agency exercises quasi-legislative power and may overrule its past
precedents without even purporting to rest on the premise that it is “finding” the law that had
existed all along. See District Lodge 64, 949 F.2d at 447 (questioning the relevance of the
concurring Justices’ Article III argument to administrative adjudications); Laborers’ Int’l Union
v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 385–89 (3d Cir. 1994) (developing this distinction between
courts and agencies at voluminous length).
In any event, the Supreme Court has indicated that agencies have at least some discretion
to decide whether or not to apply their precedents retroactively. See NLRB v. Food Store
Employees Union, Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 10 n.10 (1974) (stating that courts should allow the
Board “to decide in the first instance whether giving the change retrospective effect will best
effectuate the policies underlying the agency’s governing act”). Indeed, it would be odd if
agencies were broadly prohibited from taking account of the reliance interests of citizens who
have reasonably relied on agency precedents that were later overruled. A well-developed body
of precedent establishes that agencies’ failure to accommodate such interests can be an abuse of
discretion. See supra note 268 (citing to case law).
LEVIN.DOC 06/21/04 4:01 PM
2003] JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 359
judicial decisions have not been very common in administrative
cases anyway.305
On a more abstract level, however, the Beam line of cases carries
cautionary implications that supporters of remand without vacation
should not overlook. Their significance for present purposes lies in
the willingness of so many Justices to jettison Chevron Oil and the
wide-open interest balancing it exemplifies. Abstractions and formal
reasoning won out over pragmatic problem solving.306 These Justices
would not permit a court to exercise discretion to soften the blow of a
new constitutional doctrine, at least in most circumstances, because
such discretion would impinge upon the asserted imperatives of an
orderly legal system, or the “integrity of judicial review.”
It is hardly difficult to imagine these same Justices repudiating
remand without vacation. They might argue that the practice of
vacating unlawful administrative actions is part of the traditional and
normal mode of judicial review and cannot be overcome by an appeal
to the practical benefits of a contrary course. To state the point
differently, they might well conclude that if a court is abdicating its
judicial function when it declines, on equitable grounds, to require
retroactive compliance with its view of the law, then a refusal on
equitable grounds to require any compliance with their view of the
law for some ill-defined period of time is an even graver abdication.
Perhaps the most striking line of reasoning contributing to the
attack on Chevron Oil was the argument of some Justices that the
flexibility afforded by that case is a dangerous temptation that should
be resisted. For example, Justice Blackmun wrote approvingly in
Beam that, “[b]ecause it forces us to consider the disruption that our
new decisional rules cause, retroactivity combines with stare decisis to
prevent us from altering the law each time the opportunity presents
305. But see Funk, supra note 46, at 15–16 (lamenting the ability of regulated entities to
escape sanctions for violating a rule that is later held to have been promulgated improperly:
under Harper the rule cannot be invalidated only for the future, at least if the first challenger
receives any relief, and under Georgetown the rule cannot later be reinstated retroactively).
306. One might at first suppose that Hyde, with its careful delineation of exceptions to the
basic rule of Beam and Harper, was a counter-current, a welcome breath of pragmatism into this
area of the law. That is by no means clear. Hyde took the earlier cases for granted and derived
its “exceptions” by simply probing the limits of the logic underlying those cases’ formal
reasoning. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752–55 (1995). Moreover, at its
core, Hyde relied squarely on the objective of not allowing Harper to become merely
“symbolic.” See id. at 754. To decide whether an emasculation of Harper would be good or bad,
however, one would need an account of what policies it serves, and the Hyde opinion did not
supply one.
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itself.”307 In a similar vein, Justice Scalia acknowledged that
retroactivity poses practical difficulties, but he called them “one of
the understood checks upon judicial lawmaking; to eliminate them is
to render courts substantially more free to ‘make new law,’ and thus
to alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility
and power among the three branches.”308 These passages may
represent the ultimate measure of the distance that some Justices
have traveled from the judicial self-confidence manifested in Chevron
Oil. In short, although the Court remains divided, the views of one
bloc are a clear illustration of how the Court will sometimes override
pragmatism in favor of a “principle” about the judicial system. The
attitude manifested in their opinions presents a challenge that
proponents of remand without vacation would have to overcome.
3. Implications for Remand Without Vacation. The retroactivity
decisions discussed in the two preceding Sections are noteworthy
because, in each instance, the Supreme Court eschewed unstructured
interest-balancing in favor of a simple, conventional principle of
adjudication. As such, the two lines of decisions appear to reflect a
mood of skepticism among at least some of the Justices about the
value of judicial discretion in general, and remedial discretion in
particular. That mood, in turn, suggests the possibility that the Court
would also look unfavorably on a highly discretionary device such as
remand without vacation.
One has to acknowledge that the skeptics have something of a
point. Ours is hardly an era of boundless confidence in the wisdom of
federal judges. Caution, if not outright mistrust, is more the order of
the day. Indeed, it may seem odd for this Article to put so much stock
in judicial discretion at a time when memories of Bush v. Gore309 are
still fresh in many minds. After all, more than a few observers have
argued that the Court’s choice as to the remedy in that case—
specifically, its unwillingness to allow remand proceedings in the
307. Beam, 501 U.S. at 548 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
308. Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Harper he elaborated on this theme at length,
tracing several decades’ worth of commentary in which “[p]rospective decisionmaking [has
been] known to foe and friend alike as a practical tool of judicial activism, born out of disregard
for stare decisis.” Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105–09 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
309. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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Florida courts—was among the most troubling aspects of that
supremely controversial decision.310
As I said at the beginning of this Part,311 I do not prefer
“standards” to “rules” in all contexts. The argument here is limited to
the field of judicial remedies in administrative law. It is primarily
inductive in nature. I have reviewed in Part III the substantial equity
tradition in administrative law, explaining how, in analogous
situations, the legal system has long accepted the risks of
discretionary standards as an acceptable price to pay for flexibility.
This track record, when combined with the practical advantages of
remand without vacation,312 suggests that this remedial option should
also be welcomed despite the somewhat open-ended decisionmaking
that it necessarily entails.313
In any event, revulsion against putatively excessive judicial
discretion stands on relatively weak ground when, as with remand
without vacation, the exercise of that discretion would, if anything,
serve to limit judicial relief. One would expect the stereotypical
“judicial activist” to be eager to set aside an administrative action that
he or she has just found to be unlawful. In contrast, remand without
vacation is at bottom a means of mitigating relief that, in the court’s
view, might otherwise be overbroad. In that sense, it is an expression
of judicial humility. Thus, rhetoric about judicial self-restraint, which
typically is deployed as a basis for resisting an expansion of the
arsenal of equitable devices,314 cuts the opposite way in this instance.
310. Particularly noteworthy in this regard are the views of Professor McConnell, whom
President Bush later appointed to be a judge on the Tenth Circuit. See Michael W. McConnell,
Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 674–77 (2001) (“[T]he Court’s
7-2 decision to reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was well founded. But the same
cannot be said of the decision not to allow the lower court to attempt a recount under
constitutionally appropriate standards.”); see also Ward Farnsworth, “To Do a Great Right, Do
a Little Wrong”: A User’s Guide to Judicial Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227 (2001)
(discussing the remedial issue); Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies
Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343 (2002) (same).
311. See supra notes 255–59 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Part I.
313. Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 297, at 1789–90 n.316 (noting the “well-known
hazards” of interest balancing in the context of constitutional remedies, including tendencies
toward indeterminacy and undervaluation of constitutional rights, but finding these risks
tolerable); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 589–609 (1983) (making a
qualified case for flexibility in constitutional remedies context). For elaboration, see infra notes
368–74 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas’s reactions
to institutional reform litigation under the Constitution).
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To be sure, proponents of remand without vacation must still
come to terms with the argument made by some of the Justices in
Beam and Harper—that the consequences of judicial intervention
should be painful, so that courts will do less intervening.315 I frankly
question whether many judges would find that argument persuasive,
even in the context in which it was rendered.316 Assuming that they
would, however, the argument also seems to draw heavily on the
premise that courts are too prone to rely on the Constitution in order
to interfere with the choices made by the political branches.317 I would
be surprised to see a corresponding argument travel very far in the
context of administrative law. Such an extension would presuppose a
greater degree of dissatisfaction with the current regime of “hard
look” judicial review than I believe can be found in the federal
judiciary at the present time.318 For example, Justice Scalia, the
Court’s most forceful proponent of adjudicative retroactivity as a
brake on constitutional adventurism, is certainly no foe of vigorous
judicial review of agency action.319 In short, the argument that remand
without vacation should be shunned in order to foster greater judicial
deference to agencies seems unlikely to command wide support—and
315. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
316. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 546 (1991) (White, J.,
concurring) (“JUSTICE SCALIA, fearful of our ability and that of other judges to resist the
temptation to overrule prior cases, would maximize the injury to the public interest when
overruling occurs . . . .”); cf. Rothfeld, supra note 282, at 18 (“[I]t may be the clearest testimony
to the peculiarity of Scalia’s views here that he welcomes this sort of disruption.”); see also
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 297, at 1802–04 (rebutting the claim that nonretroactivity of
constitutional decisions violates Article III by “mak[ing] it too easy to cut free from precedent
and change the law”).
317. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (calling prospective decisionmaking “the handmaid of judicial activism”).
318. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
319. For example, in a well-known lecture on the Chevron doctrine, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that he is more prone than other Justices to find that a statute has a “clear”
meaning, which an agency would be required to follow. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520–21. He also has authored much
of the Court’s recent case law overturning agency decisions. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 714–21 (2001) (rejecting the Board’s position that nurses who proposed
to form a bargaining unit were outside the exemption for “supervisors”); Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 481–86 (2001) (invalidating the EPA’s ozone
implementation strategy); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387–92 (1999)
(invalidating an FCC rule that gave telecommunications carriers “blanket access” to
incumbents’ facilities); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 372–80
(1998) (invalidating a bargaining order because the Board’s finding that employer lacked a good
faith reasonable doubt about union’s majority status did not rest on substantial evidence and
reasoned decisionmaking).
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especially not from the private bar, which has heretofore been the
source of much, or probably most, of the criticism of that remedial
device.320
It seems, then, that remand without vacation should survive the
charge that it entails broad judicial discretion. Other objections,
however, have more to do with the manner in which courts will be
able to use their discretion if the device remains available. Those
objections will be examined in the next Sections of this Part.
B. Avoidance of “Administrative” Judgments
Another potential objection to remand without vacation would
be that it arguably involves the courts in an exercise of administrative
judgment and thereby exceeds the institutional competence of the
judiciary. This possible objection, which could be loosely described as
a separation of powers argument, brings into view some important
principles that must be incorporated into this Article’s overall portrait
of judicial remedies in administrative law. In the end, however, those
principles do not undermine the case for remand without vacation.
One version of the institutional competence critique is the
argument of Judge Sentelle, dissenting in the recent D.C. Circuit case
of Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman.321 Congress had appropriated funds to
compensate dairy farmers “for economic losses incurred during
1999.”322 The Secretary’s explanation for her implementing
regulations suggested to the court that the agency had used some of
the money to compensate farmers for 1998 losses, a goal that the
statute did not permit. A divided court remanded the regulations but
did not vacate them. The panel majority discerned a serious
possibility that the Secretary could explain her use of the funds in a
valid manner, or could choose an allocation method that would
correct the problem. Moreover, as the majority noted, the money had
already been spent, and it would be difficult if not impossible for the
320. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. This is not to say that proponents of greater
deference will necessarily reach a different conclusion. For example, Professor Pierce, who finds
much to criticize in the aggressiveness of contemporary judicial review, see Pierce, Seven Ways,
supra note 13, at 68–69, is also an enthusiastic supporter of remand without vacation. Id. at 75–
79. Apparently assuming (I think correctly) that judicial decisions invalidating agency rules will
remain a frequent occurrence in any event, see id. at 94–95, Pierce urges courts to use remand
without vacation to limit the damage that would otherwise result from those decisions. Id. at 78,
95.
321. 310 F.3d 747, 756–58 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 749 (majority opinion).
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Secretary to “unscramble the egg” and restore the status quo ante.323
Judge Sentelle, however, argued in dissent that the court should have
vacated the rules.324 He relied in part on a literal reading of the words
“set aside” in section 706 of the APA—echoing Judge Randolph’s
Checkosky argument.325 He then added that, even if remand without
vacation is lawful, it is “often, if not ordinarily, unwise,” because it
displaces what should be an administrative judgment:
Any time that the agency has not adequately justified its decision,
we do not know what the agency’s decision would have been had it
subjected the questions before it to the lawful administrative
process. Therefore, when we hold that the conclusion heretofore
improperly reached should remain in effect, we are substituting our
decision of an appropriate resolution for that of the agency to whom
the proposition was legislatively entrusted.326
Judge Sentelle’s contention rested on a doctrinal foundation that,
at its core, is not particularly controversial. It is undoubtedly true that
some remedial options that might otherwise seem to fall within the
courts’ equitable discretion are off limits because they would usurp
the prerogatives of the executive branch.327 This proposition, and its
implications for the validity of remand without vacation, are the
subject of this Part.
1. The Case Law. I will begin with a description of some
representative cases. For want of a better name, the operative
principle might be called the Pottsville doctrine, after the leading case
of FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.328 There the court of appeals
held that the Commission had erroneously denied Pottsville’s
application to construct a radio station. On remand, the Commission
scheduled a hearing to compare the qualifications of Pottsville and
two other broadcasters that had recently filed competing applications.
The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus to require the
Commission to decide Pottsville’s rights on the basis of the original
323. Id. at 755–56.
324. Id. at 757–58 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
325. See supra Part II.A.
326. Milk Train, 310 F.3d at 758 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
327. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 373 (1939) (“[W]hile the [reviewing] court
must act within the bounds of the statute and without intruding upon the administrative province,
it may adjust its relief to the exigencies of the case in accordance with the equitable principles
governing judicial action.”) (emphasis added).
328. 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
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record. At this point, the Supreme Court intervened and reversed.
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter explained that the court of
appeals did have power to require the Commission to act upon a
correct view of the law, as determined on the initial appeal, but it
lacked power to give Pottsville priority in the licensing competition.
Congress had given licensing authority to the Commission alone, and
the initial judicial reversal did “not impliedly foreclose the
administrative agency, after its error ha[d] been corrected, from
enforcing the legislative policy committed to its charge.”329
Subsequent cases have extended Pottsville in a manner that
highlights its implications for the courts’ limited remedial role in
review of agency action. In Federal Power Commission v. Idaho
Power Co.,330 the court of appeals held that the Commission had
included an improper condition in a power company’s license. The
court directed the Commission to modify the license by striking out
the condition. The Supreme Court found that relief impermissible,
declaring that the court of appeals should instead have allowed the
Commission to decide on remand whether to drop the condition or to
issue no license at all.331 The Supreme Court explained that the court
of appeals’ statutory power “’to affirm, modify, or set aside’ the order
of the Commission ‘in whole or in part’. . . . is not power to exercise
an essentially administrative function.”332 Similarly, in NLRB v. Food
Store Employees Union, Local 347,333 the Court held that the court of
appeals could not modify the Board order under review by awarding
329. Id. at 145. But see JAFFE, supra note 3, at 714, 718–19 (suggesting that the Court should
have given reviewing courts greater leeway to protect private litigants by holding agencies to
traditional “law of the case” notions). As Professor Jaffe notes, id. at 714 n.30, Congress later
sought to counteract the narrow holding of Pottsville by directing the FCC to decide a remanded
case on the basis of the original record. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(h) (2000). Subsequent decisions
have not, however, applied § 402(h) very expansively. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 398–
99 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (following Pottsville and ignoring § 402(h)); E. Carolinas Broad. Co. v. FCC,
762 F.2d 95, 98–104 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (concluding that the FCC had discretion to reopen the
record despite § 402(h), although its failure to do so in the case at bar was not an abuse of
discretion). For comprehensive analysis of circumstances in which a court may recall its
mandate, so as to permit an agency to reopen its record after the court’s judgment has become
final, see Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
330. 344 U.S. 17 (1952).
331. Id. at 20.
332. Id. at 21 (quoting Federal Power Act § 313(b), as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b)
(2000)). See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (remarking that no court
can “stay” the Commission’s denial of a license and thereby authorize a broadcaster to go on
the air).
333. 417 U.S. 1 (1974).
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the union reimbursement of litigation expenses, as a recent Board
precedent arguably indicated would be appropriate. Instead, the court
had to give the Board an initial opportunity to decide whether to
apply or distinguish the precedent.334
The constraints exemplified by Pottsville and its progeny seem to
derive primarily from inferences that courts have drawn from the very
existence of delegated authority. When Congress empowers an
agency to implement a program, it presumably intends to reap the
benefits of some institutional advantage that it thinks the agency in
question possesses, such as administrators’ capacity to develop
specialized experience or expertise, or to stay in touch with the
political process. This premise leads easily to the general proposition
that courts should refrain from ordering “equitable relief” that would
amount to an exercise of authority that Congress entrusted to the
agency instead.335
The Pottsville opinion also hinted at a constitutional basis for its
division of responsibilities between the judicial and executive
branches.336 Perhaps, therefore, one should see the case as an offshoot
of the principle of separation of powers. That line of reasoning,
however, has not flourished. To be sure, the Constitution probably
does set outer limits on the kinds of “administrative” functions that
Article III courts can be authorized to perform.337 In the modern era,
however, those limits have never been very prominent or confining.338
334. Id. at 8–10.
335. One could also support this general proposition by citing cases in which the relief
ordered by the administrative agency is a critical issue in the judicial review proceeding. See,
e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898–906 (1984) (holding that the court of appeals
improperly modified a Board remedy by requiring a minimum amount of back pay for each
affected employee). I will not discuss cases of that kind here, because they would not normally
be regarded as turning primarily on the law of judicial remedies. Everyday principles of review
of administrative action for abuse of discretion—which of course mandate substantial deference
to the agency—would provide the more relevant frame of reference.
336. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 141 (noting without elaboration that the
issues in that case implicated “the extent to which Congressional power, exercised through a
delegated agency, can be controlled within the limited scope of ‘judicial power’ conferred by
Congress under the Constitution”).
337. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677–85 (1988) (narrowly construing provisions
that set forth supervisory functions to be exercised by a special judicial panel under the
independent counsel statute, but also holding that the provisions, as construed, did not violate
Article III); Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Discretion, Judicial Review, and the Gloomy
World of Judge Smith, 1986 DUKE L.J. 258, 274 n.81 (discussing the rise and decline of early
constitutional limits on supposedly excessive judicial review).
338. Cf. Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989). In Sullivan, the Court noted that the
judicial review provisions of the Social Security disability benefits program “suggest a degree of
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Thus, although constitutional considerations may well lurk in the
background of the Pottsville doctrine, the principle can be better
explained as a product of common law—or, if one prefers to trace it
to positive law, as an elaboration of the abuse-of-discretion standard
of the APA,339 or perhaps of the agencies’ respective enabling
statutes.
Another way to understand Pottsville is to analyze it as a close
relative of the well-known Chenery doctrine. According to the latter
principle, a court normally may not uphold a discretionary agency
action except on grounds that the agency itself has endorsed.340 As the
Court said in the Chenery case, “If an order is valid only as a
determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is
authorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial judgment
cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.”341
Chenery serves to ensure that statutory discretion will be exercised by
senior administrative officials, rather than by agency staff or by
courts; it also serves to prevent circumvention of process constraints
that promote responsible decisionmaking at the agency level—such as
requirements that policymaking be rigorous and open to public
participation.342 Although one usually thinks of the doctrine as a
limitation on the circumstances in which an agency action can be
upheld, one of its corollaries is that, as a general rule, a court also may
not reject an agency action by making its own determinations on an
direct interaction between a federal court and an administrative agency alien to traditional
review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. The courts’ remand
power in that context “‘places the courts . . . virtually as coparticipants in the process, exercising
ground-level discretion of the same order as that exercised by ALJs and the Appeals Council.’”
Id. (quoting JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 133
(1978)). Although the constitutionality of this statutory scheme was not at issue in Hudson, the
Court’s failure to evince any disapproval of the scheme seems significant.
339. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 92, at 108 (“Obviously, the clause
does not purport to empower a court to substitute its discretion for that of an administrative
agency and thus exercise administrative duties. In fact, with respect to constitutional courts, it
could not do so.”).
340. See Blackletter Statement, supra note 115, at 43 (“[Courts] normally will allow an agency
to defend its action only on the basis of reasons articulated prior to judicial review and will not
supply their own rationale for discretionary agency conduct . . . .”).
341. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
342. Harold J. Krent, Ancillary Issues Concerning Agency Explanations, in ABA SECT. OF
ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC., A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL
AGENCIES (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 2–3),
available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/judical.html (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
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issue that lies within the agency’s discretionary authority.343 Rather,
the court should remand the action to the agency, allow the agency to
address the disputed issue first, and then consider the rationality of
the agency’s view in the event of a subsequent appeal.344
Actually, one could probably use a Chenery analysis to explain
the results of any of the cases in the Pottsville line of authority. For
present purposes, however, I will treat the two doctrines as separate,
because in the Pottsville cases the Court has tended to focus on the
lower court’s actions, not its reasons. It has said that the court’s
actions, such as excluding an applicant from a licensing competition,
or modifying the terms of an existing license, were choices that the
judiciary was not qualified to make in the first place. The notion that
the court made those choices for reasons that it was also not qualified
to adopt did not enter into the discussion (although it could have). As
the reader will see momentarily, this distinction between prohibited
actions and prohibited reasons will prove helpful to my analysis.
Nevertheless, the logical relationship between the two doctrines is
apparent.345
I do not mean to give the impression that the case law permits no
flexibility in the principles represented by Pottsville and Chenery. For
example, some exceptions to the general rule of Pottsville were
explored in a useful article by Judge Merrick Garland346 (written prior
to his elevation to the D.C. Circuit). In his article, Judge Garland
compiled numerous examples of situations in which courts have
imposed affirmative remedies instead of adhering to their traditional
343. See Chenery, 318 U.S. at 88 (“For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders,
an appellate court cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to
an administrative agency.”) (emphasis added).
344. An agency has broad, though not unlimited, discretion to decide how to rehabilitate its
case during remand proceedings (for example, whether to reopen the record for additional
comments). Compare Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 332–
34 (1976) (articulating a general rule of deference), with Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 713 F.2d 793, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (requiring the agency to solicit new public
comments because of the staleness of the existing rulemaking record). Regarding the “stale
record” problem, see generally Freedman, supra note 4.
345. Illustrative of the overlap are cases in which a reviewing court, after rejecting an
agency’s position on the merits, rules against the government on an additional discretionary
issue that the agency had not reached. Compare S. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, Int’l
Union of Operating Eng’rs, 425 U.S. 800, 805–06 (1976) (relying on the Pottsville line of cases as
a basis for criticizing this sort of judicial overreaching), with INS v. Orlando Ventura, 523 U.S.
12, 16–17 (2002) (reaching essentially the same conclusion by invoking the Chenery doctrine).
346. Garland, supra note 4.
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practice of vacating and remanding.347 Those situations have typically
involved circumstances in which the judicially prescribed remedy was,
at least in the perception of the court in question, the only lawful and
reasonable action the agency could take.348 Similar exceptions have
evolved as qualifications on the Chenery doctrine. Courts typically
affirm an agency decision, instead of remanding pursuant to Chenery,
where there is no serious doubt about what the agency would do in
the event of a remand,349 or where the agency could rationally reach
only one conclusion under the law anyway.350 As Judge Friendly wrote
in a famous article on the limits of Chenery, “the purists and the
realists lock horns” in the debate over how far to extend exceptions
like these.351 Judge Friendly counted himself among the “realists,”
being inclined in a close case to avoid a remand that would probably
prove unnecessary.352
While these exceptions to Pottsville and Chenery are sensible, it
should be apparent that, by their nature, they can come into play only
in fairly narrow circumstances. This kind of strong medicine, as Judge
347. Id. at 562–75.
348. For example, he reports, lower court cases have ordered affirmative relief predicated
on a violation of “nondiscretionary duties,” id. at 566, 573, or on a “determination that the
agency had repeatedly rejected the only rational course available for protecting statutory
beneficiaries,” id. at 572. Similarly, if “there is only one reasonable modification or alternative
[to a regulation adopted by the agency], arguably the court should impose it.” Id. at 570. See
also id. at 565 (“Nor does a court violate the separation of powers when it directs an agency to
take a specific action that the agency has no discretion to refuse to take—either because it has a
statutory duty to take such action, or because refusal would exceed (or abuse) the discretion the
agency does possess.”) (footnote omitted). Perhaps distinguishable are cases in which a court
refrains from remanding because the agency is simply making no progress toward reaching an
acceptable solution to the problem at hand. See supra note 63 (discussing Checkosky II).
349. See, e.g., Blackletter Statement, supra note 115, at 43 (“A court may deem an error in
reasoning immaterial if the agency clearly would have reached the same result even if it had not
made the error.”); Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of
Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199, 211, 220.
350. Friendly, supra note 349, at 210, 224. Note that in Orlando Ventura the court of appeals
had resolved without a remand the issue of improved conditions in Guatemala (which was
critical to the applicant’s asylum claim) on the basis that “‘we would be compelled to reverse the
BIA’s [Board of Immigration Appeals] decision if the BIA decided the matter against the
applicant.’” 523 U.S. at 15 (quoting Orlando Ventura v. INS, 264 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir.
2001)). The Supreme Court’s subsequent reversal, id. at 18, stands as a cautionary lesson against
overly hasty judicial invocation of this rationale for failure to remand. Nevertheless, the Court
provided a careful analysis as to why the issue of improved conditions had been less clear-cut
than the Ninth Circuit assumed. See id. at 17–18. That treatment seems to acknowledge, if only
tacitly, that truly one-sided cases need not be remanded.
351. Friendly, supra note 349, at 223.
352. Id. at 223–24. More recently, Judge Wald has expressed a similar inclination. See Wald,
supra note 37, at 666 (proposing that courts “ease up” on ban on post hoc rationalizations).
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Garland noted, is best suited to situations in which the agency’s result
seems substantively unlawful or unreasonable.353 Where, on the other
hand, the court thinks that the agency’s error may at most consist of a
failure to consider or explain an action adequately, remand should be
expected as a matter of course.354 Thus, in the ordinary situation in
which the proper course of action for the agency is open to
reasonable disagreement, a court will decline to dictate specific
results. Judge Garland noted in this connection the institutional
competence considerations that help to account for this judicial self-
restraint: Courts are not in a good position to “take evidence, weigh
competing alternatives, and construct a satisfactory rule from whole
cloth.”355
2. Implications for Remand Without Vacation. The discussion to
this point has summarized a familiar body of doctrine that
circumscribes the kinds of relief that courts may prescribe in
administrative cases. More specifically, this case law demonstrates
that, in most circumstances, a court may not impose a remedy of its
own design instead of remanding a case for further consideration by
the agency. Against this background, I will now explore whether this
line of cases should also be understood to circumscribe the kinds of
relief that a court may prescribe to accompany a remand.
The Pottsville line of cases should pose no threat to the survival
of remand without vacation, for a straightforward reason: agencies do
not object to the use of that device. In fact, it is usually agencies
themselves that seek this type of relief, because it serves their
interests. The courts’ failure to vacate the challenged action might be
best viewed as allowing the agency to decide the best way to
accommodate competing regulatory interests during the transition
period that the remand will necessarily entail.356 The agency will
presumably have the option of suspending the rule on its own (in
353. Garland, supra note 4, at 570–71.
354. Id. at 570.
355. Id. at 565.
356. See City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1171–72 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(“[W]e leave to the Commission’s judgment in the first instance how best to accommodate these
various interests [in avoiding hardship to third parties and disruption of the settlement process]
in light of the proceedings on remand.”).
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effect, “vacating” it)357 and replacing it with an interim rule that will
apply until the agency has devised a long-term solution to the
problem that occasioned the judicial remand.358 The agency also will
have the option of leaving the remanded rule in place during the
transitional period. In either case, however, the device of remand
without vacation enables the government to avoid disruption, protect
reliance interests, and maintain stability in a regulatory regime while
the agency is working on its response to the court’s concerns. It is, in
short, an accommodation of the agency’s interests, not an invasion of
its turf. This is one context in which Justice Frankfurter’s
characterization of courts and agencies as “collaborative
instrumentalities of justice”359 seems to have particular force.
This reasoning does not entirely dispose of separation of powers
concerns about remand without vacation, however, because under
Chenery the agency’s support for the bottom-line result is not
necessarily enough. A court may not even uphold an agency’s action
if its decision rests on judicially supplied reasoning that the agency
alone has the authority to adopt.360 This seems to have been Judge
Sentelle’s point in Milk Train.361 To a small extent, remand without
vacation does entail a kind of managerial judgment that overlaps the
agency’s normal sphere of policy determination.
For two reasons, however, that minor overlap seems entirely
compatible with the legitimate remedial powers of the federal courts.
First, as a formal matter, a court’s preservation of the status quo,
through remand without vacation, is consistent with Chenery because
357. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 n.21
(1983) (“[T]he agency had sufficient justification to suspend . . . [its passive restraints rule]
pending the further consideration required by the Court of Appeals, and now, by us.”).
358. To be sure, the agency could likewise respond to the remand with an interim rule if the
court does vacate the original rule. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. That does not
mean, however, that the agency is likely to be indifferent as to whether the court vacates the
original rule or not. If the court vacates the rule, the agency may well have to put other pressing
business aside and scramble to issue the interim rule immediately if it wants to avoid disruption.
Moreover, an interim rule that replaces a vacated rule may be particularly vulnerable to court
challenges. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
359. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (Morgan IV); see Scripps-Howard
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 15 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.) (“Courts and administrative agencies
are not to be regarded as competitors in the task of safeguarding the public interest.”); cf.
Friedman, supra note 1, at 772 (suggesting that the interdependence of courts and the political
branches in controversies over remedies for constitutional violations calls for a “cooperation of
powers”).
360. See supra notes 340–41 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
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it does not require the court to make the same administrative
determinations that the agency would have to make in order to
rehabilitate or replace the challenged rule or order. Indeed, giving the
agency the opportunity to make such determinations is the very
purpose of the remand. When it performs that task, the agency is
obliged to act with full deliberation, public participation, and the
involvement of senior agency officials, as the orthodox Chenery
doctrine contemplates.362 The determination that underlies a court’s
use of remand without vacation is different. What the court decides,
in the exercise of its remedial authority, is that the agency action that
is currently in force should for equitable reasons remain in place in
the short run, even though the agency may not be able (or inclined) to
adhere to it on a permanent basis. In this respect, the court’s
judgment is comparable to the kind of judgment a court exercises in
granting a stay pending judicial review. One would not ordinarily
think of a stay as raising a Chenery problem, because the issues
before the court are qualitatively different from those the agency will
have to resolve pursuant to the remand.363
Second, on a more practical level, the decision for the court
about whether or not to vacate, in addition to a remand, should not
be particularly daunting. It is a relatively simple, bilateral choice that
scarcely implicates the multifarious challenges of administering a
regulatory program. Again, it is comparable in this regard to a judicial
stay, a type of relief that certainly does not exceed judicial
competence, as Scripps-Howard confirmed.364 This judicial function is
also somewhat like the role a court plays when it finds that an agency
has unlawfully rescinded a rule. In that situation, as Judge Garland
has written, the judicial task is relatively uncomplicated. The court
“need not order the agency to do anything because vacating the
rescission order alone returns the matter to the status quo ante: the
unrescinded rule remains in effect.”365 The court’s remedial role in this
situation poses no problem of institutional competence, he explains,
because the relief “does no more than reimpose a regulation
crafted—and previously approved—by the agency itself. No judicial
362. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
363. The court’s capacity to enter a stay order is well accepted even though the agency itself
could have made the same decision on its own. See 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2000) (empowering an
agency to stay the effective date of its own action where “justice so requires”); Levinson, supra
note 135, at 648–54 (discussing administrative stays).
364. See supra notes 135–44 and accompanying text.
365. Garland, supra note 4, at 574.
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invention is required.”366 Much the same can be said about a court’s
decision not to vacate a rule that it has found to be invalid: the court’s
remedial decision is essentially passive and does not involve the court
in writing a rule on its own. If anything, remand without vacation may
be even more readily manageable, because it would by definition
comport with the agency’s preferred policy (in contrast to revival of
an unlawfully rescinded rule, which would occur in the face of the
agency’s failed attempt to get rid of it). From a functional standpoint,
therefore, the arguably “administrative” aspect of remand without
vacation remains well within boundaries that our judicial system has
long accepted as legitimate.
In short, a reviewing court should always be prepared to temper
its relief to take account of its limited capacity to micromanage the
agency’s program. But remand without vacation, which at bottom is
an act of judicial restraint, does not appear to pose a significant
danger of embroiling the courts in such an offense.
C. Underenforcement of Administrative Law Values
A final objection to remand without vacation is that its use will,
or may, undermine effective enforcement of the APA and the
administrative law values that are embodied in that Act. I have heard
many lawyers in the private bar advance one or another version of
this theory. Surely, they argue, a finding that an agency’s behavior has
been unlawful should have serious consequences. There is something
dubious, they maintain, about a doctrine that allows an acknowledged
violation to remain in place, perhaps for months or years, after the
court has finished with the review proceeding.367 In my view, these
observers have a valid point, but the solution is for courts to limit
their resort to remand without vacation, rather than to ban it entirely.
In the kindred context of constitutional remedies, Professors
Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer have provided a helpful
theoretical analysis of what is at stake. They contend that a system of
remedies for constitutional violations must be sufficient to serve two
366. Id. at 573.
367. See, e.g., Zoll, supra note 14, at 5 (“[W]hy should the taxpayers pay more money so that
[so-called agency experts] can spend more time finally doing their job? Throw the rule out, and
the next time they will know they have to do it right the first time.”). Although these lines were
written for a caricatured character in a skit, they are not much of an exaggeration of the views of
many practitioners with whom I have spoken.
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functions.368 The first is the individual interest in redress for a
constitutional violation. “Few principles of the American
constitutional tradition resonate more strongly,” they write, “than
one stated in Marbury v. Madison: for every violation of a right, there
must be a remedy.”369 The second function is to maintain the rule of
law by furnishing a vigorous judicial check on arbitrariness by the
political branches.370
Fallon and Meltzer do not contend, however, that every judicial
failure to take tangible action in response to a constitutional violation
is, by definition, inadequate enforcement. On the contrary, they
demonstrate that, throughout our history, the Marbury ideal has been
qualified by doctrines such as common law privilege, sovereign
immunity, and official immunity.371 Thus, they say, “the existence of
constitutional rights without individually effective remedies is a fact
of our legal tradition, with which any theory having descriptive
pretensions must come to terms.”372 Echoing Professor Paul Gewirtz,
they acknowledge that, even in constitutional cases, “the law of
remedies is inherently a ‘jurisprudence of deficiency, of what is lost
between declaring a right and implementing a remedy.’”373
The solution that these constitutional scholars recommend is a
regime in which “the aspiration to effective individual remediation
for every constitutional violation represents an important remedial
principle, but not an unqualified command.”374 Some such principle
seems appropriate in the context of remand without vacation,
although the precise standard need not be the same in the
administrative sphere as in the constitutional one. However one
frames the relevant standard, it should at least be made clear that
vacation is the default principle. A court should need to justify each
368. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 297, at 1787–91.
369. Id. at 1778 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
370. Id. at 1787–88.
371. Id. at 1779–87.
372. Id. at 1786.
373. Id. at 1765 (quoting Gewirtz, supra note 313, at 587). Gewirtz distinguishes between
Rights Maximizers, who evaluate remedies from the standpoint of the victim alone, and Interest
Balancers, who take account of other social interests as well. Gewirtz, supra note 313, at 588–89,
591. Concluding that the Interest Balancers have the better of the debate, he catalogs some of
the circumstances in which constitutional rights may appropriately be trumped at the remedy
stage. Id. at 598–609.
374. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 297, at 1789; see Gewirtz, supra note 313, at 602 (“Interest
Balancing must be used with great caution to assure that the [constitutional] right receives
sufficient weight in the balance.”).
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departure from that norm. Remand without vacation should, in other
words, be deemed acceptable only on the basis of a careful weighing
of competing considerations, not allowed as a matter of course. Such
a requirement would harmonize with this Article’s reliance on
equitable discretion as the basis for the proposed limiting
construction of the language of the APA, because the exercise of
equitable discretion traditionally entails a considered balancing of
interests. Moreover, it would demonstrate society’s seriousness about
the aspirations of individual redress and the rule of law that underlie
the APA. The impulse favoring flexibility should not mean complete
abandonment of the traditions of judicial review.
One component of the underenforcement objection is a kind of
crude cost-benefit analysis. The claim is that, although remand
without vacation may have some benefits to society, as explained in
Part I, these benefits are outweighed by the risk that continued use of
remand without vacation will encourage lawlessness or sloppiness on
the part of agencies and discourage challenges by private parties.375
This line of reasoning, while not implausible, rests on debatable
assumptions. The critique seems attractive if one starts from the
premises that agencies are already too assertive, and that litigants
should be encouraged to file appeals that, if brought, would force
improvements in the quality of agencies’ work products.376 It is less
persuasive, however, if one thinks that under current conditions
agencies are already too hesitant to act,377 and that litigants already
have too many incentives to file appeals that may technically have
merit but that needlessly impede agencies from fulfilling their
substantive mandates from Congress.378
375. See, e.g., Prestes, supra note 13, at 124–25.
376. Consider, in this connection, the D.C. Circuit’s and Justice Scalia’s warning in
Georgetown that to sanction “curative rulemaking” would make a “mockery” of the APA by
allowing agencies to violate rulemaking procedures with impunity. See supra note 267 and
accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Pierce’s advocacy
of remand without vacation as a cure for rulemaking “ossification”); cf. Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 546–48 (1978) (adopting a broad
prohibition against judicially created rulemaking procedures, in part because the Court thought
that agencies would otherwise have no choice but to err on the side of caution by providing
elaborate procedures in every case).
378. Cf. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. 167, 175–77, 183 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (deploring the Court’s relaxation of ripeness barriers
to judicial review as “a license for mischief because it authorizes aggression which is richly
rewarded by delay in the subjection of private interests to programs which Congress believes to
be required in the public interest”).
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For the sake of argument, however, suppose that the former set
of premises provides the more appropriate frame of reference. Even
on that assumption, one can be skeptical about the extent to which
continued use of remand without vacation would, in fact, alter the
relevant incentives for the worse. One can reasonably assume that,
amid all the factors that agencies weigh in deciding whether and how
to regulate a given subject, the threat of judicial reversal is a
constraining factor. The risk of a loss in court exerts generalized
pressure to analyze issues rigorously, to respond to comments, and so
forth. In a given case, however, the probability of reversal for failure
to engage in reasoned decisionmaking,379 or failure to adhere to the
APA,380 can be notoriously unpredictable. It does not seem realistic to
expect an agency to make a further calibration of its efforts (or of its
sense of self-restraint) by taking into account not only the likelihood
of reversal, but also the kind of relief a court is likely to grant if it
does reverse.381 Similarly speculative is whether litigants have been
deterred from challenging agency actions because of the courts’ use of
remands without vacation (or would be deterred if such use were to
increase). With or without that device, after all, the hope of obtaining
from the agency a better rule after the completion of remand
proceedings provides something of an incentive to sue.382
Whatever the likelihood of these problems, they should be
ameliorated if, as I have just recommended, the courts’ use of remand
without vacation remains discretionary in a significant sense.
Automatic refusal to vacate upon a showing of a violation might be
379. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy
in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1064–68 (1995) (“[T]he
[courts’] definition of ‘arbitrary and capricious’ remains relatively indeterminate.”).
380. For example, a final rule must be a “logical outgrowth” of the tentative rule the agency
proposed as the basis for soliciting comments, but “[o]ur cases offer no precise definition of
what counts as a ‘logical outgrowth.’” Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 116
F.3d 520, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
381. According to the prevailing case law test, the availability of remand without vacation
depends heavily on the court’s perception of the likelihood that the agency can cure its
erroneous reasoning. See infra notes 389–90, 392–95 and accompanying text. An agency that
does not even know what error the court will find is unlikely to be in a good position to predict
the court’s perception of such an eventuality.
382. Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 297, at 1804 (maintaining that state taxpayers usually
have an incentive to challenge unconstitutional taxes, even where retroactive refunds are
unavailable, because they can thereby avoid or reduce future exactions).
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enough to affect agency behavior, but discretionary use of the device
would seem less likely to weigh heavily in the agency’s calculus.383
The ultimate question is whether the benefits of firm
enforcement of the APA outweigh the countervailing public interest
in avoiding disruption of an ongoing government program, or other
social costs, which remand without vacation is intended to address. So
far, the case for that proposition is wholly abstract. No one has yet
attempted to show that the manner in which courts have administered
remand without vacation in the generality of cases, or in particular
cases, has actually turned out badly. The subject seems ripe for
pragmatic experimentation and for learning from the lessons of
experience. I do think that courts should proceed cautiously in this
area, but a total ban on remand without vacation, on the basis of its
putative impact on agency or litigant behavior, seems premature at
best.
V.  IMPLEMENTING REMAND WITHOUT VACATION
In preceding Parts of this Article, I have argued that remand
without vacation may legitimately be applied, consistently with the
APA, in a broadly discretionary fashion. At the same time, my survey
of the case law pertaining to judicial remedies in administrative law
suggests some guideposts for the exercise of that discretion: Any set
of criteria for remand without vacation (a) should prevent it from
being used routinely or without careful consideration,384 (b) should
make clear that a court should vacate an agency action that infringes
substantive statutory rights,385 and (c) should not involve the courts in
an exercise of administrative judgment.386 These propositions,
however, provide only limited guidance for courts that may wish to
make use of the device.
I will use this Part to discuss in more specific terms the grounds
on which courts have implemented remand without vacation in
particular situations. So far, I will suggest, the case law is developing
383. Moreover, although the court’s failure to vacate a rule may reduce pressure on an
agency to pursue remand proceedings diligently, the court has available various means of
monitoring the agency’s progress and inducing compliance with the judicial mandate. See infra
notes 421–22 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Part IV.C.
385. See supra Part III.C.
386. See supra Part IV.B. In this paragraph, I have not relied on the retroactivity cases
discussed in Part IV.A., because an extension of those cases’ logic to the present context would
apparently lead to a total ban on remand without vacation.
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in a fairly satisfactory fashion. I also will make some
recommendations for possible new directions, drawing in part upon
guidelines that the American Bar Association adopted in a 1997
resolution on this topic.387 The guidelines are reprinted in an
Appendix to this Article.
Because the question for the court concerns the fate of a rule or
order during a transitional period (up until the date when the agency
will have responded to the deficiencies the court has found), the court
will need to address issues similar to those it faces when considering
whether to grant a preliminary injunction—probability of success on
the merits, a comparison of hardships among the parties, and the
overall public interest.388 In the specific context of remand without
vacation, the D.C. Circuit has said, in the leading case of Allied-
Signal, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,389 that its
decision about whether to vacate, in addition to remanding, will
depend on “’the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the
extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and the
disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be
changed.’”390 These criteria provide a good starting point for analysis.
The former of the two Allied-Signal factors is analogous to the
“probability of success” factor considered in the preliminary
injunction context, but not quite the same. By the time the court
reaches the issue of remand without vacation, it necessarily will
already have decided that the agency deserves to lose on the merits of
the appeal. Thus, one could not meaningfully speak in this context
about a “probability of success” in a litigation sense.391 Instead, the
proper focus is on the probability that the agency can rehabilitate its
387. See ABA Guidelines, infra Appendix. I participated in the formulation of these
guidelines. Like most ABA resolutions, however, they contain a synthesis of many individuals’
views.
388. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 920 F.2d
960, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that the preliminary injunction test is similar); see also supra
note 142 and accompanying text (explicating preliminary injunction test).
389. 988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
390. Id. at 150–51. Actually, the court in Allied-Signal borrowed this language from Int’l
Union, UMW v. FMSHA, 920 F.2d at 967, but most cases cite to Allied-Signal for the test, and
this Article will do the same.
391. Cf. Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083–84 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(explaining that nonstatutory review of agency action under the APA differs from a preliminary
injunction proceeding, because the district court, having the entire record in hand, can directly
address the merits of the dispute, not merely the “probability” of plaintiff’s success on
the merits).
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prior action. As the ABA guidelines put it, the question is whether
“the court finds a substantial likelihood that the agency, after further
consideration, will be able to remedy its error and reach a similar
overall result on a valid basis.”392
Thus, if the basis for remand is a gap in the agency’s reasoning
that the court finds troubling but thinks the agency may well be able
to cure, or to ameliorate with minor changes in the rule or order, that
perception tends to militate towards leaving the action in place while
the agency addresses the deficiency.393 If the remand rests on a more
fundamental defect in the agency’s reasoning, the case for vacation of
the action is much stronger394—at least unless the agency can
demonstrate a more severe risk of interim disruption than would
otherwise be required. This reasoning applies even more compellingly
if the court were to find an error that the agency could not possibly
cure, such as a violation of a flat statutory ban on regulation of a
particular subject area. As I discussed earlier, cases such as TVA v.
392. ABA Guidelines, infra Appendix, ¶ 2(b). Note that the court should not be expected to
be able to predict what the agency will do after it reconsiders its earlier action. The agency
might or might not decide on a new course of action in response to the court’s critique or further
public comments (or, for that matter, changing circumstances or a revised political agenda). At
the time when the court announces its decision, even the agency itself may not be able to assess
the likelihood of such a development. The court should, accordingly, focus on a more
manageable question: the extent to which the action seems potentially salvageable. The central
point is that if the court were to deem the action so inherently flawed that the agency would
ultimately have to abandon it in any event, the equitable argument for maintaining short-run
continuity in the regulatory regime would necessarily lose much or all of its force.
393. See La. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 1085 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (finding rehabilitation to be “not unlikely . . . inasmuch as [the agency’s] only error was its
failure to explain what seems to be a policy difference with the plaintiffs”); Milk Train, Inc. v.
Veneman, 310 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (anticipating a “serious possibility” of valid justification
for the rule); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 20 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (expressing a
“willing[ness] to assume for now that the [agency] . . . will be able to provide the information
necessary to explain its . . . decisions”).
394. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 171–72 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle,
J., dissenting) (arguing, on an issue not directly addressed by the majority, that an FCC rule
should have been vacated, because the Commission had apparently made its best case for the
rationality of the rule but was unconvincing); American Bioscience, 269 F.3d at 1086 (vacating a
rule because the FDA, having had two chances to justify it, now seemed unlikely to succeed); Ill.
Pub. Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 123 F.3d 693, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (vacating a rule because
there was “little or no prospect of the rule’s being readopted upon the basis of a more adequate
explanation”); Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(declining to remand without vacation because “the Secretary’s omissions are quite serious and
raise considerable doubt about which of the proposed alternatives would best serve the
[statutory] objectives”).
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Hill militate strongly against remand without vacation under
those circumstances.395
In Part I of this Article, I discussed some of the factors on the
other side of the Allied-Signal equation, such as avoidance of
disruption and protection of reliance interests, that may militate in
favor of remand without vacation.396 I will not repeat that discussion
here. I will add, however, that the case law does not disclose a
consistent pattern regarding the way in which the two prongs of the
Allied-Signal formula fit together. Sometimes the court allows
remand without vacation where it perceives a strong likelihood that
the agency can cure its previous error, even if the court thinks that
vacating would cause little disruption.397 Conversely, the court
sometimes uses the device to head off the disruptive impact of
vacation, even if it discerns no particular indication that the rule can
probably be cured.398 As yet, however, there is no indication that this
ad hoc balancing process has led the court seriously astray.
The ABA resolution adds some additional, generally sound
perspectives.399 I will mention only some highlights here. First, at the
395. See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text. In such a case, the court may not even
need to remand. See supra note 350 and accompanying text; see also Mead Corp. v. Browner,
100 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (vacating the listing of petitioner’s former property as hazardous
waste site, because the EPA had no statutory authority to list it).
396. See supra notes 22–31 and accompanying text.
397. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1047–49 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
398. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 152
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (concluding that, although the agency’s chances of rehabilitating its fee
schedule were poor, vacation of rates would unnecessarily give licensees a windfall).
399. One problematic statement in the guidelines is the claim that remand without vacation
is more likely to be warranted where “the agency’s error did not preclude fair public
consideration of a central issue in a rulemaking or a fair hearing on the necessary findings in an
adjudication or other agency proceeding.” See ABA Guidelines, infra Appendix, ¶ 2(a). This
criterion seems more relevant to the question of whether the agency’s procedures rendered its
action invalid in the first place (more specifically, whether any procedural deficiency was
harmless). If the court has decided to remand because of a procedural error, it will by
hypothesis have concluded that the agency did not provide the requisite public consideration or
fair hearing. One setting in which this guideline would appear particularly misleading is a
situation in which an agency has erred in invoking the “good cause” exemption to avoid
rulemaking obligations. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2000) (allowing exemption where agency for
good cause finds that notice and comment would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest”). In such a case, the agency will usually have allowed no public proceedings
before adopting the rule, yet it may well be able to show that vacation of the rule would be
unduly disruptive. See Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act’s “Good Cause”
Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 166–68 (1984) (discussing sympathetically cases in which
courts have declined to vacate rules that were mistakenly issued under the good cause
exemption).
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most general level, it offers a cautionary note: “a reviewing court
should normally strike the balance in favor of vacating the agency’s
action, unless special circumstances exist.”400 This sentiment is
consistent with this Article’s suggestion that the courts should not
treat remand without vacation as a routine remedy; they should
prescribe it only after a conscious weighing of competing
considerations.401 Indeed, the ABA criterion seems to call on the
courts to display a greater degree of restraint than the language of the
prevailing Allied-Signal formula would lead one to expect. The extent
of actual divergence is debatable, however. As the discussion here
indicates, the D.C. Circuit and other courts have in fact been selective
about the occasions on which they resort to remand without
vacation—at least since questions about its propriety began to emerge
almost a decade ago.402
Second, the ABA resolution draws attention to a variable that is
not explicitly an element of the Allied-Signal test, but surely ought to
be taken into account: the interests of the petitioner or other persons
who would benefit from vacation of the contested action.403
Consideration of such interests falls squarely within the generally
understood meaning of “balancing the equities” (as reflected in, for
example, the standard preliminary injunction formula). Applying this
factor, a court should be readiest to vacate an agency action that turns
out to be unlawful if leaving it in place would inflict a particularly
severe or irreparable injury on the party who challenged it.404 For
example, the facts of Checkosky v. SEC,405 the case I discussed at
length in Part II.A, would seem to have presented a rather weak case
for remand without vacation. Recall that the court remanded, without
400. See ABA Guidelines, infra Appendix, ¶ 2.
401. See supra notes 374–75 and accompanying text.
402. The selectivity is most easily demonstrated by opinions in which the court remands
multiple rules (or sections of a rule), vacating in one or more instances and not in one or more
others. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1047–49, 1052–53 (remanding a rule on
ownership of television stations, but vacating a rule on ownership of cable stations, because
defects in the latter rule appeared less curable); United States Telecomm. Ass’n v. FBI, 276 F.3d
620, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (invalidating several rules under which the FBI would notify telephone
carriers about its needs for assistance with wiretaps, but vacating only one rule that looked
especially indefensible).
403. See ABA Guidelines, infra Appendix, ¶ 2(c).
404. Cf. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180–88 (1995) (declining to use the equitable
“de facto officer” doctrine to validate a court-martial sentence, including three years’
imprisonment, imposed by military judges who had been appointed unconstitutionally).
405. 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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vacating, an SEC order suspending two accountants from practicing
before the Commission. In Judge Randolph’s words, the court’s
remedy “force[d] petitioners to serve out their suspensions while the
Commission ponder[ed] its unlawful order.”406 In most situations, one
would think that a punitive sanction in an adjudicative case should be
vacated if a court finds that it was not validly imposed.407 On the other
hand, where the benefit of vacation to the challenging party is less
evident, a court should feel freer to allow the action to stand during
remand proceedings.408 A particularly strong case for remand without
vacation will normally be presented where the challenger favors the
steps the agency has already taken, but obtained the remand in order
to force the agency to consider going even further.409
Third, the ABA resolution seeks to refine the element of
disruption (which remand without vacation is intended to ameliorate)
by focusing on the interests of “persons other than the
Government.”410 At first blush, the resolution’s implication that
government interests should not be considered seems sensible,
because the “government is not a rights-bearer in the same sense as
an individual.”411 Ultimately, however, the limitation may not prove to
be very meaningful, because a judicial order that impairs the interests
of an agency in the short run can impair its ability to fulfill its
406. Id. at 467 (Randolph, J., separate opinion).
407. The disposition in Checkosky may be explainable on narrow grounds, however. As
Judge Silberman noted, the petitioners did not ask either the SEC or the court for a stay of their
suspensions when they had the chance. Id. at 465 (Silberman, J., separate opinion). Indeed, by
the time the court issued its opinion, they had served all but three months of their two-year
suspensions. In re Checkosky, 52 S.E.C. 1177, 1178 (1997), rev’d, 139 F.3d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
The accountants may have felt that their interest lay in getting the suspensions out of the way as
quickly as possible.
408. See A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[N]othing in the
record suggests that significant harm would result from allowing the approval to remain in effect
pending the agency’s further explanation.”); cf. Md. People’s Counsel v. FERC, 768 F.2d 450,
455 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (declining to vacate marketing orders that were due to expire within three
months, because short-term invalidation of program might “do more harm than good”).
409. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (remanding a rule without
vacation, as expressly requested by petitioners); Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1312
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (leaving exemptions in place, where successful petitioners’ “only complaint
about the exemptions is that they are not broad enough”); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d
177, 236 (5th Cir. 1989) (remanding water pollution rules, as requested by environmentalists,
but not vacating the rules, “which, if anything, may be too lenient”). But see Cement Kiln
Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussed supra note 70).
410. See ABA Guidelines, infra Appendix, ¶ 2(c).
411. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 297, at 1792 (noting that the government has less room to
plead reliance or moral blamelessness than private citizens have, and that it can spread losses
broadly among taxpayers).
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legislative mandate, so that the public interest suffers in the longer
run. Consider, for example, a line of cases in which the D.C. Circuit
has remanded fee schedules that agencies use to finance their
operations.412 In this situation, the court has noted that if it were to
vacate the rule, Georgetown would prevent the government from
recovering the sums later.413 On one level, the disruption that these
cases seek to prevent may seem unworthy of protection. Yet
Congress had determined that the agencies should use fees to finance
their operations, and a court could not very well be expected to
dismiss as unimportant the shortfalls—and thus the impairment of
services—that vacation of the fee schedules would have brought
about.414 The loss of revenues to the government might well be
outweighed by the challenger’s interest in being freed from exactions
under an illegally adopted fee schedule,415 but the government’s
interest should at least be a factor that the court does weigh.
The reference in the ABA resolution to “persons other than the
Government” is salutary, however, insofar as it brings to mind the
“public interest” factor in the traditional preliminary injunction test.
That factor requires the court to take account of the interests of
members of the public who may not be represented in the judicial
review proceeding itself.416 For example, the beneficiaries of a
412. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding that the
agency violated the APA by failing to allow notice and comment in promulgating a fee schedule
for a program that Congress intended to be self-financing, but not vacating because of “obvious
hardship” to agency); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 20 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(remanding to the agency for a clear explanation of the cost basis for the fee schedule it
adopted); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 152–
53 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that a fee schedule devised pursuant to congressional mandate was
inadequately explained, but declining to vacate it, because the commission would then have had
to refund fees and probably would not have been able to recoup later).
413. Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 152.
414. Here the court would have to be mindful of the cases emphasizing that equitable
balancing must be consistent with legislatively determined values. See supra Part III.C.
415. The court noted in some of these cases that the agency could, and should, make refunds
later to fee payers if it were to fail in subsequent proceedings to identify a sufficient justification
for the rates in question. See Am. Med. Ass’n, 57 F.3d at 1135 (noting the agency’s “ability to
make up through future adjustment any improper overcollection” of user fees during the
interim period); Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 153 (directing that “firms whose burden is lower
under a new, non-arbitrary, rule should be entitled to refunds” of excessive fees collected during
interim period); cf. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 143 F.3d 606, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying
similar reasoning to an FCC rule setting charges that long-distance telephone companies would
pay to payphone providers). Such a directive to make refunds, as needed, can be an effective
means of ameliorating the detriment that remand without vacation can impose on challengers.
416. In the words of the foundational case expounding that test, “[t]he interests of private
litigants must give way to the realization of public purposes,” especially in “litigation involving
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regulation might have a strong stake in the continued effectiveness of
the regulation during remand proceedings. The court would have
particularly strong reasons to give controlling weight to their interests
if it felt that the agency’s error was merely technical and the
challenger’s interest in securing redress for it was, accordingly,
relatively weak.417 In this situation, the court might use remand
without vacation to avoid giving private actors an incentive to resort
to judicial review to derail basically valid regulatory measures on
minor grounds.
Fourth, the ABA resolution is particularly instructive in drawing
attention to procedural issues that a court should consider in
administering the technique of remand without vacation. It indicates
that, before resorting to this technique, a court should attempt to
ensure that it is adequately informed about the implications of
various remedial options and that potentially affected persons have
had an adequate opportunity to address the merits of those options.418
Petitions for rehearing submitted by the parties,419 petitions to
intervene submitted by nonparties, and supplemental briefs solicited
by the court420 are among the devices that may assist the court in this
regard.
Fifth, the ABA resolution recognizes that the remedy of remand
without vacation reduces an agency’s incentive to cure its error
expeditiously during the ensuing proceedings. Accordingly, it
provides that the court may wish to specify a time frame within which
it expects the agency to comply with the terms of the remand order.421
the administration of regulatory statutes designed to promote the public interest.” Va.
Petroleum Jobbers’ Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
417. See supra text following note 39 (suggesting that the growth of remand without
vacation may derive in part from judges’ feeling that vacation is sometimes out of proportion to
the magnitude of the errors that have triggered a remand).
418. See ABA Guidelines, infra Appendix, ¶ 5.
419. See Air Transp. Ass’n v. FAA, 276 F.3d 599, 599 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(amending a prior opinion to provide that a fee schedule would be remanded but no longer
vacated); Endangered Species Comm. v. Babbitt, 852 F. Supp. 32, 43 (D.D.C. 1994) (amending
the judgment to allow a previously vacated listing of an endangered species to remain in effect).
420. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (requesting
supplemental briefing in order to decide whether the rule should be vacated), rev’d on other
grounds, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); UAW v. Dole, 938 F.2d 1310,
1325 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same); United Mine Workers of Am., Int’l Union v. Dole, 870 F.2d 662,
674 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same).
421. ABA Guidelines, infra Appendix, ¶ 3. Courts, in fact, have imposed such deadlines.
See, e.g., Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365,
1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (directing the agency to complete an expedited rulemaking within 120
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That safeguard is not appropriate for every case, however. In some
cases, the error found by the court may have been too minimal to
warrant tight judicial control; or the complexity of the agency’s task
on remand may militate against a time limit. The courts have other
techniques available with which they can protect the parties from
unduly dilatory bureaucratic behavior in such cases.422
CONCLUSION
This Article has proceeded on two planes at once. On the more
general level, it has provided an extensive, though largely descriptive,
survey of judicial remedies in administrative law. The pervasive role
of judicial discretion has been a prominent theme. At the same time,
the retroactivity cases hint at the Supreme Court’s developing
disquiet about unfettered interest balancing.423 Moreover, several
well-developed doctrines remind us that judicial remedial discretion
must yield to categorical statutory obligations,424 as well as to an
agency’s prerogative under a given statutory delegation to exercise its
own discretion in a reasonable fashion.425 It is curious that
administrative law scholarship has so little learning, let alone
ambitious theory, in this area. This Article’s exposition may provide a
starting point for future explorations.
The Article’s second level of analysis has treated remand without
vacation as a case study. The practical advantages of the device have
won it broad approval. It has enabled courts to temper their relief in
administrative cases so as to avoid disruptions, effect smooth
transitions, and maintain the continuity of regulatory measures that
days, unless extended by the court, and to stay all adjudications under the rule until its validity
was established); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 143 F.3d 606, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (warning the
agency to act within six months or face further judicial action); A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62
F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (directing the agency to provide an adequate explanation
within ninety days); Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 817–18 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (directing the
agency to complete rulemaking proceedings within 120 days).
422. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1136 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (exhorting
agency to act with due haste); United Mine Workers, Int’l Union v. Mine and Safety Health
Admin., 928 F.2d 1200, 1203–04 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (warning that the court would reconsider its
refusal to vacate upon a showing that the agency was not proceeding with dispatch); cf. Ford
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 372 (1939) (stating that if the Board were to fail to hold a
new hearing within a reasonable time, pursuant to the remand the agency itself had requested,
the reviewing court could vacate its own remand order and proceed to the merits).
423. See supra Part IV.A.
424. See supra Part III.C.
425. See supra Part IV.B.
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protect the public. Yet discretion has its hazards as well. Its exercise
calls for coherent standards, not just the unguided conscience of the
particular reviewing court.
At present, remand without vacation appears to stand at the
threshold of respectability. Its virtues are certainly not evident to
everyone. If reviewing courts choose to resort to it too casually,
Supreme Court intervention that would purge it from the scene seems
a real possibility. If, however, courts use it with restraint and carefully
explained reasoning, the chances for its survival should improve. That
is the challenge that now faces the lower courts. This Article
hopefully will facilitate that delicate task.
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APPENDIX
Recommendation No. 107B
Adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, August 1997
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association
recommends that:
1. When a reviewing court holds that a rule or order issued by a
federal administrative agency must be remanded to the agency for
further consideration, the court may exercise discretion in
determining whether or not to refrain from vacating the agency’s
action pending the remand proceedings. The Administrative
Procedure Act should be construed, or if necessary amended, to
permit the exercise of such discretion.
2. In exercising this discretion, a reviewing court should normally
strike the balance in favor of vacating the agency’s action, unless
special circumstances exist. Such special circumstances may be most
often found to exist where, in the context of the proceeding as a
whole:
(a) the agency’s error did not preclude fair public consideration
of a central issue in a rulemaking or a fair hearing on the necessary
findings in an adjudication or other agency proceeding;
(b) the court finds a substantial likelihood that the agency, after
further consideration, will be able to remedy its error and reach a
similar overall result on a valid basis; and
(c) the challenging party’s interest in obtaining relief from the
agency’s decision is clearly outweighed by the substantial and adverse
impact that vacation of the agency’s action would have on
(i) persons other than the Government who over time
have reasonably relied on the agency action being
remanded, or
(ii) persons other than the Government, during the interim
period before agency action on remand to cure the
error has become final,
and such impact cannot be remedied after such interim period.
3. Where the court orders the remedy of remand without
vacation, it should give serious consideration to specifying a time
frame within which the agency is to comply with the terms of the
remand order. The importance of setting a time frame is heightened if
the burden of a remand on the challenging party noticeably increases
with its duration.
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4. Where the court orders the remedy of remand without
vacation, it should also consider directing that, until agency action to
cure the previous error has become final,
(a) any statutory or administrative deadline for compliance with
the remanded action should be extended; and
(b) any proceedings brought to enforce compliance with the
remanded action should be stayed, or pursued only with permission
of the court.
5. In order to promote informed application of the above
standards, courts should encourage parties to address remedial issues,
such as the possibility of remand without vacation, in their briefs and
at oral argument. In a given case, if further explanation is needed and
undue delay will not result, the court should also consider inviting
supplemental briefs directed to this issue.
